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Abstract
My thesis comprises three papers on individuals’ preferences over family com­
position and the degree to which these are culturally determined, or learnt.
Prices, Norms and Preferences: 
The Influence of Cultural Values on Fertility
This paper investigates the influence of cultural values on fertility. High country 
of origin fertility is associated with high fertility in the UK, in line with pre­
vious results. This is consistent with fertility preferences being a transmissible 
(learnable) cultural value. However, I find that high fertility in the country of 
origin is also associated with earlier childbearing. If timing is not accounted for, 
this phenomenon could lead to an upward bias when estimating the importance 
of cultural values.
Son Preference and Culture
I measure the sex preferences of immigrant women in the United Kingdom by 
estimating the effect of family composition on birth hazard rates. International 
comparisons of son preference are constructed, the first known to the author. A 
theoretical model suggests that costs (eg, dowries) are unlikely to explain the 
variation in outcomes between groups. Finally, women arriving in the UK at a 
young age appear to have less distinct tastes, also consistent with a primarily 
cultural, rather than economic, explanation for parental sex preferences.
Son Preference and Sex Ratios: 
How many ‘Missing W omen’ are Missing?
When parents prefer sons, heterogeneity in the probability of having sons can 
lead to excess girls. I argue that this may lead to under-counting the number of 
‘missing women’. Parents show significant differences in son preference between 
countries. I exploit these differences to simulate sex ratios in the presence of 
measured heterogeneity. Parents’ son preferences account for 1.5% of differences 
between sex ratios worldwide (significant at 10%). The presence of this effect 
may imply that sex ratios are more biased than previously estimated, since pre­
vious comparisons use benchmarks that already contain too few girls. Therefore 
there may be more women missing due to discrimination than we thought.
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Executive Summary
My thesis comprises three papers on individuals’ preferences over family com­
position and the degree to which these are culturally determined, or learnt 
(Chapters 2-4). The latter two papers form the major contributions: I find 
strong evidence that preference for sons is culturally driven, and show that son 
preference can affect the sex ratio at birth. My first chapter sets out definitions 
for the terms culture, values, and norms.
Prices, Norms and Preferences: 
The Influence of Cultural Values on Fertility
Cultural values appear to influence the fertility of immigrants in the UK, but 
birth timing effects may bias this result upward. I use the total fertility rate in 
a woman’s country of origin as a proxy for her values. These rates significantly 
predict immigrants’ fertility, supporting the findings of Fernandez and Fogli 
[2006]. Without accounting for timing effects, I estimate that an extra child per 
woman in the country of origin is associated with 0.116 extra children for an 
immigrant in the UK.
This result would indicate that cultural values play a role in forming indi­
viduals’ preferences over family size. However, immigrants from high-fertility 
countries start families younger, so at the time of measurement they have more 
children relative to their expected total. This leads to an upward bias on the 
coefficient on originating country fertility. Since a variety of other factors are 
also expected to contribute an upward bias, the absolute effect of cultural val­
ues would appear to be small. Such a conclusion would imply that the costs 
of childrearing are of primary importance in determining family size, according 
with Becker et al. [1990] and Galor and Weil [2000].
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Son Preference and Culture
I present theoretical and empirical results that support a cultural, rather than 
economic, explanation for parents’ sex preferences. This contribution inno­
vates in the growing literature on cultural values since few authors have studied 
culturally-driven behaviour in environments where prices matter. To the extent 
that son preferences reflect discrimination more generally, my findings suggest 
that cultural barriers are an important factor in retarding development out­
comes for girls.
This paper measures the sex preferences of immigrant women in the United 
Kingdom by estimating the effect of family composition on birth hazard rates. I 
know of no previous attempts to measure parents’ preferences so that they can 
be compared between countries. I use hazard rate estimation to measure the 
difference in fecundity between women already having sons and those already 
having daughters; there are strong differences in behaviour between country 
groups, with some displaying strong preferences for sons (eg, India, Pakistan, 
Somalia), and others preferences for daughters (Germany).
My theoretical model [after Leung, 1991] suggests that costs (dowries or 
expected support in old age) are unlikely to explain the variation in behaviour 
between groups. A common explanation for son-preferring behaviour is that 
daughters are more expensive or can provide less support [Das Gupta et al., 
2002]. If this were true, then women who already have daughters are poorer 
than those with sons. Since children are a normal good, those having daughters 
will have fewer children in the future. However, this contradicts the empirical 
findings, so I conclude that costs do not drive the observed behaviour. Moreover, 
women arriving in the UK at a young age appear to have less distinct tastes, 
which is consistent with parents’ sex preferences being a cultural value that is 
acquired over time.
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Son Preference and Sex Ratios: 
How many ‘Missing W omen’ are Missing?
When parents prefer sons, heterogeneity in the probability of having sons can 
lead to excess girls. Son preference implies that parents will reduce childbearing 
after having boys, the extreme case being a ‘stopping rule’ whereby a woman has 
children until a son is born. If all women have the same probability of having 
a son, the sex ratio (number of boys per girl) is not affected by this behaviour. 
However, if son-probabilities are heterogeneous, women who have boys with 
low probabilities will have larger families on average. Therefore the proportion 
of girls in a son-preferring population will be higher than the ‘biological’ level 
resulting with no son preference. Heterogeneity is necessary and sufficient for 
parental decisions to affect the aggregate sex ratio; homogeneous models cannot 
display this effect in large populations [Leung, 1988].
The key contribution is my estimation of the real-world implications of this 
finding. First, I derive a new econometric estimator to measure the underlying 
probabilities of women having boys, under the assumption that individuals have 
fixed probabilities of bearing sons. I measure significant heterogeneity: ten 
percent of women have probabilities of having boys that are less than 42% or 
more than 61%. Homogeneity is strongly rejected.
Finally, I simulate the effect of son preferences — as measured for immigrant 
women in the UK — on sex ratios worldwide. Under the heterogeneity I esti­
mate, preferences account for 1.5% of differences in population sex ratios. The 
presence of this effect may imply that sex ratios are more biased than previously 
estimated, since previous comparisons [eg, Oster, 2005] use benchmarks that al­
ready contain too few girls. Therefore there may be more women missing due 
to discrimination and mortality than we thought. To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first quantitative demonstration of the influence of cultural values on 
an important demographic outcome.
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Preface
[N]o significant behaviour has been illuminated by assumptions of 
differences in tastes. [Stigler and Becker, 1977]
Since the inception of economics as a discipline, authors have regarded both 
differences in people’s preferences and social interactions between individuals 
as crucial to their understanding of human behaviour. However, while other 
social scientists, notably sociologists, are well aware of the role tastes play and 
the importance of informal sanctions and rewards in people’s lives, modern 
economists have largely neglected these topics. Broadly speaking, these are the 
values, or individual preferences, and norms, social equilibria, with which this 
thesis is concerned.
In general, economists have taken a ‘beneath the lamp-post’ approach, con­
fining models to situations where values and norms can be easily ignored. Re­
strictions include representative agent assumptions and that people do not care 
about the actions of their peers. We have been massively successful in under­
standing the world with such models, and this success has fed the view that 
we need not expand our horizons. As a result, any economic investigation into 
tastes promises to be received with some scepticism, and combined with the 
inherent difficulty of such research, the rejection from Stigler and Becker is a 
handy justification to bypass the topic altogether.
Unfortunately, we have ignored many interesting cases. The fear is that, in 
dealing with more ‘social’ topics, economics will struggle to maintain its rigour. 
That concern is fair. However, I do not believe the correct approach is to let
15
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restrictions confine our research or prohibit us from investigating more complex 
sociological topics. Instead, as a discipline, we should be more open to applying 
the rigorous methods we have developed to culturally driven phenomena.
Fortunately, the discipline is now making progress on several fronts. Theo­
rists are developing our ideas of socialisation, and there is a growing empirical 
literature trying to establish the impact of culture on outcomes, particularly 
in areas such as parental preferences. However, I believe there are three large 
holes in our current knowledge. I will describe each separately, though they are 
tightly interconnected issues.
Social Interactions
Thanks to work such as Bisin and Verdier [2000], economists are becoming more 
comfortable with the idea that parents may decide to socialise their children, 
and the decision optimises parents’ utility. Such models have fruitful applica­
tions, such as describing the evolution of unemployment claimants in European 
countries since the second world war [Michau, 2008]. But this work still depends 
on a ‘single meme’ idea of culture: people are type-A by default, and one may 
choose to socialise one’s child to type-B. Researchers have not cracked open 
the mechanism of the socialisation process, or how values are transmitted and 
assimilated. Our best guess is ‘habit formation’. But, as an example, this ex­
planation cannot inform us about how a young girl decides to wear a headscarf. 
Though we can model this choice as a taste (she receives utility from wearing 
it), a strategic decision (her family will punish her otherwise), or a combina­
tion of both, we do not yet have a conception of how these interact. Such a 
theory might explain how she disliked wearing it when young, but over time it 
became part of her identity. Understanding the mechanism may help explain 
the decisions she takes in bringing up her own daughter.
Macroeconomists understand the need for such explanations: witness the 
wealth of literature on ‘social capital’. I propose this theory should have a 
coherent microfoundation based on interpersonal interactions.
16
C u l t u r e , F e r t il it y , a n d  S o n  P r e f e r e n c e
Building that foundation will be a difficult task; Chapter 1 represents my 
attempt — not to take — but merely to pave the first step of the journey. The 
aim is to break apart the concept of a norm is and explore what it entails for its
f
subjects. More than being a ‘convention’ or ‘rule’, I maintain that the actions 
of a follower of a norm must be utility-maximising. The outcome of the norm 
must then constitute an equilibrium in which both subjects and non-subjects 
optimise with respect to the sanctions and rewards imposed by each other.
The empirical components of this thesis unfortunately shed no light on 
whether or not behaviours are driven by values (individuals’ preferences) or 
norms (social interactions based on individuals’ preferences). For example, in 
Chapter 3, I cannot distinguish between the hypotheses that (a) women have 
preferences for sons and (b) women dislike shame and some communities are 
ashamed of women who bear only daughters.1
Costs and Culture
The majority of empirical work on culture has either attempted to control for 
or eradicate the influence of prices,2 or have considered situations where costs 
are irrelevant.3 Perhaps this was inevitable: the first priority was to establish 
whether people’s backgrounds do indeed affect their behaviour. Culture does 
matter, and it is a topic worthy of economists’ time. But what’s the surprise?
From my perspective, the interaction between prices and preferences is key. 
When can behaviour be said to be driven by costs, and when do values matter? 
In Chapter 3 ,1 look at son preference amongst immigrants to the UK. Under the 
assumption that children are a normal good, son-preferring behaviour cannot 
be driven by high costs of raising girls. If girls were expensive, women with
1In terms of utility functions, I cannot discern u  =  u b (B) +  u q (G) from u =  u b ~\~g {B +  
G) +  v(r-); r =  f ( B) .  In the latter case, a woman only cares about the number of her children 
(B +  G), not the sex composition (B , G ). However, she receives a social reward r  for having 
boys.
2 For example, in Chapter 2 I look at women from different backgrounds but who live in the 
United Kingdom. Costs of raising children are plausibly equal across groups, and educational 
dummies control for different levels of human capital.
3Fisman and Miguel [2007] consider diplomats whose parking tickets do not have to be 
paid; Manning and Roy [2007] investigate national identity, which is costless.
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daughters rather than sons would be poorer. Thus, controlling for family size, 
normality implies that women with daughters would have lower fertility. The 
opposite is observed, so I conclude that a taste for sons, and not expensive 
daughters, drives the biased behaviour.4
One implication of Chapter 3 is that scholarships or other subsidies for girls 
might promote son-biased fertility behaviour. More work such as this is required 
to fully understand behaviour when preferences are put at odds with prices, since 
otherwise we cannot quantifiably predict the effects of our policy tools.
Implications
I intend ‘implications’ in two ways. First, cultural values shape the world we 
live in, and, as economists, purport to explain. It is therefore surprising that 
so little an attempt has been made to measure the impact and implications of 
those values.
Chapter 4 is such an attempt. I take the levels of son preference amongst 
immigrants in the UK and demonstrate that their behaviour significantly pre­
dicts sex ratios in their countries of origin. A preference for sons leads to an 
excess of girls.5 The effect I measure is small (but probably a lower bound). 
However, we are likely to have underestimated the number of women missing 
due to discrimination.
This finding is minor, but non-trivial. There are countless other ways in 
which cultural values affect outcomes substantively: both for good (when they 
discourage corruption or support education, for example) but also for worse, 
when they engender discrimination or promote a lax attitude to sexual health. 
Examples abound. Quantitative research, alas, does not.
The second implication of cultural economics concerns policy. Suppose, as in
the case of sexual discrimination, we determine an outcome is culturally driven.
4High costs/low benefits of raising girls could contribute to a social norm in which sons 
are required for ‘honour’, leading to a social preference for sons, as sketched in Footnote 1.
5 Women are heterogeneous in the probability of having a boy at any given birth (call this 
p). Suppose women prefer sons, and have children until they have a son. Heterogeneity implies 
that low-p women expect larger families than high-p women. Thus more children are born to 
low-p women, and there are relatively more girls born than if parents had no sex preferences.
18
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From a policy perspective, what are our options? Education is an obvious 
contender. But then the interactions between individuals must be properly 
understood. The well-meaning teacher might advocate sexual equality in the 
classroom, but what about the effect of discriminatory treatment at home or in 
the community? Until we have a coherent model of such situations, economics 
will confined to areas where cultural values are unimportant.
My larger point is more subtle: there are moral considerations to bear in 
mind when dealing with cultural phenomena. At some level, an individual is the 
product of his experiences, views, preferences and beliefs. If we seek to affect 
these, we must acknowledge that we will change the individual. The policy­
maker now assumes a degree of moral authority, and, while I have no problem in 
principle, this represents a colossal shift from amorally setting economic policy. 
And in practice, problems appear swiftly.
Final thoughts
It was not my original intention to write a thesis about culture. However, as 
the results of each paper became clear, the next question simply stood out. I 
have therefore presented my work in chronological order, except for Chapter 1: 
as I worked on Chapter 2, I was struck by the need to put formal definitions to 
the concepts I was dealing with.
As this rough explanation tries to convey, I believe a rigorous theory of cul­
ture is possibly the biggest outstanding gap in economists’ knowledge. Though 
minor in its reach, I hope this work will help others close that gap in the coming 
years.
Jas Ellis
London, September 2008
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Chapter 1
Culture, Values and Norms
In this paper I formally define a social norm to be a general equilibrium 
outcome amongst agents who hold preferences over each others’ behaviour.
My definition makes clear the distinction between the substance of a norm 
and its embodiment. This approach makes clear the difference between 
cultural values and norms. I close with a brief discussion of the implica­
tions of norms and values when addressing policy questions.
1.1 Introduction
Of the many interpretations for the word ‘culture’, I take the broad definition 
provided by Cavalli-Sforza et al. [1982], defining it to be the ‘activities, val­
ues, and behaviour of an individual that are acquired through instruction and 
imitation’. While many species exhibit such traits [Findlay et al., 1989], the 
extent to which cultural traits affect behaviour is undeniably unique to humans 
[Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1982; Higgs, 2000].1
The present paper builds a new definition of social norms and provides a 
framework for analysing cultural phenomena in an economic setting. In partic­
ular, I codify the distinction between cultural values and norms. I argue that a 
norm is best viewed as a general equilibrium outcome amongst agents who hold 
preferences over each others’ behaviour.
1 Perhaps unsurprisingly, social scientists seem much more ready than biologists to propose 
this uniqueness [See Tomasello, 1998, quoted in Dekker, 2001, p. 82].
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The major contribution of this paper is the positive construction of a norm 
basis, which is a set of values that underlie the norm. These values may be 
thought of as preferences held by individuals. The norm is then the behavioural 
outcome within a community when some (or all) individuals hold the basis 
values. This is a very general definition which encompasses those of previous 
authors. I believe this definition will allow researchers to explicitly frame the 
quantitative modelling of cultural phenomena by making clear which aspects 
of normed behaviour are relevant in which cases. I provide two very simple 
examples.
While previous work by sociologists (particularly Morris [1956]) has provided 
a coherent definition of a norm for that discipline, to the best of my knowledge 
economists are yet to broach the topic substantively.2 I therefore lean heavily 
on previous work to construct my new definition and do not lay claim to the 
broad ideas encompassed within this paper. The novelty of this work is to apply 
an axiomatic approach to build a framework that is amenable to microeconomic 
modelling. The construction is inspired by Allison [1992].
1.2 Culture
The definition of ‘culture’ given above comprises two components: a set of 
properties (‘activities, values, and behaviour’), and a transmission mechanism 
(‘acquired through instruction or imitation’). Considered in this fashion, culture 
has been the focus of a wide body of literature, spanning Biology, Economics, 
Anthropology, and Sociology, and particularly Memetics, for which this two- 
part definition is a founding concept. Memeticists attempt to explain cultural 
phenomena by considering the evolution of memes, which are small transmissible 
‘units’ of culture, analogous to genes in Genetics (this concept is due to Dawkins 
[1989]).3 Bisin and Verdier [2005] provide an inexhaustive summary of the
2Young [2008] outlines the topic informally.
3However, the status of Memetics as a discipline is as yet unresolved. Though the concept 
of a meme is not in itself unhelpful, Holdcroft and Lewis [2000] provide a thorough critique 
to the purely memetic view of culture, concluding ‘there is a serious question whether there
21
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literature.
By applying this analogy, Biologists have been particularly insightful.4 In 
Genetics, traits (or phenotypes) pertaining to morphology and behaviour are 
controlled by genes, which are transmitted through sexual or asexual reproduc­
tion. (Florini [1996, pp. 367] provides a deeper discussion of these mechanisms.) 
This leads to a natural definition for a cultural property (ie, a meme): it is sim­
ply a phenotype that is transmitted through instruction or imitation [Cavalli- 
Sforza et al., 1982]. The analogy is completed by permitting mutation during 
transmission.5
The class of memes relevant to this discussion are those which I shall call 
values, following Morris [1956].6 Whereas almost any kind of abstract idea can 
constitute a meme, a value imparts a behavioural constraint. From an economic 
perspective, this may be because the value affects one’s utility function; or it 
may be better understood as a constraint on the choice set. Having the value 
‘I must have many children’ might be best represented as the former, whereas 
‘thou shalt not steal’ evokes the latter. However, stealing could also be thought 
of as yielding an arbitrarily large negative utility. This formulation recalls the 
‘economics of identity’ of Akerlof and Kranton [2000].
For the purposes of this analysis, a value is the most basic component of 
preferences, since I am only concerned with memes that impart a behavioural 
outcome. Since the major objective here is to distinguish a value from a norm, 
I will follow the ethos of Set Theory and abstain from formally defining a value.
is available . . .  a theory of meaning that would afford to memes the kind of robust status that 
memetics demands of them’.
4See, eg, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [1981, 1983]; Cavalli-Sforza et al. [1982]; Findlay et al. 
[1989]; Guglielmino et al. [1995].
5Note that mutation of DNA base pairs is very rare [Florini, 1996, footnote 10, p. 372]; 
most of the variety across populations results from the recombination of several genes due to 
sexual reproduction. However, innovation resulting in the mutation of memes is very common 
[Dawkins, 1989, p. 323—4, in Florini, 1996].
6I shall explicitly define the terms under discussion; there are ambiguous definitions in the 
literature, and some authors appear to draw no distinction between values and norms. Morris 
[1956] provides a coherent picture; see page 25.
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1.2.1 Cultural Transmission
Cavalli-Sforza et al. [1982] distinguish three transmission modes for memes be­
tween individuals, which they label following conventions in Epidemiology:
• Vertical Transmission from parents to their children.
• Horizontal Transmission between individuals of the same generation.
• Oblique Transmission from individuals of the parental generation to those 
in the filial generation who are not their children.
Plainly, Genetics is concerned with vertical transmission only, with genes 
passed on solely through DNA [Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1983].
Though it has been argued [Harris 1998, in Dekker 2001] that vertical trans­
mission of cultural traits is negligible, the empirical evidence strongly refutes 
this. Cavalli-Sforza et al. [1982] assess the correlations between the beliefs of 
young adults, their peers, and their parents, observing stronger vertical then 
horizontal transmission for several classes of value, especially religious belief.7 
The finding of Fernandez and Fogli [2006] — that the number of one’s siblings is 
significant in predicting one’s own fertility — also points to vertical transmission 
of fertility values, though they fail to make this interpretation.
The different transmission mechanisms result in different distributional and 
dynamic outcomes, as can be seen in Table 1.1. These relate primarily to the 
rate of spread through the population and the equilibrium heterogeneity. The 
key insight of this literature is that cultural dynamics have the potential to 
produce more complex outcomes than genetic dynamics alone [Cavalli-Sforza 
and Feldman, 1983; Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza, 1984].
More recently, economists have modelled cultural transmission as purpose­
ful socialisation decisions made within families.8 Parents are usually assumed 
to be altruistic toward their offspring, and choose to socialise their children if
7Guglielmino et al. [1995] provide further examples, as does Shennan [2000, p. 813].
8 Examples include Bisin and Verdier [2000, 2005]; Tabellini [2007b]; Michau [2008].
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Table 1.1: Modes and rates of cultural transmission, reproduced from Cavalli- 
Sforza et al. [1982].
R a t io  o f  
t r a n s m i t t e r s
M a n y  t o  o n e O n e  to  few  
(few  to  fe w )
O n e  t o  m a n y
E x a m p le : S o c ia l  c la s s  o r  
c a s te  in f lu e n c e s
V e r t ic a l  (p a r -  H o r iz o n ta l  
e n t  t o  c h i ld )
S o c ia l  H ie r a r ­
c h ie s
T e a c h e r / s tu d e n t  
S o c ia l  L e a d e r s  
M a ss  m e d ia
R a te  o f  C u l­
t u r a l  C h a n g e :
L o w e s t ---- > ---- > ---- " H ig h e s t
P o p u la t io n
h e te r o g e n e ­
ity :
L i t t l e  a c c e p ta n c e  
o f  v a r ia n t s ;  b e ­
tw e e n  a n d  w i th in  
p o p u la t i o n  h e t e r o ­
g e n e i t ie s  a r e  low .
P e r s i s te n c e  o f  v a r ia t io n  ( s t a ­
b le  p o ly m o rp h ic  e q u i l ib r iu m  
n o t  u n c o m m o n );  b e tw e e n  
a n d  w i th in  h e te r o g e n e it i e s  
a r e  h ig h .
R a p id  flu x ; b e tw e e n  p o p u ­
l a t i o n  h e te r o g e n e i ty  h ig h ; 
w i th in  p o p u la t i o n  h e t e r o ­
g e n e i ty  low .
they think this will maximise their welfare (often parents show ‘imperfect empa­
thy’, and can only evaluate the effects of socialisation form their own socialised 
perspective).
1.3 From Values to Norms
1.3.1 Values
The discussion so far has focused on memes and individual values, and their 
transmission. In this section I relate this concept to norms, which are necessarily 
collective [Morris, 1956].
There exist many definitions of the term norm , and a considerable amount of 
disagreement: Gibbs [1965] cites no fewer than seven — somewhat contradictory 
— definitions (including those of Morris [1956] and Homans [1950]). Moreover, 
as Gibbs notes [p. 587], these are generally ambiguous. Here it is my intention 
to construct a more precise definition that is suitable as a micro-foundation for 
economic models.
Whereas values are not necessarily observable externally, it is generally held 
that norms must be [Morris, 1956; Allison, 1992; Florini, 1996]. That is, they 
need to involve values that are made visible through behaviour. However, norms 
are more than simply ‘behavioural regularities’ [Florini, 1996, p. 364]. Such a 
regularity might merely result from a commonly held value.
Succinctly, I take a norm to be “a set of intersubjective understandings
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readily apparent to actors that makes behavioural claims on those actors” 
[Finnemore, 1994, in Florini, 1996, p. 364]. Allison [1992] takes a very simi­
lar line (citing Homans [1950]). As a direct comparison, a value (as I define it) 
is merely an ‘understanding that makes a behavioural claim on its subject’.
Morris [1956] provides a clear distinction between values and norms:
[Vjalues are individual, or commonly shared conceptions of the de­
sirable, ie, what I and/or others feel we justifiably want — what 
it is proper to want. On the other hand, norms are generally ac­
cepted, sanctioned prescriptions for, or prohibitions against, others’ 
behaviour, belief, or feeling, ie, what others ought to do, believe, 
feel— or else. Values can be held by a single individual; norms can­
not. Norms must be shared prescriptions and apply to others, by 
definition. Values have only a subject—the believer—while norms 
have both subjects and objects—those who set the prescription, and 
those to whom it applies. Norms always include sanctions, values 
never do. [Morris, 1956]
It is clear then that visible behaviours are a fundamental component of 
norms: without observable actions being taken, sanctions cannot be applied. 
This fact prompts a first-principles construction of a norm from constituent 
values. I shall follow the approach taken by Allison [1992], who introduces the 
idea of splitting a norm into component parts.
1.3.2 Defining a Norm
Morris’s description highlights the two major classes of values held by a norm’s 
subjects. First, there is the observable behaviour, so there must be a value man­
dating or a taste for that behaviour. Second, the subject’s behaviour towards 
others is dependent on whether they display that behaviour, and therefore there 
must be some values pertaining to those sanctions or rewards. This motivates 
the first two components of the following definition, which are necessary. As
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discussed in the previous section, the subjects of some norms also have a explicit 
taste for the spread of the norm, so transmission values may also be components 
of the norm’s values. Finally, there also may (or may not) be unobservable val­
ues attached to the norm. I package these values as a single unit, which I call a 
basis, since they will define many of characteristics the norm.
D efinition 1. The basis of a norm is a set of values, N , consisting of the 
following components:
• One or more values mandating some observable behaviour (I denote the 
set of these by X ) .
• One or more values entailing sanctions against those in whom X  is not 
observed and/or rewards for those in whom X  is observed (Y ).
• Zero or more values explicitly prescribing transmission of N  (T).
• Zero or more non-observable values (Z).
The basis of a norm is just a set of beliefs; one must mandate some observable 
behaviour and one must mandate sanctions or rewards of others, given their 
behaviour. The individual holding these beliefs acts as Morris describes.
Values corresponding to transmission of the norm (T) may be included, 
but need not be; they may either be observable or not observable. (Bisin and 
Verdier [2000, 2005]’s socialisation process fits in here.) Naturally, sanctioning or 
transmitting behaviours may either be observable or not observable, so Y, T  C 
X U  Z(= N ). It will be helpful to define the set of ‘core’ observable values 
(ie, not related to sanctions or transmission), X  =  X \(F  U T), and similarly 
Z = Z \ { Y U T ) .
In economic terms, the components of this definition can be considered as 
facets of the utility function, with any sanctions or rewards being seen as alter­
ations to the choice sets of other agents. Thus, the set of values imparts both 
behavioural restrictions on the subject directly, and also incentives on others.
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D efinition 2. Amongst a number of individuals, a norm is the equilibrium 
behavioural outcome due to some (or all) agents holding a basis of values that 
satisfies Definition 1.
Restated, the existence of a norm in a group requires some agents to hold 
some belief or otherwise have preferences about how they should behave, in­
cluding behaviours that provide incentives for others (sanctions or rewards). 
Those not holding this set of beliefs are constrained in their behaviour by these 
incentives. The resulting outcome, with each agent taking into account their 
preferences and these incentives, is what I call a norm.
This definition is general enough to encompass those given by Morris [1956], 
Homans [1950], and others, and offers a clear direction for theoretical (mod­
elling) work. In particular, the ‘intersubjectivity’ of Finnemore [1994] derives 
from the simultaneous imposition of the sanctions/rewards by subjects and the 
decisions taken by all objects who are aware of the norm. The resulting outcome 
must be an equilibrium in which all agents maximise their utility with respect 
to the constraints placed upon them by others.
Young [2008] makes a less formal definition, that a norm a “customary rule 
of behaviour that coordinates our interactions with others” . However, my defi­
nition is more basic, in that coordination is a (possible) outcome, not a funda­
mental component. My more formal approach from first principles makes clear 
precisely where a norm is different to commonly held preferences or behavioural 
regularities: it is the beliefs about others’ behaviour.
There are two non-neoclassical elements to my definition. First, I allow 
agents to have arbitrary preferences about each others’ behaviour, and these 
preferences motivate the sanctions subjects apply to others. Fortunately, no new 
ideas will be needed to formally model such situations, since this can be treated 
as a type of externality. On the other hand, preferences must be malleable in 
some sense, which I have not defined. Habit-forming and deliberate socialisation 
are two possible mechanisms that have been modelled previously [Bisin and 
Verdier, 2000, for example].
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1.3.3 Examples
Two examples demonstrate the generality of my definition. First, it is rare 
for users of public transport in London to speak to one another. For some 
this results from a preference for travelling in silence, though this is not true 
for everyone. Consider this as a norm. The value mandating the observ­
able behaviour is the preference for not talking: X  =  {‘travel in silence’}, 
and this also applies when not observed by others: Z  =  {‘travel in silence’}. 
Meanwhile, transgressors — regardless of their preferences — are punished, 
so Y  = {‘respond rudely to those who talk to you’}. This punishment may or 
may not be observed by others, depending on the context. Finally, T  =  0. T  is 
empty since I make no explicit attempt to convey the norm to others: I don’t 
necessarily want you to like travelling in silence. However, I may transmit these 
values to some by example. A Euler diagram representing the relationships 
between X , Y  and Z  can be found in Figure 1.1, Panel (A).
The norm then, is the equilibrium outcome within the population, some 
of whom hold values N  =  X  U Z, and others who do not, but are nonetheless 
affected by the incentives imposed by those holding N . That is, if you attempt to 
speak to someone, you risk sanction if that person holds N . On public transport 
in London, there appear to be a sufficient number of ‘holders’ to support a 
no-talking equilibrium, with occasional infractions and sanctions. Elsewhere, 
though there may be individuals holding the basis N , they may not be enough 
to support such an outcome.
A second example would be the norm of a hypothetical religious group that 
is evangelical. Here, religious practice is observable, though of course the fun­
damental beliefs are not. Moreover, evangelism is prescribed and is observ­
able. So here we have X  =  {‘practise religion’} (eg, attend worship); Y  — 
{‘shun those not practising’}; Z  =  {‘true religious belief’}. T  = {‘evangelise’} 
(and T  C X ). Supposing the sanction is also observable, we have Y  C X , and 
X  =  X  U Y  UT. Panel (B) in Figure 1.1 demonstrates this example. Note that 
7 f l T  ^  0: evangelistic behaviour and sanctions may coincide. Here, the norm
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Figure 1.1: Euler diagrams representing basis values for norms for (A) not 
talking to fellow passengers on public transport and (B) an evangelical sect. 
See Section 1.3.3 for details of the examples. X  is those values that mandate 
observable practices; Y  denotes values prescribing sanctions or rewards; Z  is 
the set of unobservable values; and T  is those values mandating transmitting 
behaviours.
(A) (B)
T  =
is the equilibrium level of religious practise within a community.
1.4 Equilibrium Outcom es
Morris [1956] presents a typology of norms (reproduced in Table 1.2) breaking 
down 17 key dimensions along which norms may be compared. Many of these 
derive from the values comprising the norm as discussed above. However, not all 
do. For example, knowledge of the norm by objects (those to whom the norm 
applies) will depend on the number of subjects (those holding the values) in 
the population. In short, this is a property of the general equilibrium outcome 
(though it need not be static).
The innovation here is to draw a distinction between the set of values com­
prising the norm, the basis, and the manifestation of the norm within a pop­
ulation. A norm that is held by a small number of people in one society may 
constitute the same values as another norm prevalent elsewhere, but the effects 
on the behaviour of both subjects and objects may well be different, especially 
for objects who are not subjects.
In some sense, once can consider the basis of norm as exogenous to the
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Table 1.2: Characteristics of norms, from Morris [1956]. The following annota­
tions are mine: ‘I ’ corresponds to properties intrinsic to the norm as a set of 
values, whereas lG’ denotes properties that will depend on general equilibrium 
effects in the population, or the manifestation of the norm. See the discussion 
on page 30.
I .  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  n o r m
E xten t o f knowledge o f the norm
(1) By subjects (those who set G
the  norm)
(2) By objects (those to  whom I,G
the  norm applies)
E xten t o f acceptance or agreement with the
norm
(3) By subjects I
(4) By objects I,G
E xten t o f application o f the norm  to objects
(5) To groups or categories I
(6) To conditions I
I I .  M o d e  o f  e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  t h e  n o r m
(7) Balance of re- I
w ard/punishm ent
(8) Severity of sanction I
(9) Enforcing agency I,G
environment,9 and the prevalence and outcomes of the norm as endogenous and 
depending on the environment in which the norm resides. Thus, in the final 
column in Table 1.2 I categorise each property. Either the property is intrinsic 
(T) — that is, specified completely by the basis of the norm, or the property 
depends on the manifestation of the norm (the general equilibrium outcome, 
‘G’) — these outcomes include the number of subjects holding the norm, their 
distribution amongst the general population, and other factors.
Extent of the norm amongst subjects (property 1) is necessarily a general 
equilibrium outcome, since this quantity is simply the number of people hold­
ing the values that constitute the basis of norm. The number of subjects will 
be a dynamic outcome of the transmission process, which will depend on the 
constituent values themselves — but only indirectly, through the prevalence 
rate.
Conversely, knowledge of the norm by objects (property 2) will depend di­
rectly on the intrinsic nature: if the values do not mandate strong sanctions 
against non-subject objects (perhaps if subjects are rewarded instead) and
9 Exogeneity is highly unlikely in the strict sense — the basis must have originated from 
somewhere, and most likely evolved into its observed form for some reason. See the discussion 
on page 32 and in Young [2008].
(10) E xtent of enforcem ent (spe- I
cialised or universal)
(11) Source of au thority  I
(12) Degree of internalisation by I,G
objects
III. T r a n s m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  n o r m
(13) Socialisation process I/I,G
(14) Degree of reinforcement by I,G
subjects
(15) Am ount of conformity at- G
tem pted by objects
IV. C o n f o r m i t y  t o  t h e  n o r m
(16) Amount of deviance by ob- G
jects
(17) Kind of deviance I,G
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prevalence is low, knowledge of the norm amongst these would be expected 
to be low. It should be evident that any measure relating to objects will de­
pend somewhat on the prevalence of the norm at least, and is hence denoted 
‘G’. However, the intrinsic values of the norm will still matter: a rare norm 
that mandates evangelism would be better known than a rare norm mandating 
secrecy, say. Therefore T  applies here too.
Finally, the transmission process (property 13) is of note. Transmission cer­
tainly depends on the values of the norm, especially if there are values mandating 
efforts to teach the norm. However, it may also depend on the general equi­
librium: some norms become institutionalised. Rather than being transmitted 
chaotically between individuals, there are structures formed specifically to (say) 
teach the constituent values. This institutionalisation changes the transmission 
process, and whether this happens (and how) will depend on the manifestation 
of the norm. However, many norms are not institutionalised, and continue to 
be transmitted in their endogenous fashion.
It is implicit in this discussion that, by my definition, the values of a norm 
can be held by a single individual; however, this does not contradict Morris’s 
1956 description (see page 25). All that is required is that there be only one 
subject that holding the constituent values. A norm itself, though, is a property 
of groups, corresponding to equilibrium behaviour. (But note that a single 
subject, if sufficiently powerful, may be able to impart sufficient incentives for 
a norm to be observed in a group).
In any case, it is unlikely that a norm’s values can be held by only one 
individual in practice: the values must spread, otherwise the norm itself will 
become extinct before too long. One successful example is Mormonism, founded 
by Joseph Smith Jr. in the early 19th century. At its inception, the number of 
subjects was just one: Smith himself.
To summarise, I differentiate two concepts: the value, which is a belief that 
imposes a behavioural constraint, and the norm which is an equilibrium outcome 
in which some agents have several bundled values. Some of these values must
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imply observable behaviours, and some must mandate enforcing behaviour on 
others. There may also be allied non-observable values or values implying efforts 
to transmit or teach the norm.
At the population level, a norm’s effects will depend on its prevalence. At 
any instant, the collective efforts of the subjects of the norm will impose a set 
of incentives for all in the society, and transmission will partly arise from this.
1.5 Development of Norms
One outstanding issue is the reason for the existence of any norms. The prevail­
ing explanation is simple: evolutionary advantage. 10 The evolutionary process 
can be considered in the usual — Darwinian — sense [eg, Allison, 1992; Mark, 
2002; Young, 2008], in which populations having certain norms are more suc­
cessful than others. Hence the world we observe is populated by groups who 
are made more successful due to their norms. 11
One rationale for such behaviour is the case of some externality, so that 
individual choices lead to a socially inefficient outcome. Several well known 
mechanisms allow the social surplus to be maximised, such as taxation schemes 
and the introduction of missing markets. But norms can also fulfil this role, 
with interacting sanctions ensuring each actor behaves cooperatively. If children 
exert an externality on others (either positive or negative), fertility norms may 
constitute a means of achieving the most efficient fertility rate for the society.
Additionally, norms may assist decision-making even when there are not 
coordination problems. If agents are unable to ascertain the full consequences of 
their actions, prevalent values and/or norms may entail that chosen behaviours 
are not detrimental. Naturally, societies having such values will be advantaged.
Florini [1996, p. 379] cites the example of heuristic rules in chess; these provide
10Proponents include Cavalli-Sforza et al. [1982]; Allison [1992]; Florini [1996]; Henrich 
[2001]; Mark [2002].
11 There is also a more sophisticated evolutionary interpretation: the memetic point of view  
applies the concept of natural selection to memes, values, and norms themselves. In this 
context, a successful norm is one which is prevalent. This view presents people as merely 
being the substrate for values, which may indeed harm its subjects, analogously to a parasite. 
See Holdcroft and Lewis [2000] for a full explanation and comments.
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a short cut, allowing the player to avoid considering each possible branch of the 
game-tree. These rules can help successful decision making even if the player 
does not understand the reasoning behind the rule. Similarly, norms can impart 
knowledge very cheaply, to save individuals from costly experimentation.
1.5.1 Diversity
If one expects the evolution of norms that are adapted to benefit a society, 
it is not unreasonable to expect that different societies will develop different 
norms, according to the environment they face. One conceivable outcome is the 
divergence of fertility rates between different populations.
However, such reasoning is not essential in explaining differences in norms 
between populations. Theoretical and simulation-based work by Findlay et al. 
[1989] demonstrates that cultural systems exhibit more complicated dynam­
ics than solely biological systems, often resulting in multiple stable equilibria. 
Though that research considers values alone, norms, via their incentive struc­
tures in equilibrium, create further potential for arbitrary self-sustaining (focal) 
equilibria, implying that differing environments are not a necessary require­
ment for differing norms. The existence of social norms are therefore likely to 
be strongly history-dependent.
1.6 Discussion
The arguments here highlight the distinct problems faced by the researcher seek­
ing to explain social phenomena when cultural forces are in evidence. However, 
having acknowledged the distinction between values and norms allows the im­
plications of each to be drawn more specifically. The difference lies in the fact 
that interactions affect individuals’ behaviour within groups where norms are 
present. Values affect only the individual holding them.
One major question arises: do values-driven outcomes ever occur without 
norms? This question is an empirical one, and has thus far gone unanswered by
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social scientists. But I hypothesise that the answer is no. Without a norm, there 
is little opportunity for a value to be transmitted. Insofar as one’s preferences 
are formed in a particular way by socialisation, rather than being physiologically 
determined, they must be picked up from — or moulded in reference to — one’s 
social environment. As an example, it is hard to conceive that son preference 
is transmitted simply as a value alone without social interactions [Das Gupta 
et al., 2 0 0 2 ].
If values alone drove a behaviour, policy implications would be simple in 
practice, despite the moral concerns raised when preferences are to be changed. 
For example, addressing discrimination due to son preference is relatively clear- 
cut: policy should strive to teach that boys and girls are of equal worth, and 
the time to implement this teaching would be at a young age, when preferences 
are more malleable. This is indeed a moral position, based on the axiom that 
discrimination due to gender is obscene. It is not hard to find a consensus on 
an issue such as this. However, what, if anything, should be done about son 
preference when it truly does not lead to discrimination? Some would argue 
that this too is obscene, though far less agreement would be found. 12
The moral questions do not disappear when the policy question addresses 
norms, but the practical problems certainly increase. With a strong norm in 
place, a locally stable equilibrium exists, so any attempt to alter outcomes must 
overcome the stabilising forces. If, say, son preferences are strongly reinforced 
by all members of a community, education alone is unlikely to have a significant 
impact. Moreover, if a policy is implemented from outside the community, there 
may be a negative reaction to the external influence.
This paper’s aim is to push forward our understanding of values and norms 
in a manner that is helpful for economists. The discipline is at last making great 
strides in the field of cultural interactions, particularly in theoretical work. Fu­
ture empirical work should consider social forces in more detail, and particularly 
attempt to identify when social factors are quantitatively important, as in Chap­
12To my mind, the ‘moral authority’ wielded by the policy-maker becomes more obvious 
when one considers one’s preferences as one’s identity, as Akerlof and Kranton [2000] do.
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ters 3 and 4. However, we must bear in mind the moral dilemmas that policy­
making involves. Usually, policy action affects incentives: the costs people face. 
If values and norms are deemed to cause unwanted outcomes, policy-makers will 
find themselves needing to alter who people are.
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Chapter 2
Prices, Norms and 
Preferences: 
The Effect of Cultural 
Values on Fertility
This paper investigates the influence of cultural values on fertility. First, 
I compare the fertility of immigrants in the UK with fertility in their 
countries of origin, before extending my analysis to consider the effect of 
differential birth timing on the measurement of fertility.
High country of origin fertility is associated with high fertility in the UK, 
in line with previous results. This is consistent with fertility preferences 
being a transmissible (learnable) cultural value. However, I find that high 
fertility in the country of origin is also associated with earlier childbearing. 
If timing is not accounted for, this phenomenon could lead to an upward 
bias when estimating the importance of cultural values.
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2.1 Introduction
There are large differences in fertility rates between countries. In Somalia, the 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is over seven births per woman; in Hong Kong it 
is close to one. 1 Many explanations for these differences have been proposed, 
including: opportunity costs in childrearing and women’s relative wages [Galor 
and Weil, 1996, 2000; Wolf, 2006], returns on human capital [Becker et al., 
1990; de la Croix and Doepke, 2003], child mortality rates [Becker and Barro, 
1988; Barro, 1991], family policies [Neyer, 2003], economic risks [Pommeret and 
Smith, 2004], ‘altruistic’ reasons [Becker and Tomes, 1976; Becker and Barro, 
1988; Ellis, 2006], and provision for care in old age [Neher, 1971; Ehrlich and 
Lui, 1991; Morand, 1999; Ellis, 2006].
This paper investigates the influence of cultural values on fertility. That 
culture does — or at least, has the ability to — influence fertility decisions 
is self-evident: witness the Shaker movement, whose chastity led to eventual 
extinction. This is an extreme example; however, many societies have norms or 
otherwise prevailing values that influence choices about the number and timing 
of births.
Following Fernandez and Fogli [2005, 2006], I compare the fertility of im­
migrants in the UK with fertility in their countries of origin. High country of 
origin fertility is associated with high fertility in the UK, in line with Fernandez 
and Fogli’s results and consistent with fertility preferences being a transmissible 
(learnable) cultural value. However, I then extend my analysis to consider the 
effect of differential birth timing on the measurement of fertility. I find that 
high fertility in the country of origin is also associated with earlier childbearing, 
possibly leading to an upward bias when estimating the importance of cultural 
values if timing is not accounted for.
When comparing high-fertility immigrants with low-fertility immigrants, the 
former have their children when younger. If children are counted when women 
are still fertile, high-fertility immigrants have had some of their children, and
1World Bank Development Indicators (1997); see Table 2.2.
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are measured as having larger families, while low-fertility women are yet to have 
theirs. This biases up the estimated effect of cultural background on completed 
fertility, since the low-fertility women catch up in later years, and the final 
fertility gap is smaller than the gap that is measured.
2.1.1 Empirics
The methodology taken in this paper follows that of Fernandez and Fogli [2005, 
2006], matching data on immigrants into Britain from the UK Labour Force 
Survey with data (from World Development Indicators) from their country of 
origin. The basic specification regresses the fertility of the individual on the 
origin-country fertility rate. (Full details of methodology are to be found in 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
There are two identifying assumptions: first, I assert that these women have 
differing values regarding desired fertility, and the origin-country fertility rate 
proxies for this. The second assumption requires that prices and external incen­
tives are the same for different immigrant groups. This is unlikely in practice, 
but several observable differences can be controlled for (eg, educational attain­
ment gives an indication of the opportunity costs of childrearing) . 2
This paper presents several improvements on previous work. First, the LFS 
dataset is both larger and better suited to this task than the General Social 
Survey and US Census data used in Fernandez and Fogli [2005] and Fernandez 
and Fogli [2006] respectively. My base sample contains 11,081 observations, 
compared to their samples of 6,774 and 1,145. Moreover, all women in my 
dataset are first-generation immigrants, and I have information on their date 
of arrival into the UK. In Fernandez and Fogli [2006], the women’s antecedents 
may have been in the US for several generations. I discuss this further in Section 
2.2. Also, a much wider selection of countries is represented in my sample.
Second, and more importantly, I consider heterogeneity in birth timing be­
2 It should be observed that the majority of the unaccounted mechanisms would lead to an 
upward bias of the estimated coefficients for cultural values. See Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
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tween different groups. As my analysis in Section 2.4 indicates, this is likely to 
bias up Fernandez and Fogli’s estimates, since they interpret these coefficients 
as differences in completed fertility. The strength of cultural norms provides an 
upper bound for the role of policy in shaping fertility trends — if these norms 
are very strong, policy will be ineffective. My results, indicating less impor­
tance for cultural norms, suggest a greater role for policies acting through price 
channels.
2.1.2 Identification
The benefit of this methodology is that, by studying women of different ‘cultural 
origins’ within the same environment, greater validity is lent to comparisons be­
tween groups. Were those groups observed in differing environments (their orig­
inal countries), they would face different prices and norms and no comparison 
would be readily appropriate. The same idea is applied by Fisman and Miguel 
[2007] to another cultural sphere: corruption, or adherence to protocol. Their 
quasi-experiment depends on agents (UN diplomats) being separated from their 
cultural brethren and placed in a common environment (New York). Because 
of diplomatic immunity, parking fines levied on diplomatic cars were unenforce­
able; payment depended on diplomats’ own values. Most importantly, decisions 
to pay fines are taken without facing the pressures of any norms prevalent in 
their home environment.
There are two essential components for interpreting such work. The first is 
the existence of a norm in the country of origin, or at least a prevailing value 
that is transmitted to the agent. The value prescribes a fertility behaviour, 
or can alternatively be considered as instilling particular preferences. Since 
women take their values from their originating countries, there is a diversity 
of values amongst the subjects of the study and, moreover, these values are 
correlated with the values held in their origin countries. The second component 
is observation in a common environment. This (hopefully) entails that, when 
the agents come to act, they face a common set of prices and norms, and the
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differing effects of the values they hold can be ascertained.
2.1.3 Related Work
This work links several strands of research. Lam [1986], Kremer and Chen [2000] 
and De la Croix and Doepke [2003] suggest that, besides the aggregate fertility 
rate, fertility differentials between groups matter for both social mobility and 
income inequality. These authors concentrate on differentials by income. How­
ever, differences between ethnic groups may play a similar role, especially if they 
reinforce income-driven effects. For example, (poor) immigrants may choose to 
have many children for both cultural and financial reasons. This could feasibly 
be perceived as problematic by the native majority, especially in countries with 
generous social welfare systems.
A second strand includes work on social norms such as Manning and Roy 
[2007], who investigate the degree to which immigrants describe themselves as 
British (they too use data from the LFS). They measure (predictably) that 
immigrants are more likely to call themselves British over time, but they find 
the perhaps surprising result that those from poorer countries seem to do so at 
a faster rate.
This raises the question of whether other social determinants, such as fertility 
norms, also converge over time. However, the age-specific nature of fertility may 
make analysis difficult. This matter is further complicated by the effects found 
by Andersson [2001] of elevated birth probabilities for most immigrant groups 
shortly after arrival in Sweden. His interpretation is that “migration and family 
building are interrelated processes” [Andersson, 2001, p. 1], though citizenship 
eligibility might be expected to play a role in this.
2.1.4 Implications
The empirical work presented in this paper has implications in a number of 
areas. The effects of the fertility rate on macroeconomic growth are highlighted 
by Young [2005a,b], who studies the implications of the fertility response to
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the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. Young states that the fertility 
decline he observes could simply be a price effect in response to labour scarcity 
[2005a, p. 424]. Regardless, his long run predictions for per-capita consumption 
depend on this fertility decline, and even a small influence via cultural channels 
could have non-trivial long-term effects.
Conversely, many developed countries currently face below-replacement fer­
tility (see eg, Billari and Kohler [2002]; Neyer [2003], and Table 2.2 in this pa­
per) . Dixon and Margo [2006] highlight some of the implications of low fertility 
in Britain, and discuss some of the remedial options available to policy-makers. 
The first pillar of their argument is that, regardless of intent, government policy 
affects fertility decisions, and that fertility ‘side effects’ should be borne in mind. 
Indeed, they go on to suggest the government should be more direct in ‘promot­
ing’ fertility. Such a policy was introduced in Quebec and is studied by Milligan 
[2002]. However, if culturally-derived preferences or incentives play a large role 
in fertility choices, price-based policies may be infeasible or too expensive.
2.2 Data and Methodology
2.2.1 Variables
The objective of this paper is to quantify the effects of culture — in the forms 
of individual values and collective norms — on fertility decisions.3 For this, 
three key things are needed: a sample exhibiting a variety of cultural values, 
some quantification of these values, and some measurement of the outcome in 
a common — or at least, comparable — environment. I shall address each in 
turn.
Variation: The focus of this study is immigrant women. Coming from dif­
ferent cultural backgrounds, it is hoped that they hold different cultural values, 
transmitted to them in their original countries. This transmission could act
3I use the term ‘decision’, although it is not expected that this is always made consciously; 
by this I mean only that people choose between different behaviours (eg, contraceptive use or 
abstinence) that affect the probability of a birth at different costs.
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via any of the vertical, horizontal and oblique modes (from parents, peers or 
the community, respectively; see Cavalli-Sforza et al. [1982]), either simply as a 
learnt value, or through incentives existing due to a norm.
Quantification: In any country, the total fertility rate (TFR) represents 
the number Of women choosing to have children at the time of measurement.4 
Each parental decision is itself the outcome of a process that involves parents’ 
preferences, the prices they face (including the institutional framework), and 
non-price incentives imposed by others — not to mention chance. Variations in 
TFR between countries will be driven by all of these factors.
However, it would be surprising if the true underlying values were not pos­
itively correlated with the number of births. Thus, TFR represents, to some 
degree, the fertility preferences — that is, values — of the population, and 
those which we expect the immigrant to hold. Therefore, following Fernandez 
and Fogli [2005, 2006], I use country of origin TFR as a measure for these values.
Naturally, there will be heterogeneity in the values held by individuals of the 
country; indeed, there will be considerable variation in actual fertility outcomes. 
But empirically this heterogeneity is hard to separate from unobservable factors 
or stochastic components. Therefore I take the TFR to be merely indicative 
of the individual’s preferences, and so appropriate care must be taken when 
making inferences.
Environment: While the quantification of fertility preferences is vague, other 
factors relevant to individuals’ fertility can be measured more directly. One 
of the most commonly cited fertility determinants is the opportunity cost of 
childrearing. This underlies the human capital and wage arguments of Becker 
et al. [1990], de la Croix and Doepke [2003], Galor and Weil [1996, 2000], and 
many others. If children require a considerable amount of maternal time, higher 
wage rates mean a higher level of forgone income.
Estimating this forgone income (effectively the price of a mother’s time)
4TFR represents the total number of children born to a hypothetical woman whose be­
haviour at any age is the current behaviour of women that age. It will coincide with the 
completed fertility rate (total children born to the cohort currently ending their fertile years) 
when fertility patterns are stable over time.
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presents considerable difficulties, since it is a joint outcome with the fertility 
decision itself. However, educational attainment is unaffected by one’s fertility, 
and presents a measure of the mother’s human capital, and hence opportunity 
costs. The literature cited suggests that a mother’s human capital will be neg­
atively correlated with her fertility. Since women are, in general', more likely 
to remain at home to raise children, husbands’ income is more often used as a 
measure for household income. The same arguments can be made for fathers’ 
forgone income as for mothers, but here income effects may be expected to be 
dominant [Becker et al., 1990; Galor and Weil, 1996, 2000]. That is, higher in­
come and higher wage rates make children more affordable (presuming children 
are a normal good). However, there may be concerns that paternal income is 
endogenous because of assortative matching between high-capital partners.
Other factors that might be expected to affect fertility, such as access to 
family planning technologies or infant mortality (as suggested by Barro [1991]) 
can reasonably be neglected when considering women in a developed country 
such as the UK. Contraceptives and abortion are available widely, and so use 
of these can be expected to be a woman’s own choice, even if norms — perhaps 
enforced by husbands — may discourage such behaviour in some communities. 
In addition, infant mortality is low in the UK (though it is feasible the some 
groups from developing countries have higher rates than the native population 
[Troe, 2008]).
In sum, the identifying assumption is that the economic costs of raising 
children are equal for all groups in my sample, or at least that these costs are 
not correlated with fertility in the country of origin. I will consider the validity 
of this assumption in Section 2.5.
2.2.2 Existing Work
Fernandez and Fogli [2005, 2006] suggest that cultural values m atter in women’s 
fertility decisions. The former paper uses data from the United States’ 1970 Cen­
sus, focusing on women born in the US but whose fathers were not. They define
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‘country of origin’ to be the father’s country of birth. They restrict their sam­
ple to married women aged 30-40, resulting in 6,774 observations after omitting 
women from various countries.5 Their remaining sample contains women having 
origins in 25 different countries. However, 16 of these are European, and four 
of the others are members of the OECD .6
In the latter paper, they use data from the US General Social Survey (GSS). 
This dataset contains variables covering fertility and ethnic origins, in the form 
of a question “From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors 
come?” They restrict attention to women born in the US to control for country 
differences such as educational systems. Taking observations from 1977, 1978, 
1980 and 1982-1987, they select their sample to include only married women 
aged 29-50. They again make restrictions on country of origin, similar to those 
discussed in footnote 5. Here they are reduced to 14 countries, of which 11 are 
European, a further two OECD but not European (Canada and Mexico), and 
finally Russia.
The proxy Fernandez and Fogli use for ‘cultural values’ is 1950 Total Fertility 
Rate (TFR) in country of origin. 7 They state that this is the earliest data 
appropriate, and it is intended to represent TFR at the time of respondents’ 
ancestors’ migration. In this case, timing assumption is arguable; respondents 
ancestors may have migrated hundreds of years previously. Indeed, only 8 % of 
respondents claimed “American” or “American Indian” heritage [Fernandez and 
Fogli, 2006, footnote 7, p. 554]. However in mitigation, the authors indicate that 
the distribution of national TFRs is highly stable [Fernandez and Fogli, 2006, 
pp. 560].
5They exclude all women whose fathers bom  in countries that became centrally planned 
economies after World War II, reasoning that these women’s parents must have been in the US 
by 1940. Therefore their emigrating parents would not have experienced the transformation 
to communism, and TFR in 1950 does not ‘capture the correct culture for these individuals’ 
[Fernandez and Fogli, 2005, p. 10]. They also exclude countries with fewer than 15 observa­
tions.
6The remainder are Cuba, China, Lebanon, the Philippines and Syria.
7TFR attempts to measure the number of children a woman is expected to have ‘by the end 
of her childbearing years’. It is be calculated as the sum of age-specific fertility rates, weighted 
by the probability of reaching each given age. It does not, however, denote the completed 
(ie, actual) fertility of any cohort of women, and is affected by changes in birth timing, as 
highlighted by Bongaarts and Feeney [1998]. I will discuss timing further in Section 2.4.
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2.2.3 The Labour Force Survey
I use household data obtained from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) between 
1996 and 2005 and proxy data from the World Bank Development Indicators 
dataset. The LFS is a rolling panel conducted every quarter with each house­
hold appearing in five ‘waves’, and contains variables detailing employment, 
education, income, family status, ethnicity and religion.8 Whilst there are some 
disadvantages, the LFS data are superior to the US Census data and GSS in 
several ways.
2.2.3.1 Disadvantages o f the LFS
First and foremost, the LFS does not contain data on respondents’ ancestry; 
in my data, country of origin is known only for first generation immigrants. I 
believe that this disadvantage of the LFS data is more than compensated by 
the ability to focus solely on a single generation of immigrants who have a rela­
tively consistent history in the UK. Fernandez and Fogli [2005] focus on second 
generation immigrants, but if there were heterogeneity in matching between 
groups (ie, some nationalities are more likely to find a partner within their own 
group), then the cultural transmission would also feasibly be heterogeneous, 
since women reporting some nationalities would be more likely to have both 
parents of that nationality .9 The reporting of origin in Fernandez and Fogli 
[2006] is even more restricted, because the GSS data cannot discern how long 
ago respondents’ ancestors arrived. In some cases this may have been hundreds 
of years ago, so 1950 TFR may be an inappropriate proxy for their cultural 
values. By taking only first-generation immigrants, I ensure that the women in 
question have comparable circumstances.
A second disadvantage is that the LFS does not contain ‘raw’ fertility data,
81 take household responses from the first wave only.
9I am able to test for heterogeneity in matching rates. In my sample, 46% of women 
have husbands from the same country of origin. Across countries, the average proportion of 
husbands of the same origin is 0.40 with a standard deviation of 0.24. Singapore is lowest 
(0.028) and Albania is highest (1.00). This suggests there may be heterogeneity in transmission 
of values.
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for example in the form of birth histories or a number-of-births variable. To 
circumvent this, an identifying assumption must be made: I assume that all 
children live with their mothers [as in Gangadharan and Maitra, 2003].10 That 
is, I take the number of a woman’s children in the household to be the number 
of that she has had. Implicitly, childhood mortality is assumed to be zero. Non­
trivial mortality will only cause identification problems if there is heterogeneity 
in mortality rates amongst immigrants from different countries. 11 It is likely 
that infant mortality would be higher for those immigrants from less-developed 
countries, where fertility is typically higher [Troe, 2008]. This would tend to 
bias down the coefficient on country of origin TFR, making it harder to find 
a significant positive result. However, since mortality is low in general, this is 
unlikely to be problematic.
2.2.3.2 Censoring
To reiterate, I define a woman’s fertility to be the number of her children and 
stepchildren aged below 15 who live in her household. I label this variable 
CHILDREN. This is likely to be accurate for younger women: they are not old 
enough to have children who are older than fifteen. However, attenuation may 
occur with older women, particularly for those groups who have children earlier. 
This could have implications when considering birth timing factors (see Section 
2.4). The effect can be considered as a ‘censoring’ of the data (cf. Greene [1997, 
§19.9.2, pp. 936]).
In several regression specifications (see Tables 2.3, 2.6 and 2.8) large squared- 
age coefficients indicate declining completed fertility with age at the upper end 
of the sample range. Possibly older cohorts simply had fewer children. How­
ever, this finding is more likely to reflect either censoring of the data as older 
children leave home, or that the a quadratic model is unsuitable for such a wide 
age sample. The former is more likely and the results in Fernandez and Fogli
10I treat stepchildren in exactly the same way as children, reasoning that for each woman 
living with a stepchild, there is a woman not living with her child.
11 In computing TFR estimates I also neglect adult mortality. Therefore I simply compute 
TFR as a sum of age-specific fertility rates.
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[2006] do not show this effect (Fernandez and Fogli [2005] does not report age 
coefficients). Further, as can be seen in Figure 2.2, women appear to have chil­
dren swiftly once they begin a family, and then childbearing tails off. Thus, 
the total number of children is increasing, but at a diminishing rate, suggesting 
a quadratic is appropriate. However, all results presented here are robust to 
eliminating women over 39. I attempt to address some of these issues in Section 
2.4.
2.2.3.3 Advantages o f the LFS
Most importantly, the LFS is a large survey. The years 1996-2005 record 1.15 
million people, of which almost 80,000 were born abroad. I present results 
using almost all 11,081 married women in aged 30-49; this compares favourably 
with Fernandez and Fogli’s samples of 6,774 from the US Census [2005] and 
of 1,177 from the GSS [2006].12 Various summary statistics can be seen in 
Table 2.1. GTFR is my proxy for fertility norms, the Total Fertility Rate 
in the country of origin, taken from the World Bank Development Indicators 
(1997), and DEGREE, FE, AL and GCSE are indicators of highest educational 
attainment, taken from the LFS variable HIQUALD. Husband’s gross pay is 
measured in thousands of pounds per annum, and is derived from the LFS 
variables GRSSWK and GRSSWK2 (gross weekly pay in first and second jobs 
respectively).
The LFS also captures immigrants from many more countries than the GSS: 
89 compared with fourteen. Moreover, my sample includes a wide variety of 
currently developing countries (see Table 2.2); in the GSS sample the majority 
of original countries — and the majority of sample respondents — are from 
western Europe. Only one has a instrumented TFR of above four (Mexico, with 
6.87 children per woman), and only a further three have values above three. 
The mean 1950 TFR is 3.01, with a standard deviation of 1.20. In my sample
12 Following Fernandez and Fogli, I disregard countries with fewer than ten observations 
(though all results are robust to their inclusion). However, I have not eliminated women from 
the former communist bloc as those authors do: their reasoning is not applicable for the time 
periods relevant to my sample.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics, women born abroad aged 30-49, Labour Force 
Survey 1996-2005. GTFR is my proxy for fertility norms, taken from the World 
Bank Development Indicators. DEGREE, FE, AL and GCSE are indicators of 
highest educational attainment. Husband’s gross pay measured in thousands of 
pounds per annum.
V ariable M ean S td . Dev. M in. M ax. N
CHILDREN 1.48 1.264 0 9 11081
GTFR 3.126 1.498 1.087 7.25 11081
AGE 39.179 5.654 30 49 11081
DEGREE 0.123 0.328 11081
FE 0.062 0.241 11081
AL 0.065 0.246 11081
GCSE 0.086 0.28 11081
Husband’s DEGREE 0 .2 0 1 0.4 11081
Husband’s FE 0.048 0.214 11081
Husband’s AL 0 .1 2 0.326 11081
Husband’s GCSE 0.056 0.229 11081
Husband’s gross pay 29.497 26.388 0.26 663.416 4370
the values are 3.13 and 1.50, respectively. Figure 2.1 shows the relationship 
between my sample’s mean fertility and country of origin TFR.
For simplicity, I use 1997 TFR as my proxy for fertility preferences. The 
window for arrivals in the LFS sample is 1946-2005.13 This is certainly smaller 
than the ‘arrival window’ Fernandez and Fogli [2006] are faced with, which is 
feasibly several hundred years since they cannot focus on a single generation 
of immigrants. Fernandez and Fogli [2005]’s sample also has a large arrival 
window.
Unfortunately the resolution of the country of origin data is not perfect: not 
all countries may be identified uniquely. I therefore take means of TFRs for 
‘grouped’ countries. The groupings are given in Appendix A .l, page 145.
13Women aged 29-50, interviewed between 1996 and 2005. Restricting by age at arrival 
would further reduce this window.
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Table 2.2: Country Statistics. See note on Table 2.1. Fertility denotes the mean 
number of children of immigrants from each country, as plotted in Figure 2.1. 
Country groups are explained in Appendix A.I.
Code Obs. GTFR Fert. Code Obs. GTFR Fert.
AGO 17 7.00 1.58 MEX 22 2.64 0.90
ALB 15 2.52 2.06 MLT 87 1.83 1.16
ARG 13 2.62 0.84 MMR 17 3.30 1.29
AUS 233 1.77 1.35 MUS 86 2.04 1.26
AUT 18 1.36 1.00 MWI 60 6.43 1.63
BEL 30 1.60 1.83 MYS 167 3.26 1.25
BGD 536 3.30 2.55 NGA 204 6.00 1.92
BGR 20 1.09 1.05 NLD 88 1.53 1.56
BIH 11 1.60 1.45 NOR 27 1.86 1.22
BRA 49 2.27 0.97 NZL 108 1.96 1.25
BRB 24 1.75 1.33 PAK 1034 5.00 2.22
CAN 183 1.55 1.15 PHL 235 3.64 1.06
CHE 43 1.48 1.20 POL 126 1.51 0.92
CHI 18 1.75 1.38 PRT 102 1.46 1.15
CHL 15 2.25 1.26 ROM 26 1.32 0.88
CHN 132 1.90 1.09 RUS 55 1.23 0.87
COL 51 2.70 1.13 SDN 26 4.90 2.30
CYP 198 2.00 1.38 SGP 181 1.63 1.29
CZE 18 1.17 1.66 SLE 29 6.06 1.62
DEU 522 1.35 1.38 SOM 31 7.25 3.00
DNK 43 1.75 1.11 SVK 12 1.43 0.50
DZA 20 3.50 1.80 SWE 53 1.52 1.35
EGY 39 3.55 1.53 THA 61 1.90 0.81
ESP 97 1.15 1.21 TTO 54 1.75 1.40
ETH 19 5.86 0.89 TUR 152 2.72 1.36
FIN 32 1.75 1.15 TZA 126 5.60 1.34
GHA 122 4.50 1.63 UGA 195 6.60 1.38
GRC 23 1.31 1.08 UKR 22 1.30 1.00
GUY 39 2.45 0.97 USA 428 1.97 1.32
HKG 239 1.08 1.29 VNM 53 2.40 1.54
HRV 15 1.69 1.13 YUG 75 1.74 1.69
HUN 20 1.38 0.85 ZAF 301 3.00 1.28
IDN 20 2.75 0.90 ZAR 11 6.70 2.81
IND 1529 3.30 1.32 ZMB 91 5.60 1.60
IRN 113 2.80 1.46 ZWE 144 3.96 1.50
IRQ 49 4.70 1.95 GRP02 36 5.60 1.22
ITA 170 1.22 0.98 GRP03 29 3.00 1.44
JAM 193 2.70 1.06 GRP04 109 5.30 1.69
JPN 137 1.38 1.05 GRP07 46 3.10 1.23
KEN 577 4.70 1.34 GRP08 99 5.70 1.88
KOR 39 1.60 1.35 GRP09 27 4.60 1.11
LBN 27 2.50 1.66 GRP10 203 1.72 1.31
LBY 38 3.80 2.26 GRP12 35 4.45 2.11
LKA 207 2.15 1.30
LTU 18 1.39 0.55 Av. 124.5 2.89 1.38
MAR 37 3.10 1.64 Std. 214.4 1.63 0.45
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Figure 2.1: Mean fertility of immigrants in UK versus TFR in country of ori­
gin. Fit lines are (a) weighted by size of country group in my sample, and (b) 
unweighted.
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2.3 Regression Specifications and R esults
2.3.1 Ordinary Least Squares
Fernandez and Fogli [2006] run several ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions 
of the following form:
Zisjt =  Po +  P[Xi  +  P'2Yi - f  P'3Z j +  / s +  7 t  +  €iSj t ■
Here, ZiSj t is the fertility of a woman i, who lives in region s, is of ancestry 
j ,  and is interviewed in year t. X i contains individual characteristics depending 
on the specification and Zj is the cultural values proxy: country of origin TFR 
(I label this variable GTFR). yt is the year-of-survey fixed effect. Here, I do not 
consider regional effects (f s). Yt is the number of siblings the woman herself 
has, a factor which I also do not investigate here.
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2.3.1.1 Regression M odel
My comparable regression model is:
Zijt — A) +  P[Xi +  fyZj  + 7 1 +  tijt-
The terms are:
Zijt The number of children of a woman i, who lives in region s, is of 
ancestry j ,  and is interviewed in LFS wave t. I label this variable 
CHILDREN.
X i  Individual characteristics of woman i, depending on the specification.
Zj My proxy for fertility norms, the Total Fertility Rate of country j .
This variable is labelled GTFR.
7 1 Survey-wave fixed effect.
€ijt Error term.
Control variables used include AGE and AGE2, the woman’s age and squared 
age; indicators DEGREE, FE, AL and GCSE denoting the woman’s education 
(a degree, further education, A-Level and GCSE attainment (or equivalent) 
respectively); husband’s educational attainment indicators; and her husband’s 
gross pay (measured in thousands of pounds sterling per annum ) . 14
The coefficient of interest is 02, which measures the power of the fertility 
proxy in explaining fertility outcomes amongst the women in my sample.
fa , the constant term, is a measure of the baseline number of children that 
the women in my sample have. If age controls are included in X i, it will reflect 
the number of children a woman has had at age 30, since the sample contains 
women of age 30-49. The actual expected number of children will be a linear 
transformation also involving the age coefficients from 0 \ . It must be noted that 
this is a completed fertility measure. I will return to this in Section 2.4. 15
14Husbands’ income is chosen to avoid endogeneity between fertility and women’s income. 
See the discussion on Page 43.
15In particular, see the discussion on page 65 concerning the interpretation of coefficients.
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2.3.1.2 R esults
Table 2.3 presents OLS results, with robust standard errors accounting for clus­
tering at the country of origin level. With only the cultural proxy included in the 
regression (column (1 )), Fernandez and Fogli [2006] find it to be statistically sig­
nificant at better than 1%, with a coefficient of 0.166. In the same specification 
I estimate this coefficient to be 0.146, also significant at 1%. (Time dummies 
are included for all 40 waves, as is a constant term, though these coefficients are 
not reported).
Where available, I use the same controls as Fernandez and Fogli: age (AGE), 
squared age (AGE2) and dummies for highest educational attainment (derived 
from the LFS variable HIQUALD). These are DEGREE, FE, AL and GCSE, 
representing degree level, further education level, A-Level or GCSE attainment 
respectively. Controlling for age and education (Table 2.3, column (2 )) they 
find this falls slightly to 0.117 (still significant at 1%); I find a value of 0.144, 
significant at 0 .1 %.
Quantitatively, this coefficient value corresponds to an increase of 0.23 chil­
dren for a standard deviation increase in GTFR (1.63). This is about half of 
the standard deviation of the fertility across country groups (0.45).
The age controls are also significant at 0.1% as would be expected and have 
the expected signs: the age coefficient is positive — older women have had more 
children, and the squared-age coefficient is negative suggesting (predictably) 
that the rate of childbearing declines with age.
The education dummies all have negative signs and are jointly significant at 
5%. However, only DEGREE and AL are individually significant, at the 1% and 
5% level respectively. Note that these two coefficients are quantitatively quite 
large (-0.282 and -0.244), suggesting that women having these qualifications 
tend to have a quarter of a child fewer.
W ith GTFR ranging between 1.087 and 7.25 (Table 2.1), country of origin 
fertility is the largest factor in predicting individuals’ fertility besides age, dom­
inating education. These findings support the argument that cultural values are
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Table 2.3: Ordinary Least-Squares regressions, family size on TFR rate in coun­
try of origin. A constant term and wave dummies are included in each regression. 
Standard errors account for clustering at the country of origin level (White) 
[Greene, 1997, pp. 503].
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
GTFR 0.146**
(0.0452)
0.144***
(0.0419)
0.140***
(0.0405)
0.116**
(0.0379)
AGE 0.720***
(0.0347)
0.723***
(0.0339)
0.749***
(0.0483)
AGE2 -0.00992***
(0.000394)
-0.00996***
(0.000383)
-0 .0 1 0 1 ***
(0.000579)
DEGREE -0.282**
(0.105)
-0.236**
(0.0745)
-0.265**
(0.0824)
FE -0.144
(0.105)
-0.0968
(0.0818)
-0.0153
(0.0937)
AL -0.244*
(0 .1 1 2 )
-0.192*
(0.0896)
-0.136
(0.0915)
GCSE -0.126
(0.104)
-0.0737
(0.0855)
-0.0698
(0.0743)
Husband’s DEGREE -0.0948
(0.0757)
-0.0436
(0.0979)
Husband’s FE -0.145
(0.0805)
-0.0678
(0.107)
Husband’s AL -0.189*
(0.0834)
-0.169
(0 .1 0 0 )
Husband’s GCSE -0.138
(0.0865)
-0.0834
(0 .1 2 2 )
Husband’s gross pay 0.00118
(0.00114)
Observations 11081 11081 11081 4370
R 2 0.035 0.166 0.169 0.144
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p <  0.05, ** p <  0.01, *** p <  0.001.
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Table 2.4: Correlations between educational controls for women and their hus­
bands. Note that the indicator is 1 for the highest level of qualification only. 
NONE corresponds no qualification.
Variables DEGREE FE AL GCSE NONE
Husband’s DEGREE 0.45 0.09 0.06 -0 .0 2 -0.38
Husband’s FE 0.03 0 .1 2 0.05 0.07 -0.15
Husband’s AL -0.03 0.03 0 .1 1 0.13 -0.13
Husband’s GCSE -0.04 0.04 0.05 0 .1 2 -0 .1 0
Husband’s NONE -0.34 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 0.50
significant in determining family size preferences.
My estimates of the GTFR and age coefficients are robust to including 
women’s husbands’ characteristics (Table 2.3, columns (3) and (4)). Dummies 
for husbands’ education all appear negatively, with A-Level attainment having 
5% significance (column (3)). This finding is unexpected, since if fathers do 
not undertake childcare, higher paternal earnings would expand the household 
budget set without increasing opportunity costs, as in Galor and Weil [1996, 
2000]. However, there is a high level of correlation between husbands’ and 
wives’ education (Table 2.4) — there is some degree of assortative matching.
Assortative matching entails that the coefficients on husbands’ education 
partly identify their wives’ education. In Table 2.3, column (3), women’s educa­
tion dummies are all reduced in magnitude (they become more positive) when 
husbands’ education is included, though significance levels are unchanged. The 
minor increase in the R 2 statistic is consistent with this story. As such, hus­
band’s education may act negatively because educated men marry educated 
women (who have fewer children), even though husbands’ human capital may 
have a positive effect on fertility in itself.
In Table 2.3, column (4), husbands’ income is included in the regression. 
Husband’s gross pay enters positively but insignificantly. This mirrors the find­
ing by Fernandez and Fogli [2006]. The positive effect is previously documented 
[Butz and Ward 1979; Heckman and Walker 1990, in Galor and Weil 1996] and 
is predicted by the models of Galor and Weil [1996, 2000]. Though insignificant, 
the positive coefficient is consistent with paternal education having a positive
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effect on fertility which is dominated by assortative matching with educated 
women.
The influence of women’s age and education are robust to inclusion of hus­
bands’ income, and small changes to the education coefficients are attributable 
to the smaller subsample. Results are very similar when specification (3) is run 
on the sample of model (4) (regression not reported).
2.3.1.3 Fixed Effect M odels
Table 2.5 presents OLS results with country of origin dummies included, rather 
than country of origin fertility. The fit of each model (measured by the R 2 
statistic) can be used to infer the explanatory power of the culture proxy. With 
each set of controls, the more general specification improves model fit by around 
8  percentage points, with the country of origin dummies being significant at 
better than 0.1% in each case. On its own, the proxy GTFR explains 3.5% of 
fertility differences between women (Table 2.3, column (1)), or roughly a third 
of the differences between country groups. Other factors make up two-thirds of 
between-group differences.
Standard deviations of the country dummies lie in the range 0.41-0.47 for the 
various specifications in the table. As in the previous specification, differences 
in fertility between country groups are larger than the effects of any other factor 
in the regressions, except age.
In the alternative models with country dummies, coefficients on women’s 
education all become less negative, with A-Level education becoming insignifi­
cant and both DEGREE and GCSE increasing by around 0.13, about half their 
magnitude. This result suggests there are differences in levels of education be­
tween country groups that are not correlated with GTFR. The country dummies 
identify some of the educational differences.
Husbands’ education coefficients also become more positive; they are sta­
tistically insignificant (column (3)). Moreover, these coefficients are essentially 
insignificant economically. In this case, including husbands’ education does not
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Table 2.5: Ordinary Least-Squares regressions, family size on country of origin 
dummies. Wave dummies are included in each regression. Standard errors 
account for clustering at the country of origin level (White) [Greene, 1997, pp. 
503].
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGE 0.737***
(0.0307)
0.739***
(0.0304)
0.745***
(0.0473)
AGE2 -0 .0 1 0 1 ***
(0.000353)
-0 .0 1 0 1 ***
(0.000351)
-0 .0 1 0 0 0 ***
(0.000569)
DEGREE -0.153**
(0.0502)
-0.160**
(0.0484)
-0 .2 2 1 **
(0.0728)
FE -0.0125
(0.0500)
-0.00719
(0.0495)
0.0399
(0.0677)
AL -0.125
(0.0643)
-0.114
(0.0613)
-0.116
(0.0782)
GCSE 0.00128
(0.0454)
0.0157
(0.0444)
-0.00218
(0.0600)
Husband’s DEGREE 0.00521
(0.0406)
0.0217
(0.0763)
Husband’s FE -0.0509
(0.0548)
-0.0138
(0.0892)
Husband’s AL -0.0738
(0.0428)
-0.0901
(0.0673)
Husband’s GCSE -0.0462
(0.0463)
-0.0214
(0.0811)
Husband’s gross pay 0.00205**
(0.000752)
Observations 11081 11081 11081 4370
R 2 0.119 0.241 0.241 0.224
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p <  0.05, ** p  <  0.01, *** p <  0.001.
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increase the R 2 statistic at all, suggesting a high correlation in educational 
attainment both within couples and within country groups.
With country fixed effects, husbands’ income is significant at the 1% level 
(Table 2.3, column (4)). Relative to the baseline model with the culture proxy, 
the point estimate coefficient is almost doubled, and all the educational dum­
mies are more positive. As with education, income levels are likely to be differ­
ent between country groups. Across the whole sample, income is statistically 
insignificant, but once group differences are accounted for with fixed effects, 
income is significant.
The magnitudes of the fixed effect coefficients, along with the lesser im­
portance of education is consistent with significant differences in family size 
preferences across groups. Transmitted values, as proxied by country of ori­
gin fertility, appears to comprise a non-trivial component of these differences. 
Nonetheless, there are sizeable group-specific factors that are not captured by 
the proxy. Future work will investigate these differences more fully, particularly 
with respect to sample selection issues.
2.3.1.4 Problem s
Econometrically, a linear specification is unsatisfactory. The number of children 
a woman has is likely to be better modelled as a discrete, count-based data 
generating process. I shall now consider some of these specifications, following 
the discussion in Greene [1997, §19.9] and Wooldridge [2002, §19.2]. Young 
[2005a,b] demonstrates some applications of this model to fertility.
2.3.2 Poisson Count
2.3.2.1 Regression M odel
In the Poisson count model, the dependent variable takes a Poisson distribution 
with mean (and hence variance) whose logarithm is a linear combination of the
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independent variables. 16 That is,
Zijt ~  Poisson (jiijt)
Where logfiijt = (30 + f3[Xi + (3'2Zj +  7 1.
Conveniently, the estimates have the same interpretation as those in a log- 
linear regression.
The coefficient estimates may computed numerically by the maximum like­
lihood method. It should be noted the Poisson model necessarily implies het- 
eroskedasticity, since if Z  ~  Poisson(/z), then Var(Z) =  E (Z) =  /z.
Even in the case that the dependent process is not Poisson, the coefficient 
estimates found by (pseudo-)maximum likelihood estimation are robust to a 
number of misspecifications. Particularly, they are unchanged under the gener­
alisation that Var(Z) =  cr2E(Z) for constant a2. If a 2 >  1 this is described as 
‘over-dispersion’ Wooldridge [2 0 0 2 , p. 647]. However, although the coefficient 
estimates are unchanged, the standard errors must be adjusted upwards.
Conversely, if cr2 < 1 (under-dispersion), the standard errors derived by 
pseudo-maximum likelihood are robust. There are a number of tests for over­
dispersion (recorded in Wooldridge [2002, pp. 655] and Greene [1997, §19.9.3, 
pp. 937]). I have found no evidence of over-dispersion in my sample; most tests 
indicate a small degree of under-dispersion.
2.3.2.2 Results
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 records the results of these Poisson regressions with the same 
independent variables as the OLS regressions in Tables 2.3 and 2.5 respectively, 
again with clustered errors at the country of origin level. In each case the fit is 
slightly better than its OLS counterpart, according to the predicted values test 
(Pseudo-R 2) given by Wooldridge [2002, p. 653].
The coefficients cannot be compared directly with those from the OLS but
 k
16The Poisson distribution with parameter /z has probability mass function f(k) = e .
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Table 2.6: Poisson regressions, family size on TFR rate in country of origin. 
A constant term and wave dummies are included in each regression. Standard 
errors account for clustering at the country of origin level (White) [Greene, 1997, 
pp. 503].
(1 )
Poisson
(2 )
Poisson
(3)
Poisson
(4)
Poisson
GTFR 0.0950***
(0.0259)
0.0937***
(0.0237)
0.0912***
(0.0231)
0.0804***
(0.0232)
AGE 0.637***
(0.0559)
0.640***
(0.0550)
0.670***
(0.0451)
AGE2 -0.00877***
(0.000724)
-0.00881***
(0.000712)
-0.00908***
(0.000567)
DEGREE -0 .2 0 0 **
(0.0660)
-0.167***
(0.0478)
-0.191***
(0.0567)
FE -0.103
(0.0695)
-0.0695
(0.0553)
-0.0149
(0.0651)
AL -0.172*
(0.0707)
-0.136*
(0.0575)
-0 .1 0 0
(0.0627)
GCSE -0.0891
(0.0647)
-0.0533
(0.0541)
-0.0419
(0.0497)
Husband’s DEGREE -0.0681
(0.0471)
-0.0325
(0.0649)
Husband’s FE -0.106*
(0.0515)
-0.0501
(0.0704)
Husband’s AL -0.134*
(0.0535)
-0.125
(0.0684)
Husband’s GCSE -0.0968
(0.0546)
-0.0650
(0.0812)
Husband’s gross pay 0.000829
(0.000871)
Observations 
Pseudo R 2
11081
0.034
11081
0.175
11081
0.178
4370
0.151
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.05, ** p <  0.01, *** p  <  0.001.
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Table 2.7: Poisson regressions, family size on country of origin dummies. A 
constant term and wave dummies are included in each regression. Standard 
errors account for clustering at the country of origin level (White) [Greene, 
1997, pp. 503].
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGE 0.650***
(0.0496)
0.651***
(0.0495)
0.667***
(0.0445)
AGE2 -0.00892***
(0.000644)
-0.00894***
(0.000644)
-0.00901***
(0.000569)
DEGREE -0.109**
(0.0346)
-0.113***
(0.0335)
-0.163**
(0.0520)
FE -0.0119
(0.0348)
-0.00726
(0.0343)
0.0243
(0.0453)
AL -0.0883*
(0.0428)
-0.0799
(0.0409)
-0.0846
(0.0542)
GCSE 0 .0 0 1 1 2
(0.0286)
0 . 0 1 2 0
(0.0284)
0.00818
(0.0418)
Husband’s DEGREE 0.00178
(0.0278)
0.0176
(0.0514)
Husband’s FE -0.0430
(0.0380)
-0.0134
(0.0583)
Husband’s AL -0.0575
(0.0300)
-0.0730
(0.0475)
Husband’s GCSE -0.0360
(0.0302)
-0.0206
(0.0516)
Husband’s gross pay 0.00149**
(0.000530)
Observations 11081 11081 11081 4370
Pseudo R 2 0 .1 2 0 0.254 0.0254 0.233
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p <  0.05, ** p  <  0.01, *** p  <  0.001.
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the pattern of significance is very similar, as are the relative magnitudes. GTFR 
is statistically significant at 0 .1 % in each specification.
Quantitively, these results suggest that a one (group) standard deviation 
increase in GTFR (1.63) explains an increase in fertility of 13-14%. As with 
the OLS regressions, the economic significance of the culture proxy dominates 
all other factors except age. Again, country fixed effects improve the fit of the 
model by around 8  percentage points, with GTFR alone explaining 3.4% of 
family size differences, consistent with a role for cultural values in determining 
fertility preferences.
2.4 Heterogeneous Birth Timing
Fernandez and Fogli [2006] take some steps to address the dynamic nature of 
fertility: they restrict the sample to older women (ages 29-50), and they in­
corporate age and squared-age controls. In Fernandez and Fogli [2005] they 
consider only women aged 30-40. Ideally one would consider only ‘completed 
fertility’, looking at older women, so that any timing differences would be ac­
counted for. However, in the sample age range, women are still fertile. Hence, 
coefficient estimates may be biased or misleading if birth timing is heterogeneous 
and systematically correlated with the cultural proxy.
Figure 2.2 indicates this may be the case: it appears that women from 
high-TFR countries reach their highest fertility in the 20-25 age band, whereas 
women from low-TFR countries reach their peak between 25 and 30. This 
comparison does not control for factors such as education, but this illustration 
suggests that further investigation is appropriate.
There is another potential problem deriving from birth timing: differing 
patterns of fertility after thirty are seen, implying heterogeneity in birth rates 
in the 30-40 age band. This is likely to bias the measurement of completed 
fertility differences, because age coefficients will not correctly capture continuing 
fertility for all groups. It is not clear that Fernandez and Fogli [2006] will be
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Figure 2.2: Trends in birth timing. Data plotted are the age-specific fertility 
rates for immigrants, grouped by TFR in their country of origin.
TFR estimates for each group are the sum of the 5-year rates (see the discussion 
in Footnote 11, page 46). This is equal to the integral of the relevant curve. 
Not only do high-TFR countries (third and top quartiles) have more children, 
their peak fertility appears to be earlier (25-30 as opposed to 30-35).
Note that raw data is plotted: there are no controls for educational attainment 
or other factors; these may be correlated with the TFR proxy.
Fertility trends by country-of-origin TFR quartiles
-B—  Bottom quartile (TFR 1.4) 
-6—  Second Quartile (TFR 1.8) 
-0—  Third Quartile (TFR 2.3)
■*—  Top Quartile (TFR 2.6)0.7
0.6
S’ 0.5
0.4
0.2
0.1
Age
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immune from this problem if similar trends were shown in their data. Indeed, 
is possible that Fernandez and Fogli [2005] will be more susceptible, since their 
sample includes only women in that age range.
Here, I test for this effect by including the interaction between age and the 
TFR instrument as a regressor in a Poisson regression. An alternate specification 
would allow different countries of origin to have different age coefficients (a 
random growth model).
2.4.1 Concerns
Birth timing may be heterogeneous for several reasons. Education might be 
expected to be a major factor, since women may defer childbearing until it is 
completed. Earnings and the expected path of future income may also play a 
role, and this may be ambiguous: women might decide to have children when 
their financial constraints are less, but also they may delay childbearing if the 
present opportunity cost is very high.
These effects are also likely to work though husbands’ earnings, recalling 
the contribution of Galor and Weil [1996]. In their model, increases in women’s 
wages increase the opportunity cost of childrearing and reduce fertility. Con­
versely, men’s wages relate only to the size of the budget set, and higher male 
wages make children more ‘affordable’: fertility increases in male earnings.
Finally, another reason for heterogeneous birth timing may be differing pref­
erences — that is, cultural values. It is appropriate for any work considering 
culture and fertility preferences to consider preferences regarding timing; how­
ever neither Fernandez and Fogli [2005] nor Fernandez and Fogli [2006] mentions 
this.
2.4.2 Implications
If women from low-TFR countries have children earlier, this will bias up the 
estimated differences in completed fertility. The mechanism for this is simple: 
selecting a sample of women aged 30 and older, the regression model used entails
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that the constant term and coefficient on GTFR together reflect fertility at age 
30, with the age coefficients reflecting time trends as if  common to all women.
As an example, consider the hypothetical case that the cultural proxy was 
entirely uncorrelated with completed fertility, but a high proxy were related 
to early fertility. A regression including only women in the middle of their 
fertile years would record a positive coefficient on GTFR, since those with a 
high proxy would have ad their children early, before the time of measurement 
and the others would not yet have had their children. Conversely, a regression 
with only older women would report zero: the true effect of GTFR on fertility. 
The positive estimate is only due to timing, not aggregate fertility. If between- 
group timing differences are present in the data, the interpretation of the GTFR 
coefficient must be re-examined.
2.4.3 Testing
Here, I test for a time-shift correlated with GTFR by including the interaction 
between age and the TFR instrument as a regressor in a Poisson regression. 
I append two terms, GTFR*AGE, and GTFR*AGE2, taking account of the 
interactions with age and squared age respectively.
First, the AGE coefficient is likely to increase, since the baseline woman (low 
GTFR) is expected to have children at a faster rate in the sample age range. 
The interaction coefficient will correspondingly take a negative sign, since high- 
GTFR women are expected to have fewer children between 30 and 50.
By allowing separate trends for high- and low-GTFR women, I expect the 
former to be fitted a flatter cumulative fertility with age, and the latter a steeper 
profile. This results in a wider gap between the predicted fertilities at age 30 
— ie, a larger GTFR coefficient. But since the trends converge, the gap in 
completed fertility is now smaller. The effect on the constant term will depend 
on the identity ‘baseline’ woman, ie, the normalisation used. I will return to 
this in Section 2.4.3.3.
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2.4.3.1 Norm alisation
Up to this point, I have followed Fernandez and Fogli [2005, 2006] to allow a 
direct comparison of my results. However, the interpretation of the constant 
term is not immediately obvious in their framework. I therefore make a number 
of normalisations.
First, I normalise the cultural proxy GTFR by subtracting the value for 
Britain (1.73) to construct the variable GTFRN. The objective is to put in con­
text the constant term and age coefficients for a hypothetical British woman.17
Secondly, I normalise age by subtracting 30, the lower bound of my sample, 
constructing the variable AGEN, squaring this to make AGEN2. Along with 
the above, this now gives a very simple interpretation of the constant term. In 
a linear regression it is the expected number of children a British woman aged 
30, and in a Poisson regression it is the logarithm of this expectation.
Note that these linear transformations do not alter the fundamental regres­
sion framework. To see this, observe that the spans (GTFR, AGE, AGE2,1) and 
((G T F R -1.73), (A G E-30), (A G E -30)2, 1) are the same, since (A G E -30)2 =  
AGE2 — 60(AGE) +  900. Another way of putting this is that the new coefficients 
will be bijection of the old coefficients. 18
2.4.3.2 Results
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2.8 records the results from OLS and Poisson 
regressions with interaction terms between age and my cultural proxy. Columns
(1) and (3) show results from regression without interactions. These two are 
transformations of the regressions in Table 2.3 column (2) and Table 2.6 column
(2) respectively, following the preceding discussion. All regressions here include 
educational controls and sample wave dummies (not reported).
While interaction terms themselves are only significant in the Poisson model,
17This woman is hypothetical in the sense that she has ‘British preferences’ but was bom  
abroad. The baseline woman might alternately be considered to  be from France (inc. Monaco) 
(TFR 1.73) or Serbia and Montenegro (TFR 1.74).
18A simple algebraic manipulation shows that estimated coefficients on GTFR and GTFRN 
will be the same, as will the coefficients on AGE2 and AGEN2. /?a gen  =  /?AGE +  60/3agE2-
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Table 2.8: OLS and Poisson regressions with fertility rate-age interaction. Wave 
and educational dummies are included in each regression. Standard errors ac­
count for clustering at the country of origin level (White).
For reference, columns (1) and (3) record analogous regressions to those in Table 
2.3 column (2) and Table 2.6 column (2) respectively; refer to the discussion on 
normalisation (page 65).
(1 )
OLS
(2 )
OLS
(3)
Poisson
(4)
Poisson
GTFRN 0.144***
(0.0419)
0.246***
(0.0707)
0.0937***
(0.0237)
0.156***
(0.0378)
AGEN 0.125***
(0.0126)
0.141***
(0.0125)
0 .1 1 1 ***
(0.0132)
0.135***
(0.0124)
AGEN2 -0.00992***
(0.000394)
-0.00999***
(0.000513)
-0.00877***
(0.000724)
-0.00982***
(0.000705)
GTFRN*AGEN -0.0118
(0.00642)
-0.0150**
(0.00507)
GTFRN* AGEN2 0.0000423
(0.000242)
0.000646*
(0.000277)
Constant 1.391***
(0.116)
1.255***
(0.0956)
0.260***
(0.0768)
0.158*
(0.0744)
Observations 11081 11081 11081 11081
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p <  0.05, ** p <  0.01, *** p  <  0.001.
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Table 2.9: Predicted fertility deriving from regressions (2) and (4) from Table 
2.8; no educational dummies are used. Note that predicted fertility declines 
between 35 and 40; this follows from large squared age coefficients relative the 
age coefficients, and may reflect censoring in the data (see page 45).
Age 30 35 40
OLS ‘Britain’ (GTFRN =  0 ) 1.26 1.71 1.67
Kenya (GTFRN = 1.97) 1.74 2.08 1.93
Difference 0.48 0.37 0.26
Poisson ‘Britain’ (GTFRN =  0 ) 1.17 1.80 1.69
Kenya (GTFRN = 1.97) 1.59 2.18 1.94
Difference 0.42 0.38 0.25
they are jointly significant at 0.1% in the OLS model and at 0.5% in the Poisson 
model.
When the interaction terms are added, the GTFRN coefficients increase by 
roughly 70%. Also in line with predictions, the AGE coefficient increases with 
the interaction terms having opposite signs to the age terms. It remains signif­
icant in each specification. This might be taken as evidence that the cultural 
proxy is more important than previously thought. However, a more careful 
consideration these results suggests the opposite is true for completed fertility.
Table 2.9 shows predicted fertility for two women, one being a hypothetical 
British woman (GTFRN =  0), and the other being, say, Kenyan (GTFRN «  
2). (No educational dummies are applied.) It is predicted that the fertility 
difference is less for older women than those aged 30. This reflects the fact 
that the GTFRN interaction terms have the opposite signs to the plain age 
coefficients. However, these figures must be treated with caution, since declining 
total fertility suggests data problems, for example the censoring of children of 
older women (see page 45).
2.4.3.3 Explanation
It appears that the model of Fernandez and Fogli [2005, 2006] is insufficient 
to explain the fertility trends observed in my data. The evidence presented 
here suggests that a part of the measured fertility differences across groups may 
result from differences in birth timing and not differences in total fertility.
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Figure 2.3: A simple model of fertility dynamics.
a  represents the constant term in found in the regression, (3 the coefficient on 
GTFRN and 7  the coefficient on age. 5 denotes the GTFRN-age interaction. 
Quadratic age terms are ignored.
The a , /3 and 7  terms stylise the fitted coefficient values if an interaction term 
is not included in the regression.
Fertility
a  + (3 
a  +  /3
Age30 40
Though it appears that immigrants from high-TFR countries have had more 
children at the age of 30, this trend is reversed as immigrants from low-TFR 
countries catch up later. Figure 2.3 shows a stylised model of this. The dark 
lines represent linear fertility trends for women from a low-TFR country and a 
high-TFR country. At age 30, the fertility difference is (3. However, by age 40 
the gap narrows to (3 — 6.
The dotted lines in Figure 2.3 represent the model that Fernandez and Fogli 
fit, with a fixed fertility gap at all ages. The same age profile is fitted for both 
groups: this is too steep for the high-TFR women, and too shallow for the low- 
TFR women. The fitted profiles are then too close at 30 and too far apart at 
40 ((3 — 6 < (3 < (3). In this example, the predicted difference in both completed 
and age-30 fertility is (3. However, the true difference in completed fertility is 
(3 — 6. We see that interpretation of the GTFR coefficient is dependent on the
6 8
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timing of fertility within the sample.
With the normalisation I use in my regressions (explained in Section 2.4.3.1), 
the constant term corresponds to predicted fertility at 30 for a ‘British’ woman. 
Her fertility was previously overestimated. In the diagram, this corresponds to 
a  >  a .
2.4.3.4 Sim ulation
I conduct a simple simulation to estimate the effects of misspecifying the re­
gression model. If the interaction terms formed part of the true data-generating 
process, what would be the estimated coefficients if it was estimated without 
interaction terms?
To try and answer this hypothetical question, I generated 1000 predicted 
values using the constant, GTFRN, age and interaction coefficients for both the 
OLS and Poisson models. I took AGEN and GTFRN drawn from U[0,10] and 
U[0,2] respectively (corresponding to ages 30-40 and GTFR between 1.73 and 
3.73). I ignore education and wave coefficients.
I then regressed these predicted values on a constant, GTFRN and the age 
terms only. This gives predicted coefficients for Fernandez and Fogli’s spec­
ification, assuming the data-generating process truly involves the interaction 
terms.
Table 2.10 records the results of this exercise. While not matching the 
original estimates exactly, in each case the bias is towards that found in the 
‘No Interaction’ regressions. This further suggests that birth timing and not 
absolute differences in completed fertility rates may be driving Fernandez and 
Fogli’s results and my earlier estimates.
2.4.3.5 Summary
There is evidence that heterogeneity in birth timing may result in misleading 
results if it is not controlled for. Indeed, if cultural values act systematically 
on birth timing, the effect of the those norms on family size may have been
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Table 2.10: Actual and simulated regression coefficients, indicating bias in es­
timates without controls for birth timing. ‘Predicted’ estimates derive from 
regressions (2) and (4), Table 2.8. AGE and GTFRN are drawn from U[0,10] 
(corresponding to ages 30-40) and U[0,2] respectively with no education or wave 
coefficients.
‘No Interaction’ estimates are repeated from regressions (1) and (3), and ‘Inter­
action’ estimates are repeated from regressions (2) and (4).
No Interaction Predicted Interaction
OLS GTFRN
AGEN
AGEN2
Constant
0.144
0.125
-0.00992
1.391
0.187
0.129
-0.00993
1.320
0.246
0.141
-0.0999
1.255
Poisson GTFRN 0.0937 0.0997 0.156
AGEN 0 .1 1 1 0.119 0.135
AGEN2 -0.00877 -0.00915 -0.00982
Constant 0.260 0 .2 2 1 0.158
overestimated in previous work.
2.5 Conclusion
My results indicate that culture (as instrumented by country of origin TFR 
from the World Bank Development Indicators) does play a role in the fertility 
decisions of immigrants in the UK (recorded in the Labour Force Survey). I 
extend the linear regression model used by Fernandez and Fogli [2005, 2006] to 
a Poisson specification which is better suited to count data.
By including culture-age interaction terms in my regressions, I test for sys­
tematic differences in birth timing that are correlated with the culture proxy, 
and find statistically significant evidence for this. I argue that failure to account 
for timing can result in overestimation of the influence of culture on completed 
fertility.
Survival analysis would provide a robust way to deal with such timing issues. 
Hazard rate estimation has been used extensively to study son preference. 19 In 
that literature, the method takes women with a given number of children and 
assesses the likelihood that a woman has a further child, given the number of
19Examples include Leung [1988]; Gangadharan and Maitra [2003], and Chapters 3 and 4 
of this thesis.
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sons so far. Here, the dependent variable would be fertility rate in the country 
of origin. An additional benefit is the reduction in censoring problems when 
children leave home, since it is the age gaps between children that are relevant.
In sum, whilst cultural values do have a significant predictive effect for fertil­
ity, they do not appear to explain the whole story, since immigrants’ fertility is 
certainly different to that in their countries of origin. There are also differences 
in fertility rates between groups that are not attributable directly to fertility 
norms, though these may relate to other cultural institutions, such as childrea­
ring practices. Institutional structure may act by affecting implicit prices and 
surely play a significant role; further study is required to properly establish the 
importance of fertility values amongst these other factors.
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Chapter 3
Son preference and Culture
This paper measures the sex preferences of immigrant women in the 
United Kingdom by estimating the effect of family composition on birth 
hazard rates. International comparisons of son preference are constructed, 
the first known to the author. I argue that aggregate sex ratio statistics, 
as exploited in existing research, are inadequate for cross-sectional com­
parisons.
I construct a theoretical model which suggests that costs (eg, dowries) 
are unlikely to explain the variation in outcomes between groups. Both 
the model and data are supportive of a cultural, rather than economic, 
explanation for cross-country variation in sex preferences. Finally, women 
arriving in the UK at a young age appear to have less distinct tastes, also 
consistent with a primarily cultural explanation of parental sex prefer­
ences.
3.1 Introduction
Parental sex preferences are considered to be a primary factor in retarding 
development outcomes for girls [United Nations, 1994, 2000; Das Gupta et al., 
2002]. However, the underlying causes of preferential behaviour are still subject 
to much debate, with some researchers finding a primary role for cultural and 
social influences [see, for example, Das Gupta et al., 2002; Das Gupta, 2005], 
though others suggest economic factors are the major cause [eg, Burgess and 
Zhuang, 2000; Qian, 2006].1
1A third strand of research highlights the potential of biological explanations for skewed 
sex ratios [Graffelman and Hoekstra, 2000; Norberg, 2004; Oster, 2005, 2006; Matthews et al.,
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This paper assesses the fertility outcomes due to the sex preferences of im­
migrant women in the United Kingdom. By estimating birth hazard rates for 
country groups, I provide the first comparable microeconometric estimates of 
son preference for a range of countries. I argue that aggregate sex ratio statistics, 
as exploited in previous research, are an inadequate measure of sex preferences, 
and cross-sectional comparisons in particular are untenable.
Considerable differences in son preference are observed between groups in 
the sample, and income does not appear to account for these differences. In 
addition, a neoclassical model of fertility indicates that relative costs of boys 
and girls are unlikely to explain the findings. Finally, women arriving in the 
UK at a young age appear to have less distinct tastes. The data and theory are 
consistent with a primarily cultural explanation of parental sex preferences.
I identify variation in ‘cultural values’ by grouping women by country of 
origin. This assumes that, to some degree, their preferences or expectations 
are formed at an early point in life and retained from then on .2 I estimate 
the birth hazard rates of women with fixed effects (country dummies) for each 
group. Then, by interacting the country dummies with the number of boys 
already in each family, estimates of son preference are found for each group. 
The coefficients on these interaction terms measure the reduction in the hazard 
rate due to having an extra son, keeping family size constant.3
The identifying assumption is that the relative costs of girls and boys are 
equalised across groups — likely to be the case for women living in the UK. How­
ever, the overall cost of children need not be equalised across groups. The in­
clusion of non-interacted country dummies accounts for differing fertility trends 
between the groups, including differences due to costs.
Many groups I observe do reduce their fertility after having sons.4 I term
2008].
2Similarly to Fernandez and Fogli [2005, 2006] and Fisman and Miguel [2007]. Chapter 
2 considers the caveats to this approach in more detail. I make no attempt to fully capture 
cultural effects; ‘country of origin’ merely provides a source of variation in women’s values.
3The theoretical model of Section 3.2 rationalises this approach to measuring son prefer­
ences.
4 Almost all authors find that parents have preferences for sons when measured this way 
[eg, Leung, 1988; Gangadharan and Maitra, 2003; Das Gupta, 2005].
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this the ‘Big Sister Effect’ (BSE), since more children will end up with older 
sisters than older brothers. If prices are equal, greater preference for sons does 
result in a positive Big Sister Effect since the marginal value of a future child 
is higher for women with daughters.
Conversely, higher costs for girls lead to a ‘big brother effect’, contrary to 
what is observed in the data. As my theoretical model demonstrates, if girls 
are more costly, women having girls are poorer, all else equal. Thus, if children 
are a normal good, onward fertility should be lower for the women with girls. 
Das Gupta et al. [2002] argue that girls are indeed more expensive due to dowries 
or a lesser ability to provide care in old age; this argument applies particularly 
in son-preferring countries such as India or China. So if the price differential is 
positively correlated with a son preference, my measure of the big sister effect 
is downward biased. Thus, given the significant differences in the BSE between 
groups (robust to controlling for income) cultural values are likely to play an 
important role — they outweigh the price effects. This story is consistent with 
the weaker effects observed for young arrivals to the UK, who had less time 
immersed in their originating country.
In summary, I observe strong levels of son preference amongst some country 
groups, such as Bangladesh, India, Kenya and Pakistan. Conversely, women 
from most rich countries (eg, Germany), show insignificant preferences or a slight 
preference for daughters (Australia, Canada). I contend that this preferential 
behaviour cannot be explained by differences in the relative prices of girls, and 
so must derive from differences in individuals’ preferences.
Literature
To date, few studies have attempted to find explanations for the differences in 
parental sex preferences across countries. Indeed, to best of my knowledge, no 
study even measures the levels of son preferences accurately. This stems chiefly 
from a lack of appropriate data. An exception is Das Gupta et al. [2002], though 
this sociological study only surveys India, China and South Korea.
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Most studies assessing sex preferences focus on single countries. However, 
as Goodkind [1999] and Hank and Kohler [2002] note, findings are not usually 
comparable due to the variety of methodologies used.5 However, macro-level sex 
ratio statistics are readily available for many countries and regions, and these 
have been used by authors such as Oster [2005]; Qian [2006] and Dubuc and 
Coleman [2007]. Unfortunately aggregate measures are difficult to interpret in 
terms of parental sex preferences, since they are subject to ambiguous biases 
when birth-progression decisions are accounted for. This caveat is raised by 
Leung [1988]; the result dates back to Weiler [1959] and Goodman [1961]. In 
Chapter 4, I simulate the effect of observed behaviour on sex ratios, and con­
clude that population sex ratios are inappropriate for comparing son preferences 
between countries.
I follow the example of Leung [1988] and Gangadharan and Maitra [2003] in 
estimating the effect of existing family composition (number of sons) on birth 
hazard rates for different groups. Whereas they consider only a few ethnic 
groups, I am able to study women originating from a large number of countries. 
I believe my estimates are the first internationally comparable measures of son 
preference.
In contrast to sex preferences, fertility behaviour has received a considerably 
greater amount of attention .6 The most recent addition to our understanding of 
worldwide fertility differences is the recent work by Fernandez and Fogli [2005, 
2006] on the relevance of cultural factors. These papers, like Chapter 2, use 
surveys of immigrant women in given country, exploiting country of origin to 
provide variation in cultural background. Though culture is a robustly signifi­
cant predictor of influence, the estimated effects are not great, suggesting that
5Microeconometric techniques include surveying attitudes to sons [Hank and Kohler, 2002; 
Pande and Astone, 2007], birth parity progression analysis [Leung, 1988; Heckman and Walker, 
1990; Gangadharan and Maitra, 2003; Das Gupta, 2005], family expenditure studies [Bhalotra 
and Attfield, 1998; Burgess and Zhuang, 2000]. The latter two techniques assess the effect of 
family composition on parental decisions over future fertility and household spending, respec­
tively.
6Examples abound: Barro [1991]; Galor and Zang [1997]; Ahn and Mira [2002]; Billari and 
Kohler [2002]. Along with many within-country studies at the micro level, these studies have 
allowed fertility trends to be comparatively well understood. Fertility is a component of many 
mainstream macroeconomic models.
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prices dominate the differences in preferences regarding quantity of children. I 
apply the approach of these papers to investigate the influence of cultural values 
on son preference.
Despite the growing theoretical literature on cultural values,7 empirical re­
search on this topic lags behind. Apart from the work on fertility described 
above, work such as Manning and Roy [2007] and Fisman and Miguel [2007] 
has considered the influence of cultural background on national identity and 
car parking habits, respectively. However, these studies consider non-costly be­
haviours.8 I believe this paper is the first to explicitly consider the interaction 
between cultural values and the economic environment.
3.2 Theory
This paper seeks to establish the cultural influences on parental sex preferences. 
The model presented here has two aims: first, to outline the interaction between 
prices and the measurement of son preference, and second to rationalise the 
econometric framework used in Section 3.4.
3.2.1 Micro-founding fertility models
Fertility decisions are taken sequentially, and at any point, the sex composition 
of the family is known. Then, if parents have preferences over the sex of their 
offspring, the probability of having another child will depend on the current 
composition.
This concept encompasses a range of ‘stopping rule’ models, which suppose 
that parents continue to have children until some criterion is met: having a son, 
say. These models have been studied at length by Sheps [1963]. One general 
result is that, in a population with homogeneous probability of a male birth, 
the aggregate sex ratio converges to that probability as the population becomes
7 Eg, Bisin and Verdier [2000, 2005]; Tabellini [2007b,a].
8Fisman and Miguel’s diplomats are not required by law to pay parking fines.
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large [Leung, 1988].9
Leung [1991] proposes an alternative modelling approach: parents choose, in 
each period, the probability that they have a child at that time. He constructs 
a neoclassical consumption model which is then solved as a standard dynamic 
programming problem.
Without differentiating between the sexes, Leung’s model provides some 
plausible predictions. Generally, the probability of birth increases with income 
and decreases with the cost of children. This is borne out empirically by Heck­
man and Walker [1990], and reflects the findings of Galor and Weil [1996, 2000]. 
Children are a normal good, with fertility increasing with income when all else 
is equal. 10
When girls and boys are distinguished, parents may be allowed to prefer one 
sex over the other. Under some conditions, if parents prefer boys, then having 
had more boys reduces the probability of birth, holding the current number of 
children constant [see Leung, 1991, p. 1082].
Intuitively, diminishing marginal returns for each sex imply that, at a given 
family size, having more boys reduces the marginal return to a further boy. 
Son preference entails that each boy makes a greater contribution to parental 
utility than each girl. Although having more boys also increases the marginal 
return to a further girl, the son preference means that this is more than more 
than offset by the decrease in the marginal return of a extra boy. Hence the 
marginal benefit of an extra child diminishes, and so does the optimal birth 
probability. Another way to see this is to observe that boys carry more weight 
when considering the effective number of children. Thus, increasing the number 
of boys increases the effective number of children, holding the total number of 
children constant. The implication of this result for the birth probability is
9In small populations, a male-favouring stopping rule in fact leads to higher numbers of 
females. However, simulated results suggest that convergence is fast [Leung, 1988]. In Chapter 
4, I prove that in the case of heterogeneous probabilities, excess girls will be present also in 
large populations.
10Higher wages increase the costs of rearing children, and this effect dominates to give low 
fertility in rich households and economies [Wolf, 2006]. This finding does not contradict the 
assumption that children are normal, as in the models of Leung [1991]; Galor and Weil [1996, 
2000]; Kim [2005].
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testable, and underlies the sex-preference tests using the progression ratio, OLS 
birth intervals and hazard rates.
Leung is forced to make several unintuitive assumptions on the parental 
utility function in order to solve for the parents’ value function algebraically. 
Further, since both boys and girls are perfect complements for consumption, 
questions concerning prices and preferences cannot be answered. His model 
yields few predictions that can be taken to the data.
Rather than taking a particular form for the utility, I simplify the model 
by eliminating the dynamic component. This does not change the economic 
intuition behind the model, but simplifies matters considerably. As a result, I 
need only assume that parental utility is additively separable in its arguments. 
This reduced model is analogous to the final period of Leung’s model without 
his restrictive assumptions. 11 However, I am able to derive the effect of differing 
prices for boys and girls.
3.2.2 Model
I construct a one-period model in which parents maximise their expected utility 
with respect to the probability of having a further child (h). Initially, they have 
an endowment of (B q,G q, Y ) 6  R+, where B q and Go are the initial numbers 
of boys and girls respectively, and Y  is income. Girls and boys cost Pq G R+ 
and Pb  G R+ respectively. 12
Utility comprises two additive components: a standard utility part relating 
to the number of children (B  and G) and consumption (C), and a component 
representing the disutility of fecundity. This latter term is expressed as a func­
tion W  of the birth probability h, as in Leung [1991] and Kim [2005].
A ssum ption  1. U : R+ —► R and —W (.): [0,1] —► R are bounded, twice con­
tinuously differentiable and strictly concave. U is increasing in each of its ar­
11 The intuition behind my model is not affected by the static formulation. I am able to 
construct a simulation of a dynamic extension, which confirms that my analytical results hold 
more generally.
12Following the literature, I take the existing number of children to be continuous. Note, 
however, that childbearing outcomes sure discrete.
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guments.
A ssum ption  2. For some h* € (0,1), W '(h) < 0 for all h 6  [0,/i*) and 
W '(h) > 0 for all h 6  (h*, 1]. Further, let W ' —> oo as h /*  1 and W ' —» —oo 
as h \  0 .
Assumption 2  follows from the notion that it is costly to set the fertility 
probability at extreme values, h* represents the ‘natural’ fecundity rate. The 
latter criterion of the assumption ensures that corner solutions are ruled out.
A child is born with probability h and this will be a boy with known ex­
ogenous probability 7r. Therefore the final family composition is given by the 
following rule:
^ B  ^ 
\ ° /
1 B  N-DO
Go j
+ H
v 1 /
+ n i N 
V - 1 / J
Where H  ~  Bernoulli(h) is a random variable indicating childbirth, and 
n  ~  Bernoulli(7r) is a random variable (latently) indicating a boy.
To summarize, parental utility is U d= U (B ,G ,C ) — W{h). The budget 
constraint is standard: Pb B  4 - PgG + C < Y ,  with Pb  and Pg being the prices 
of having children of either sex. Consumption is numeraire. To ensure that 
expected utility is defined, a further assumption is required, providing that a 
child of either sex is affordable.
A ssum ption  3. Y  — Pb {Bq + 1) — Pq G q > 0 a n d Y  — P b B q —Pg {Gq-\-1)) > 0.
P a re n ts ’ p rob lem
As stated, parents maximise their expected utility with respect to the proba­
bility of childbirth, subject to a budget constraint. Thus, the parents’ problem 
is:
E [U (B ,G ,C )-W (h )]
h{Bo, Go) =  argmax <
h s. t. Pb B  +  Pg G + C < Y
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This expression may be rewritten to remove the expectation operator. By
Assumption 1 , the budget constraint will always hold, so this may also be sub- 
d c fstituted. Let Yq = Y  — Pb Bq — PGGq denote initial disposable income.
'  hirU(B0 +I ,G 0,Yo - P b )
+ h{ 1 -  n)U(B0, Go +  1, Y0 -  PG)
+ (l-h)U(Bo,G0lY0)
-  W(h)
The first three terms within the braces are the probabilities of having a boy 
(/i7r), girl (h( 1 — 7r)), or no child (1 — h), respectively, multiplied by the utility 
obtained in each case. The fourth term is the fecundity penalty.
The first order condition (FOC) is therefore
W'{h) =  icU(B0 + 1, G0, To -  Pb)
+ {l-n)U{Bo,Go + l , Y o - P G)
- U ( B 0,Go,Yo)
Assumption 2 provides that there will be a solution with h 6  (0,1). The 
second order condition for this to be a maximum is —W"(h) < 0, which follows 
from the concavity of — W(.) (Assumption 1).
The reasoning behind this condition is simple: the marginal disutility of 
fecundity must equal the expected marginal utility of an extra child. W ’ is 
monotonically increasing by Assumption 1 , so a higher expected marginal utility 
of an extra child is associated with higher fertility.
In order to derive predictions from this model, I make the use of the following 
separability criterion.
d e fAssum ption 4. Let U ( B ,G , C )  =  o .bu(B ) +  a c u ( G )  +  u(C) fo r  some in­
creasing, bounded, twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave junction  
u : M+ —► R and ag , o l q  G K+.
The coefficients a g  and a G reflect the parents’ underlying preferences for
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sons and daughters. Under Assumption 4, the first order condition becomes:
W '(h ) =  7r [aBu (B 0 +  1) +  a Gu(G 0) +  w(Y"0 -  Pb )\
+  (1 -  7t ) [aBu(B 0) +  a Gu (G 0 +  1) +  u(Y0 -  PG)]
-  a Bu (B Q) +  a Gu(G 0) +  u(y0)
The separability criterion simplifies my analysis but is not necessary for my 
major result, Prediction 3.
3.2.3 M odel Predictions 
D efinition  3. The ‘Big Sister Effect’ (BSE) is
\ d - f  d h  
A ( 5 o )  -  ~ m B q+ G q—N q
The object of interest is A, which gives the marginal decrease in the proba­
bility of birth with an extra son, for a given total number of children.13 This is 
the object that is observed when progression rates or hazard rates are compared 
between women having different family compositions after a given number of 
children. It is usually measured to be positive, with more children having older 
sisters than older brothers. Women having more sons are less likely to have 
further children, implying that the expected marginal value of an extra child is 
lower when a woman has more sons.
The implications of the model hence depend on the sign of A. Taking the 
derivative of the FOC with respect to B q results in the following:
A (B 0) =
- 1
W"{h)
a B7r [u'(B0 + 1) -  u'(B0)]
-  a G( 1 -  tt) [u' (N0 -  B 0 + 1 ) -  u'(N 0 -  B 0)] 
+  cxc(Pg  ~  Pb ) [nu'iYo — PB)
+  ( 1 - 7 T  )u'(Y0 - P g ) - u '(Y0)}
(3.1)
13The Effect can also be considered as the marginal increase in the probability of birth with
B q + Gq = N q
an extra daughter: A  =
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Thus, the sign of A is the opposite to the term in parentheses, since —W(.) 
is concave. The first two terms in square brackets are negative, since u(.) is 
concave (Assumption 4). Therefore u'(x + 1) < u'(x) for all x  E R+, and so 
A depends positively on a s  and negatively on ag . This leads to the first two 
predictions of this model.
Prediction 1. Ceteris paribus, the Big Sister Effect is higher when sons yield 
higher utility (higher a s )-
Prediction 2. Ceteris paribus, the Big Sister Effect is lower when daughters 
yield higher utility (higher etc)-
The intuition in each case is simple. When a family of given size (No) 
contains fewer boys, the marginal value of a future boy (it (Bo +  1) — it (Bo)) is 
higher. At the same time, there are more girls, so the marginal value of a future 
girl (u(No — Bo + 1) — u(7V0 — Bo)) is lower. The change in marginal value of 
a future child is thus ambiguous. However, if boys are more preferred (larger 
a s ) ,  the change in marginal value of a future child becomes dominated by the 
boys term. That is, it becomes more positive: the Big Sister Effect increases. 
The situation is symmetric for girls.
Returning to Equation 3.1, it can be seen that the third term in square 
brackets is positive. Girls and boys have positive prices, so u'(Yo — Pb), u'(Yq — 
Pq) > u'{Yq). Therefore the weighted sum tvu'(Yo — Pb) + (1 — ir)it'(To — Pg) 
is greater than u'(Yq). Therefore we have:
Prediction 3. The Big Sister Effect is decreasing in the girl-boy price differ­
ential (Pg — Pb)-
Prediction 3 says that if girls cost more than boys, the Big Sister Effect is 
lower than when costs are equal. When girls are more expensive, families having 
more girls are poorer than those of the same size but with more boys. Children 
are a normal good, so the richer family has higher fecundity. The Effect is 
negative.
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It must be noted that this implication depends only on the formulation of 
the utility function with respect to consumption. Thus this result is robust
d e fto the relaxation of Assumption 4 so that U (B ,G ,C ) = u(B ,G ) +  v(C) for 
neoclassical u and v.
The generality of the intuition behind Prediction 3 suggests that price-based 
explanations for son preference in fertility decisions, such as the existence of 
dowries, are unlikely to dominate. It requires only that children are a normal 
good. If large dowries are required for daughters, families already having many 
girls should be expected to have fewer further children. The opposite is seen to 
be true in the data, suggesting that underlying preferences may be even stronger 
than have previously been measured.
3.2.4 Testing the predictions
The quantity A, the Big Sister Effect, is the marginal decrease in fecundity with 
an extra son, controlling for the total number of children. This formulation 
provides the basis for the empirical tests used in this paper. At a given birth 
parity (number of children), I test for the change in the birth hazard rate with 
an extra son.
With several distinct groups in my dataset, son preferences can be mea­
sured for each by including interactions between group dummy variables and 
the number of sons. The resulting coefficient can be interpreted as a change in 
the hazard associated with having one more boy. Negative coefficients imply a 
positive Effect.
As can be seen in Equation 3.1 (page 81) and Predictions 1-3, a more pos­
itive Big Sister Effect in one group implies a combination of the following: (a) 
the group has a stronger taste for sons (Prediction 1); (b) a weaker taste for 
daughters (Prediction 2); or (c) the group faces a lower girl-boy price differential 
(Pg — Pb ) (Prediction 3), that is, girls are relatively cheaper.
The advantage of conducting empirical work with UK data is that childrea­
ring costs are generally high [Wolf, 2006], and not obviously different for boys
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and girls. Equivalently, the girl-boy price differential is feasibly nil. This would 
leave inter-group differences in the BSE entirely down to variation in preferences 
due to different cultural values.
It is possible to argue that relative costs of raising girls and boys may not be 
equal amongst different cultural groups, such as immigrants from different coun­
tries. Indeed, it is usually argued that groups displaying strong son preferences 
face relatively higher prices for girls (positive girl-boy differential) [Das Gupta 
et al., 2002]. This is due to dowries or less ability to provide old-age support. 14
However, Prediction 3 gives that the effect of a positive girl-boy price dif­
ferential will be to reduce the Big Sister Effect. The implication is that under 
equalised prices the Effect would be even stronger. If there is a correlation 
between higher prices for girls and stronger innate preference for sons, cross- 
cultural differences as estimated later in this paper will be downward biased.
Finally, it should be noted that these price-based arguments pertain only to 
son preference as measured by onward fertility measures. If neonatal mortality 
or educational attainment differentials are used as a measure of son preference, 
as in Qian [2006], a positive response to the price differential would be expected, 
as is found in that paper: when female wages rise, girls’ mortality decreases.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 The Labour Force Survey
The source of data for this study is the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). This 
is a quarterly survey of households, typically recording data for some 1 2 0 ,0 0 0  
individuals. The LFS is conducted as a rolling panel with households appearing 
for five consecutive quarters, or waves.
From 1996, a family relationship matrix is available for each household,
14Das Gupta et al. state that greater costs for girls are actually a cause of son preference, 
a claim which cannot be reconciled at the individual level with the neoclassical intuition 
presented here. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that some general equilibrium model might 
support this hypothesis.
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allowing children to be matched to their parents. Hence, birth histories may be 
constructed for each woman, by sorting her children by date of birth . 15
Amongst the LFS data are various personal attributes, including country of 
origin and year of arrival for immigrants. Also present are variables recording 
education, jobs, income, religion and ethnicity. Where a spouse or cohabiting 
partner lives in the household, he can be identified using the household rela­
tionship tables and his records paired up with the woman’s.
In the LFS, some questions are only asked once. Since the time between first 
and last waves is small in terms of fertility cycles ( 1 2  months), and many of the 
variables of interest are constant, I take only replies from first-wave responses 
from quarter 1, 1996 to quarter 4, 2005. This records 1,157,739 individuals, of 
which 27,544 are born abroad, female and aged 16-55.
3.3.2 Summary statistics
Summary statistics are listed in Table 3.1, grouped by birth parity. Throughout 
this study, comparisons are restricted to women with a given number of children, 
or ‘parity level’. This is common in the literature and negates the influence of 
general birth spacing effects. Women are included in the sample at all parities 
up to the total number of their children at the time of survey.
In order to reduce the incidence of spurious country coefficients, only coun­
tries represented by more than 1 0 0  women are included in these tables and any 
calculation. This does not greatly reduce the overall sample size but significantly 
drops the number of coefficients in the regressions. This has the added benefit of 
reducing computation time: including dummy variables for small country groups 
makes the estimation problem difficult to solve, since the objective function has 
a shallow curvature at the maximum . 16
Reported ages (variable AGE) correspond to the age at entry into the rele-
15These birth histories are necessarily net of mortality. The oldest child younger than 16 
will be considered the woman’s first, ie, of parity one. Gangadharan and Maitra [2003] take 
the same approach, concluding that the implications are negligible [see p. 383] provided that 
standard errors are computed to  account for arbitrary heteroskedasticity (frailty).
16Not all countries of origin in the LFS are identified uniquely. Three groups of countries 
appear in my regressions. They are:
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics, women born abroad, aged 16-55 (UK Labour 
Force Survey 1996-2005).
(a) Parity 1
V a r i a b l e M e a n S t d .  D e v . M i n . M a x . N
A G E 2 6 .3 4 5 .2 2 14 5 1 .5 13223
A G E C A M E 2 0 .2 9 1 1 .0 3 0 5 5 .5 8 13112
G R S S P A Y 2 7 .25 2 6 .5 9 0 .2 6 6 6 3 .4 2 3915
S O N S 0 .5 3 0 .5 0 1 13223
E X P O S U R E 6 0 .9 7 6 .8 3 1 4 72 13223
P R O G R E S S E D 0 .6 9 0 .4 6 0 1 13223
D B G  R E E 0 .0 9 0 .2 9 0 1 13223
F E 0 .0 6 0 .2 4 0 1 13223
A L 0 .0 7 0 .2 5 0 1 13223
G C S E 0.1 0 .3 0 1 13223
(b) Parity 2
V a r i a b l e M e a n S t d .  D e v . M in . M a x . N
A G E 2B.56 5 1 5 .4 2 48 7 7 0 4
A G E C A M E 19.6 1 0 .85 0 5 4 .2 5 7 6 3 0
G R S S P A Y 26 .9 6 2 8 .7 6 0 .2 6 6 6 3 .4 2 2215
S O N S 1.05 0 .7 2 0 2 7 7 0 4
E X P O S U R E 7 3 .9 9 7 1 .7 2 1 396 7 7 0 4
P R O G R E S S E D 0 .4 5 0 .5 0 1 7 7 0 4
D E G R E E 0 .0 8 0 .2 7 0 1 7 7 0 4
F E 0 .0 6 0 .2 3 0 1 7 7 0 4
A L 0.0 6 0 .2 4 0 1 7 7 0 4
G C S E 0.1 0 .2 9 0 1 7 7 0 4
(c) Parity 3
V a r i a b l e M e a n S t d .  D e v . M i n . M a x . N
A G E 2 9 .3 7 4 .6 1 17 4 7 .8 3 2 3 4 3
A G E C A M E 2 0 .2 3 9 .6 5 0 .0 6 5 4 .2 5 2 3 1 7
G R S S P A Y 18 .9 15.22 0 .2 6 100 506
S O N S 1.5 3 0 .8 8 0 3 2343
E X P O S U R E 6 6 .3 6 3 .1 8 1 3 33 2 3 4 3
P R O G R E S S E D 0 .4 7 0 .5 0 1 2 3 4 3
D E G R E E 0 .0 4 0 .1 9 0 1 2 3 4 3
F E 0 .0 3 0 .1 7 0 2343
A L 0 .0 4 0 .1 9 0 1 2 3 4 3
G C S E 0 .0 6 0 .2 4 0 2343
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vant parity. First births occur at a mean age of 26.3 years, second births at 28.5 
years and third births at 29.3 years. 17 Age at arrival in the UK (AGECAME) 
seems regular across the three subsamples, at about 2 0  years.
Education levels are slightly lower than UK averages (recorded in dummy 
variables DEGREE, FE, AL, and GCSE, corresponding to degree level, further 
education, A-Levels and GCSE equivalents respectively) . 18 At parity 1, only 
31% of women have GCSE or higher qualifications. At parity 2, the figure is 
30% but this falls to 16% at parity 3. The UK average for women in this age 
range is 34% . 19
When the woman’s spouse is present in the household, I can match his 
details with the woman. Husbands’ gross annual income at the time of survey 
is denoted as GRSSPAY, measured in thousands of pounds. As with education, 
women at parities 1 and 2 are similar (means of £27,000 per year — equal to 
the survey average), with parity 3 women having poorer husbands (£18,000). 
This variable is chosen over women’s own income to avoid possible simultaneity 
issues between work and childbearing decisions. However, basic results do not 
depend on this selection, and husbands’ income is more often reported .20
The number of sons a woman has already had is denoted by SONS. At 
parities 1, 2 and 3 the means are 0.53, 1.05 and 1.54, respectively. Sex ratios 
are slightly elevated at earlier parities: these figures correspond to 1.13, 1.11 
and 1.05 boys per girl. The usually cited ‘natural’ ratio is 1.06. Little inference
Grp0 2  ‘Other Caribbean Commonwealth’: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, The, Do­
minica, Grenada, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines.
Grp04 ‘Other Africa’: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cen­
tral African Republic, Chad, Congo, Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Togo.
Grp08 ‘Other Middle East’: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen.
17The differences between ages at birth understate birth spacing intervals for individual 
women, since those having more children are likely to have started younger. Indeed, mean 
ages at first and second births conditional on a third birth sire 23.3 and 26.0 respectively.
18Educational dummies are derived from the LFS variable HIQUALJD.
1 9 Author’s calculation from LFS.
20Though a woman’s current husband may not be the father of (all) her children, this 
variable is nonetheless useful in proxying the woman’s lifetime budget constraint.
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can be made from these differences, however: aggregate level sex ratio statistics 
are subject to biases in both directions. See Appendix B.l.
Important variables for the survival analysis are PROGRESSED, indicating 
whether a woman continues to a higher birth parity, and EXPOSURE, the 
time at risk .21 This latter figure measures the time the woman remains at 
the relevant parity before either having another child (progressing to the next 
parity), or the data are censored, ie, the survey occurs before a subsequent birth. 
PROGRESSED is one when exposure terminates in birth, and zero if exposure 
terminates at the survey.
3.3.3 Country differences
Table 3.2 lists the countries included in my regressions. For the first birth 
(parity 1), proportions of sons differ across country groups, ranging from 0.470 
(Mauritius) to 0.584 (Zimbabwe). These figures represent sex ratios of 0.89 and 
1.40 boys per girl respectively.
The sex of a given child does not depend on parental decisions, so the aggre­
gate sex ratio at a given parity is not subject to biases due to sex preferences.22 
Thus the sex ratio at first birth is a measure of the biological sex ratio.
Despite seemingly wide disparities between countries in the first birth sex 
ratios, they are not statistically different, with an F-test yielding a p-value of 
0.31. This result stands in contrast to Oster’s assertion [2005, pp. 1170] that 
some country groups display higher biological sex ratios.
In later regressions, I split my sample by spouses’ income, and by age at ar­
rival. RICH indicates women above the median income, and YOUNG indicates 
arrival in the UK before the age of 10. POOR and OLD are respective comple­
ments. The number of women in each subgroup are given in the middle columns 
of Table 3.2. W ith the restriction that 100 observations are present from each
21Time at risk neglects ten months after a birth to account for post-partum amenorrhoea 
and a further pregnancy, following Leung [1988].
2 2  Population sex ratios are subject to biases due to parental decision-making (see Appendix 
B .l and Chapter 4).
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics by country. YOUNG indicates arrival before age 
10. RICH indicates above median income (spouse’s) (at the relevant parity).
(a) Parity 1
C o u n tr y N S O N S P O O R
S u b g ro u p  s izes  
R IC H  Y O U N G O L D
P R O G R E S S E D  
'  0 S o n s  " ‘1 S on
A U S 242 0 .4 7 5 32 70 90 151 0 .6 3 8 0 .6 8 7
• C A N  • 188 0 .5 4 8 '6 4  ’ 104 0 .6 5 9 0 .6 8 0
N Z L 110 0 .5 8 2 23 86 0 .6 3 0 0 .5 4 7
K E N 661 0 .5 5 7 96 119 168 4 8 7 0 .7 9 2 0 .7 1 2
U G A 263 0 .5 3 2 55 208 0 .7 3 2 0 .6 7 9
T Z A 156 0 .5 0 6 28 128 0 .7 1 4 0 .5 8 2
Z M B 122 0 .5 7 4 40 81 0 .6 3 5 0 .6 5 7
Z W E 197 0 .5 8 4 38 159 0 .6 2 2 0 .6 0 0
G H A 256 0 .4 7 3 14 2 39 0 .7 0 4 0 .6 5 3
N G A 341 0 .4 9 9 33 3 04 0 .7 8 9 0 .7 7 1
JA M 45 9 0 .5 2 3 110 336 0 .5 2 5 0 .5 7 1
G R P 0 2 119 0 .5 3 8 37 80 0 .6 1 8 0 .5 1 6
B G D 98 0 0 .5 5 7 170 31 116 8 5 4 0 .8 1 8 0 .8 3 7
IN D 1976 0 .5 5 1 366 289 280 1676 0 .7 5 3 0 .7 0 3
L K A 246 0 .5 4 5 60 53 30 216 0 .6 1 6 0 .6 0 4
H K G 29 7 0 .5 8 2 68 2 27 0 .6 6 1 0 .6 3 0
M Y S 187 0 .5 0 3 53 134 0 .7 9 6 0 .7 0 2
S G P 205 0 .5 0 7 161 42 0 .6 9 3 0 .7 0 2
C Y P 283 0 .5 6 9 147 132 0 .6 9 7 0 .7 0 8
M L T 115 0 .5 6 5 84 29 0 .7 2 0 0 .6 0 0
M U S 115 0 .4 7 0 12 103 0 .6 0 7 0 .5 7 4
Z A F 345 0 .5 1 3 41 106 92 252 0 .6 5 5 0 .6 1 6
G R P 0 4 186 0 .5 1 1 17 167 0 .6 7 0 0 .6 5 3
U SA 402 0 .4 8 3 30 122 65 335 0 .7 0 2 0 .6 2 4
P A K 1558 0 .5 3 8 2 00 99 199 1342 0 .8 4 9 0 .8 0 7
C H N 138 0 .5 1 4 5 132 0 .4 6 3 0 .5 0 7
J P N 111 0 .5 3 2 2 109 0 .5 7 7 0 .5 2 5
P H L 24 7 0 .5 5 5 57 45 1 246 0 .5 0 0 0 .5 9 9
IR N 147 0 .5 7 8 7 140 0 .6 6 1 0 .6 1 2
G R P 0 8 156 0 .5 2 6 50 106 0 .7 9 7 0 .7 6 8
F R A 23 7 0 .4 9 8 25 79 23 213 0 .5 8 0 0 .6 1 9
IT A 20 9 0 .4 6 8 61 148 0 .4 8 6 0 .6 2 7
N L D 110 0 .4 8 2 14 95 0 .6 8 4 0 .7 1 7
D E U 8 42 0 .5 1 7 137 172 518 312 0 .6 0 0 0 .6 2 5
P O L 149 0 .5 5 0 3 145 0 .5 0 7 0 .4 0 2
P R T 178 0 .5 0 0 8 169 0 .5 2 8 0 .4 9 4
E S P 120 0 .5 2 5 13 107 0 .5 6 1 0 .4 9 2
Y U G 113 0 .4 9 6 1 112 0 .6 6 7 0 .7 1 4
T U R 236 0 .5 6 4 13 222 0 .6 3 1 0 .6 7 7
S O M 221 0 .5 0 7 0 221 0 .8 2 6 0 .8 5 7
(b) Parity 2
C o u n tr y N S O N S P O O R
S u b g ro u p  s iz e s  
R IC H  Y O U N G O L D
P R O G R E S S E D  
0 S o n s  1 S o n  2 S o n s
A U S 147 1 .014 57 89 0 .2 7 8 0 .3 2 9 0 .3 6 8
C A N 121 1 .0 1 7 55 66 0 .3 2 4 0 .2 5 5 0 .2 7 8
K E N 478 1 .0 5 9 56 98 131 342 0 .5 5 1 0 .2 4 2 0 .2 6 7
U G A 176 0 .9 8 3 41 135 0 .3 8 3 0 .2 5 9 0 .3 8 6
Z W E 115 1.052 29 86 0 .3 1 8 0 .3 2 3 0 .2 8 6
G H A 167 1.012 12 153 0 .5 0 0 0 .5 2 8 0 .4 2 5
N G A 247 1.012 24 221 0 .6 4 3 0 .5 0 0 0 .5 9 3
JA M 246 1 .089 66 173 0 .5 4 2 0 .3 2 0 0 .2 5 7
B G D 7 64 1.082 130 31 74 683 0 .7 1 4 0 .7 0 4 0 .6 6 8
IN D 1371 1.062 217 244 221 1132 0 .5 2 9 0 .3 3 5 0 .3 5 3
L K A 140 1 .0 4 3 19 121 0 .1 3 2 0 .2 0 7 0 .3 1 8
H K G 179 1 .1 4 0 43 135 0 .4 3 2 0 .2 6 2 0 .3 0 6
M Y S 131 1 .015 42 89 0 .3 0 6 0 .2 4 6 0 .3 9 5
S G P 137 1 .073 113 23 0 .1 8 8 0 .3 1 7 0 .2 3 8
C Y P 193 1 .119 102 88 0 .3 2 5 0 .3 3 3 0 .3 6 5
Z A F 206 1 .0 3 9 57 148 0 .3 4 0 0 .2 8 6 0 .2 5 9
G R P 0 4 116 0 .9 4 0 11 103 0 .6 7 9 0 .4 4 8 0 .4 7 6
U S A 253 0 .9 4 9 36 216 0 .3 3 8 0 .3 2 3 0 .3 7 9
P A K 1221 1 .039 125 94 151 1056 0 .7 3 5 0 .7 0 2 0 .6 7 1
P H L 126 1 .143 1 125 0 .1 3 0 0 .1 9 4 0 .1 7 1
G R P 0 8 115 1 .0 4 3 34 81 0 .6 3 0 0 .6 0 7 0 .5 0 0
F R A 129 1 .0 2 3 15 114 0 .3 5 3 0 .2 5 9 0 .2 4 3
IT A 111 1.036 40 71 0 .3 2 1 0 .2 9 4 0 .1 5 6
D E U 49 4 1 .036 62 123 312 174 0 .3 9 0 0 .2 8 3 0 .3 5 5
T U R 147 1 .116 11 135 0 .4 0 0 0 .2 8 7 0 .3 3 3
S O M 174 1.011 0 174 0 .7 3 9 0 .7 2 5 0 .7 5 0
(c) Parity 3
C o u n tr y N S O N S P O O R
S u b g ro u p  s izes  
R IC H  Y O U N G O L D 0 S o n s
P R O G R E S S E D  
1 S o n  2 S o n s 3 S o n s
K E N 148 1 .331 39 105 0 .4 8 3 0 .1 7 7 0 .1 6 7 0 .1 9 0
N G A 123 1 .4 7 2 8 114 0 .5 8 8 0 .4 2 2 0 .3 1 9 0 .3 5 7
B G D 490 1 .6 0 2 39 448 0 .6 2 8 0 .5 5 6 0 .6 1 5 0 .4 8 7
IN D 500 1 .5 2 8 68 74 87 408 0 .4 3 3 0 .2 8 0 0 .2 4 7 0 .2 0 5
P A K 812 1 .5 3 9 70 63 81 721 0 .6 7 0 0 .6 2 0 0 .5 5 0 0 .6 3 6
D E U 153 1 .5 1 6 111 39 0 .1 2 5 0 .1 7 5 0 .2 2 6 0 .2 8 6
S O M 117 1 .5 9 0 0 117 0 .9 1 7 0 .6 0 0 0 .7 5 5 0 .5 6 3
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group in any regression, there are sufficiently many women for the coefficients to 
be identified on the interaction terms RICH*Country and POOR*Country. All 
subgroups are large enough for OLD*Country, though some YOUNG*Country 
terms will not show strong identification.
3.3.4 Son Preferences
Table 3.3 reports progression rates with respect to existing family composition. 
After two or three children, significant differences in the progression rates — 
the proportion of women having a further child — are observed between women 
with sons and women with daughters. At each parity, women having no sons are 
more likely to continue having children, though negligible differences are seen 
between women having more than one son.
However, looking more closely reveals great differences between country 
groups. The final columns of Table 3.2 list progression rates by current number 
of sons. Differences are not typically great at parity 1, but increase with birth 
order. For example, 92% of Somali women with three daughters go on to have 
another child, compared with 56% of those with three sons.
For clarity, statistics for India and Germany are collected in Table 3.4. For 
Indian women, the largest group in my sample, son preference is very strong at 
all parities. Conversely, for German women, there appears to be a reasonable 
preference for daughters at parity 3. Note that in these cases, the number 
of boys does indeed matter, not just the presence of a son (or daughter, for 
Germans). The following section seeks to assess these country differences more 
thoroughly.23
23After having two children, German women are less likely to have another if they have had 
one of each sex. This behaviour suggests a preference for a mixed family, as found by Hank 
and Kohler [2 0 0 2 ] for German women. Here I focus on preferences for sons.
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Table 3.3: Birth parity progression rates, whole sample.
Number of Boys
Children 0 1 2 3
1 0.70 0.69 -
2 0.52 0.43 0.44
3 0.57 0.46 0.47 0.45
Table 3.4: Birth parity progression rates, Indian and German women.
(a) India
Number of Boys
Children 0 1 2 3
1 0.75 0.70 -
2 0.53 0.34 0.35
3 0.44 0.27 0.27 0.20
(b) Germany
Number of Boys
Children 0 1 2 3
1 0.60 0.63 -
2 0.38 0.26 0.36
3 0 . 1 2 0.17 0.25 0.26
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Regression specification
This paper follows the example of Leung [1988] and Gangadharan and Maitra 
[2003], who study the son preferences of different ethnic groups in Malaysia and 
South Africa, respectively. I, however, group immigrants to the UK by country 
of origin. I test for parental sex preferences using a Proportional Hazards model 
of childbearing with the current number of boys included as a regressor, as 
discussed in detail in Appendix B.2. Reported coefficients relate proportional 
changes in hazard rates to unit changes in the independent variables. Negative 
values imply lower hazards at all points in time and hence longer transition and 
lower future fertility.
Specifically, the hazard rate for woman i at time t is 9i(t) =  \i9o(t), where 
Ai is the proportional hazard rate for woman i. My most basic regression takes 
the form log A* =  (3'Xi +  5SONS*.24 Coefficients are estimated using the Cox 
partial likelihood method, with 9q left unspecified. A negative coefficient on 
the number of boys in the family, SONS, implies a preference for sons. This 
deduction follows the theoretical model presented in Section 3.2; women with 
boys are more likely to cease having children.
To account for life-cycle effects such as spacing of births, controls for the 
woman’s age (AGE) and squared age (AGE2) are included in A*. Since educa­
tion is known to influence fertility, dummies for highest educational attainment 
(DEGREE, FE (further education), AL (A-Level) and GCSE) are also used, to 
account for different fecundity amongst differently educated women.
3.4.2 Initial Regressions
Table 3.5 Column (1) reports regressions without country fixed effects or SONS, 
so describes fertility only. The age coefficient is positive at parity 1, suggesting
2 4  By including only women with the same number of children in any regression (restricting 
to a single parity), total family size is controlled for.
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Table 3.5: Birth hazard rate regressions for immigrant women in the UK. 
Coefficients relate proportional changes in hazard rates to unit changes in 
the independent variables. Negative values imply lower hazards: 9{(t) =  
exp (P'Xi +  <5SONSi)f?0 (t).
(a) Parity 1
(1). (2 )
A G E 0 . 1 4 0 " * (0 .0 1 9 3 ) 0 . 1 4 1 " * (0 .0 1 9 3 )
A G E 2 - 0 .0 0 3 5 1 * " (0 .0 0 0 3 6 0 ) -0 .0 0 3 5 3 * * * (0 .0 0 0 3 6 0 )
D E G R E E 0 .1 4 7 * * * (0 .0 3 8 7 ) 0 .1 4 7 * * * (0 .0 3 8 7 )
A L -0 .1 2 0 * * * (0 .0 4 4 1 ) -0 .1 2 3 * * * (0 .0 4 4 1 )
F E -0 .0 2 5 7 (0 .0 4 5 7 ) -0 .0 3 0 8 (0 .0 4 5 7 )
G C S E -0 .0 4 6 9 (0 .0 3 5 6 ) -0 .0 4 8 0 (0 .0 3 5 6 )
S O N S -0 .0 8 4 7 * * * (0 .0 2 1 0 )
O b s e rv a t io n s 13223 13223
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p <  0.01.
(b) Parity 2
(1) (2) ~ ( 3T
A G E -0 .1 0 3 * * * (0 .0 3 6 1 ) -0 .1 0 4 * * * (0 .0 3 6 0 ) - 0 .1 0 2 ’ ** (0 .0 3 6 0 )
A G E 2 -0 .0 0 0 1 2 0 (0 .0 0 0 6 4 8 ) -0 .0 0 0 1 1 2 (0 .0 0 0 6 4 7 ) -0 .0 0 0 1 6 0 (0 .0 0 0 6 4 7 )
D E G R E E -0 .0 4 8 9 (0 .0 7 4 6 ) -0 .0 5 5 3 (0 .0 7 4 5 ) -0 .0 4 9 8 (0 .0 7 4 5 )
A L -0 .3 7 5 * * * (0 .0 8 1 9 ) -0 .3 7 5 * * * (0 .0 8 1 9 ) -0 .3 8 0 * * * (0 .0 8 1 9 )
F E -0 .3 0 4 * * * (0 .0 8 5 9 ) -0 .3 1 2 * * * (0 .0 8 5 9 ) -0 .3 1 4 * * * (0 .0 8 5 9 )
G C S E -0 .3 5 1 * * * (0 .0 6 4 3 ) -0 .3 5 2 * * * (0 .0 6 4 3 ) -0 .3 5 1 * * * (0 .0 6 4 3 )
S O N S -0 .1 5 4 * * * (0 .0 2 4 2 )
O N E B O Y -0 .3 5 0 * * * (0 .0 4 1 3 )
T W O B O Y S -0 .3 0 9 * * * (0 .0 4 6 2 )
O b s e r v a t io n s  7 7 0 4  7 7 0 4    7 7 0 4
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
(c) Parity 3
fl)~~ (2 ) ~l3T
A G E - 0 .1 9 5 ’ ** (0 .0 6 4 8 ) -0 .1 9 6 * * * (0 .0 6 4 9 ) -0 .2 0 1 * * * (0 .0 6 4 8 )
A C E 2 0 .0 0 1 9 2 * (0 .0 0 1 0 9 ) 0 .0 0 1 9 1 * (0 .0 0 1 1 0 ) 0 .0 0 1 9 7 * (0 .0 0 1 0 9 )
D E G R E E -0 .9 9 3 * * * (0 .2 6 1 ) -1 .0 1 4 * * * (0 .2 6 1 ) -1 .0 3 6 * * * (0 .2 6 1 )
A L -0 .6 8 9 * * * (0 .2 2 6 ) -0 .7 4 2 * * * (0 .2 2 7 ) -0 .7 2 4 * * * (0 .2 2 7 )
F E -0 .5 1 9 * * (0 .2 2 2 ) -0 .5 5 6 * * (0 .2 2 2 ) -0 .5 6 2 * * (0 .2 2 2 )
G C S E -0 .7 8 4 * * * (0 .1 7 5 ) -0 .7 9 3 * * * (0 .1 7 5 ) -0 .7 9 0 * * * (0 .1 7 5 )
S O N S -0 .1 8 1 * * * (0 .0 3 5 5 )
O N E B O Y -0 .4 3 7 * * * (0 .0 9 4 5 )
T W O B O Y S -0 .5 5 6 * * * (0 .0 9 5 0 )
T H R E E B O Y S -0 .5 9 9 * * * (0 .1 1 5 )
O b s e r v a t io n s  _______ 2343  2 3 4 3  2 3 4 3
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p <  0.10, ** p  <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
that older women are more likely to have second children. However, this effect
is diminishing, as the squared age coefficient is negative. The peak hazard is at
40 years. Feasibly younger women are in less of a hurry to have more children,
whereas older women may not have more than one.
Various education effects are significant. Interestingly, the coefficient on
DEGREE is positive and significant (1%) at parity 1, and the value of 0.147 
(Table 3.5, Column (1)) implies a 16% increase in the hazard rate relative to 
women without high school qualifications.25 The coefficient is negative at parity 
2. Conversely, at parity 3 the coefficient is -0.993, suggesting a 63% reduction
25exp(0.147) =  1.16.
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(significant at 1%). The theoretical literature suggests that higher levels of 
human capital reduce fertility since the opportunity cost of childrearing is higher 
(eg, Galor and Weil [1996, 2000]). The evidence presented here accords with this: 
educated women are significantly less likely to have more than three children. 
However, they also have tighter birth spacing — they have a second child sooner 
— possibly to allow a quicker return to work.
When SONS is included, the coefficient is negative and significant at 1% for 
each parity. The higher the parity, the larger the effect per son. After a first 
child, the coefficient of -0.0847 implies a reduction in the birth hazard of 8 % 
when women have a son instead of a daughter. After three boys, the hazard 
is reduced by 42% relative to a woman with three daughters .26 This suggests 
a high degree of preference for sons amongst the sample overall (see Table 3.2, 
page 89).
A strong preference for sons is also seen when dummies for family compo­
sition (ONEBOY, TWOBOYS and THREEBOYS) are included in the model 
(Table 3.5, panels (a) and (b), column (3)). After two children, having one son 
reduces the fertility hazard by 30%, relative to a woman with no sons. Women 
with two sons show only a reduction of 27%, suggesting some taste for a mixed 
family. After three children fertility reduces with each son, from 35% to 45% 
compared to a woman with three daughters. The dummies are significant at 1% 
in each case and are not (jointly) significantly different, implying that, for the 
sample as a whole, having one son is more important than the number of sons. 
However, Table 3.4 suggests this taste varies considerably by country. Nonethe­
less, throughout this paper all results presented are robust to using presence of 
a son as a regressor instead of the number of sons (variable SONS).
2 6 exp(3 * -0 .181) =  0.58.
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3.4.3 Country differences
Table 3.6 reports relative birth hazard rates for women at parities 1-3 with 
country fixed effects.27 The regression specification is
log Ai = fi'X i +  ^ 2  ledic + <5SONSi +  <5cSONSi * dic
c c
diC indicates that woman i comes from country c. Column 1 in each panel 
includes only country dummies; since the Cox model reports hazard rates rel­
ative to an unspecified baseline hazard, one country dummy variable must be 
omitted. For ease of comparison, I omit the same country in each specification: 
India, the largest group. Country coefficients thus represent differences in fe­
cundity between each group and India. In line with Chapter 2 and Fernandez 
and Fogli [2005, 2006], these dummies are generally significant, indicating that 
women of different origins indeed have differing fertility objectives.
Including SONS and Country*SONS interaction terms (Table 3.6, Column 
(2)) allows son preferences to be identified for each group. The coefficient on 
SONS itself measures the degree of son preference of Indian women, which is 
significant at 1% in each regression. The effect is large: having three sons 
reduces the future birth hazard rate by 67% relative to having three daughters.
Of the six largest country groups,28 Bangladeshi women show significantly 
less son preference at all parities (Bangladesh dummy is positive), and Pakistan, 
Germany and Somalia show less in two of the three regressions.29 For every 
country the signs are the same at each parity. Finally, whilst Kenyan women do 
not show preferences significantly different to Indian women, their preferences 
are significantly different from zero at all parities (5% or better). After three 
sons, fecundity is just a quarter of that after three daughters.
27Only selected coefficients Eire reported in Tables 3.6-3.9. Full regressions Eire given in 
Appendix B.3, Tables B.1-B.12 (pp. 156).
2 8  Kenya, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Germany and Somalia appear in each regression.
29Dubuc and Coleman [2007] suggest that son preferences amongst Indian women in the 
UK axe stronger than those for Pakistanis since they have fewer children overall, yet still want 
to have a son. This hypothesis is consistent with my results, since the Pakistan coefficient 
is positive (significant at 1%) in each regression, as is SONS*Pakistan (10% significance for 
parities 2 and 3).
95
C u l t u r e , F e r t il i t y , a n d  S o n  P r e f e r e n c e
Table 3.6: Birth hazard rate regressions for immigrant women in the UK with 
country fixed effects and country son preference effects. Selected coefficients 
only; full results in appendix, Tables B.1-B.3 (pp. 156).
(a) Parity 1
( i ) (2 )
A G E  .
A G E 2
D E G R E E
A L
F E
G C S E
.0 . 1 6 4 " *
- 0 .0 0 3 8 5 " *
0 . 1 8 1 * "
-0 .0 5 1 4
0 .0 4 2 7
0 .0 4 8 9
(.0 .0197) . 
(0 .0 0 0 3 6 6 ) 
(0 .0 3 9 6 ) 
(0 .0 4 4 9 ) 
(0 .0 4 7 0 ) 
(0 .0 3 6 9 )
0 . 1 6 5 * "
-0 .0 0 3 8 8 * * *
0 .1 7 4 * * *
-0 .0 5 2 6
0 .0 3 7 2
0 .0 4 5 6
(0 .0 1 9 7 )
(0 .0 0 0 3 6 7 )
(0 .0 3 9 7 )
(0 .0 4 5 0 )
(0 .0 4 7 1 )
(0 .0 3 7 0 )
K e n y a
N ig e r ia
B a n g la d e s h
P a k i s ta n
G e rm a n y
S o m a lia
0 .0 3 0 9
0 .2 4 7 * * *
0 .3 8 6 * * *
0 .4 3 8 * * *
-0 .1 1 7 * *
0 .6 2 8 * * *
(0 .0 5 2 6 )
(0 .0 6 7 4 )
(0 .0 4 4 6 )
(0 .0 3 8 6 )
(0 .0 5 2 0 )
(0 .0 7 8 3 )
0 .0 4 4 5
0 .1 4 9
0 .2 6 8 * * *
0 .3 8 6 * * *
-0 .3 0 8 * * *
0 .3 3 3 * * *
(0 .0 7 6 4 )
(0 .0 9 4 8 )
(0 .0 6 6 2 )
(0 .0 5 6 2 )
(0 .0 7 5 3 )
(0 .1 1 3 )
S O N S
S O N S * K e n y a  
S O N S *  N ig e r ia  
S O N S *  B a n g la d e s h  
S O N S *  P a k i s ta n  
S O N S * G e r m a n y  
S O N S * S o m a lia
-0 .2 6 1 * * *
-0 .0 2 1 4
0 .1 6 9
0 .2 0 9 * *
0 .0 8 7 5
0 .3 4 8 * * *
0 .5 6 8 * * *
(0 .0 5 3 0 )
(0 .1 0 5 )
(0 .1 3 4 )
(0 .0 8 8 4 )
(0 .0 7 7 0 )
(0 .1 0 3 )
(0 .1 5 6 )
O b s e r v a t io n s 13223 13223
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, * * *  p  <  0.01.
(b) Parity 2
'■ UT ' (2 )
a g £
A G E 2
D E G R E E
A L
F E
G C S E
-0 .0 1 4 0
-0 .0 0 1 4 1 * *
0 .0 7 3 9
-0 .1 9 8 * *
-0 .1 4 6 *
-0 .1 8 8 * * *
(0 .0 3 7 1 )
(0 .0 0 0 6 6 4 )
(0 .0 7 6 5 )
(0 .0 8 3 4 )
(0 .0 8 8 3 )
(0 .0 6 6 0 )
-0 .0 0 9 9 7
- 0 . 0 0 1 4 9 "
0 .0 5 8 3
-0 .2 1 4 * *
-0 .1 7 4 * *
-0 .1 9 3 * * *
(0 .0 3 7 2 )
(0 .0 0 0 6 6 5 )
(0 .0 7 6 6 )
(0 .0 8 3 6 )
(0 .0 8 8 6 )
(0 .0 6 6 2 )
K e n y a
N ig e r ia
B a n g la d e s h
P a k i s ta n
G e rm a n y
S o m a lia
-0 .0 5 2 7
0 .7 9 2 * * *
0 .8 5 7 * * *
0 .9 2 2 * * *
0 .0 1 8 5
1 .1 6 2 * * *
(0 .0 9 3 1 )
(0 .0 9 7 4 )
(0 .0 6 2 9 )
(0 .0 5 6 0 )
(0 .0 9 0 6 )
(0 .0 9 9 6 )
0 .2 4 2
0 .7 2 1 * * *
0 .6 7 7 * * *
0 .7 8 3 * * *
-0 .1 4 8
1 .0 6 9 * * *
(0 .1 4 9 )
(0 .1 7 3 )
(0 .1 0 9 )
(0 .0 9 6 0 )
(0 .1 5 5 )
(0 .1 7 6 )
S O N S
S O N S * K e n y a
S O N S * N ig e r ia
S O N S *  B a n g la d e s h
S O N S * P a k is ta n
S O N S * G e rm a n y
S O N S * S o m a lia
-0 .2 8 0 * * *
-0 .3 0 3 * *
0 .0 7 9 8
0 . 1 8 3 "
0 .1 4 1 *
0 .1 6 8
0 .0 9 8 2
(0 .0 6 3 4 )
(0 .1 3 3 )
(0 .1 4 4 )
(0 .0 8 8 2 )
(0 .0 7 9 6 )
(0 .1 2 5 )
(0 .1 4 5 )
O b s e r v a t io n s  7 704  7 7 0 4
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.10, ** p  <  0.05, * * *  p  <  0.01.
(c) Parity 3
U)______________ W
A G E -0 .1 1 0 * (0 .0 6 5 2 ) -0 .1 0 5 (0 .0 6 5 4 )
A G E 2 0 .0 0 0 5 6 9 (0 .0 0 1 1 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 4 7 3 (0 .0 0 1 1 0 )
D E G R E E -0 .6 8 1 * * (0 .2 6 5 ) -0 .6 9 5 * * * (0 .2 6 6 )
A L -0 .4 3 6 * (0 .2 3 0 ) -0 .4 8 6 * * (0 .2 3 0 )
F E -0 .3 0 4 (0 .2 2 9 ) -0 .3 1 7 (0 .2 3 0 )
G C S E -0 .4 9 7 * * * (0 .1 7 8 ) -0 .4 9 4 * * * (0 .1 7 8 )
K e n y a 0 .0 7 5 5 (0 .1 9 2 ) 0 .0 8 4 8 (0 .3 0 2 )
N ig e r ia 0 .7 5 9 * * * (0 .1 7 2 ) 0 .5 2 7 * (0 .3 1 2 )
B a n g la d e s h 0 .9 0 7 * * * (0 .1 0 5 ) 0 .6 2 8 * * * (0 .2 0 4 )
P a k i s ta n 1 .0 2 1 * * * (0 .0 9 7 2 ) 0 .7 4 2 * * * (0 .1 8 6 )
G e rm a n y -0 .0 5 0 2 (0 .2 0 1 ) -0 .8 1 7 * (0 .4 4 2 )
S o m a lia 1 .4 5 3 * * * (0 .1 4 2 ) 1 .0 4 5 * * * (0 .2 8 8 )
S O N S -0 .3 6 9 * * * (0 .1 0 0 )
S O N S * K e n y a -0 .0 9 3 1 (0 .2 1 5 )
S O N S * N ig e r ia 0 .1 4 8 (0 .1 9 7 )
S O N S *  B a n g la d e s h 0 .2 0 5 * (0 .1 2 2 )
S O N S * P a k is ta n 0 .1 9 8 * (0 .1 1 4 )
S O N S *  G e rm a n y 0 .5 0 4 * * (0 .2 3 8 )
S O N S * S o m a lia 0 .2 8 2 * (0 .1 6 9 )
O b s e r v a t io n s  2 343  2 343
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, * * *  p  <  0.01.
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The full tables B.1-B.3 show significant differences from India for 12, 7 and 
4 countries at parities 1, 2 and 3, respectively (out of 39, 25 and 6  groups). 
Of the remainder at parity 1, five show preferences different to zero (including 
Kenya, as discussed). The SONS*Country interactions are jointly significant at 
1% for the first two regressions (x2 test).
In an alternative specification, I control for family composition with dum­
mies indicating the number of sons (Appendix B.3, Tables B.4 and B.5, pp. 
159).30 Of countries showing significant preferences, two patterns emerge: sim­
ilar magnitude coefficients on each of the dummies suggests a preference for a 
son. Conversely, differing values implies women care about the number of sons, 
or want a mix of sexes. For example, Kenya and Pakistan show preferences for 
having a single boy at parities 2 and 3, with significant coefficients on all dum­
mies. Interestingly, these country groups show lowest birth hazards for women 
with two sons and a daughter. By contrast, at parity 3, Indian and Bangladeshi 
women show hazard rates declining with the number of sons, suggesting they 
want as many sons as possible. German woman are the opposite, with a prefer­
ence for daughters, though they show a significant taste for mixed families after 
the second child. Australian women also show a significant taste for having 
a daughter; after two boys they are two-and-a-half times more likely to have 
another child than after two girls.31
The varying degrees of observed son preference amongst the groups suggests 
that individuals’ origins — and hence, cultural values — play a definitive role 
in shaping preferences over family composition. In the following experiments I 
attempt to rule out some alternative explanations.
30In order to compare preferences within country groups, I omit non-interacted composi­
tion dummies. Coefficients therefore measure the hazard rates relative to a compatriot with 
no sons. (In all other specifications, coefficients measure hazards relative to an Indian woman, 
controlling for the number of sons. This presentation emphasises differences between coun­
tries.)
31exp(0.918) =  2.50.
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3.4.4 Income
Possibly, income could explain differences in son preference between groups. 
Perhaps poor women of all groups have preferences for sons, and the previous 
regressions are explained by differences in earnings. To exclude such stories, I 
construct regressions with income dummies for each country. As discussed in 
Section 3.3, I use husband’s income. This is more often reported than women’s 
income and raises fewer endogeneity concerns: female earnings are likely co­
related with childrearing decisions. In any case, the major results do not depend 
on this choice of regressor.
My regression model is:
log A* =  (3'Xi + 7 cpPOOR* * dic +  7 RICH* +  ^  7 *RICH* * dic
c c
+  <5pSONS* * POOR* +  6c'SONS* * POOR* * dic
C
+5r SONS* * RICH* +  ^  SfSONSi * RICH* * dic
C
RICH indicates above-median income, and POOR is its complement; the me­
dian is taken at the sample level, not per country. This specification, including 
POOR interaction terms as well as RICH, allows son preference to be com­
pared at each income level. India dummies are omitted, as before. I am less 
concerned with differences between the rich and poor of any country than in 
comparing, say, rich Germans with rich Indians. W ith my chosen specification, 
the coefficient on SONS*RICH*Germany measures exactly this.
Table 3.7 gives selected coefficients. In Column(l), only country dummies 
are included. The coefficient on RICH is negative and significant at Parity 
1, implying that birth hazards are generally lower for richer women. This is 
not predicted in the literature, as fertility is usually found to increase in male 
earnings (see also the theoretical model of Galor and Weil [1996]). However it 
is very likely that assortative matching explains this finding, since educational 
dummies become insignificant in all of these regressions. The explanation is that
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Table 3.7: Birth hazard rate regressions with country fixed effects and country 
son preference effects, split by income at sample median. Selected coefficients 
only; full results in Tables B.6-B.7 (pp. 162).
(a) Parity 1
( 1 )  ( 2 )
A G E 0 .2 8 0 ’ ** (0 .0 4 8 3 ) 0 .2 8 6 ’ ” (0 .0 4 8 5 )
A G E 2 -0 .0 0 5 7 4 * * * (0 .0 0 0 8 8 7 ) -0 .0 0 5 8 3 * * * (0 .0 0 0 8 9 0 )
D E G R E E 0 .0 8 8 5 (0 .0 8 4 8 ) 0 .0 8 8 0 (0 .0 8 5 4 )
A L -0 .0 3 4 1 (0 .1 0 4 ) -0 .0 3 0 5 (0 .1 0 5 )
F E 0 .1 3 5 (0 .1 1 5 ) 0 .1 4 7 (0 .1 1 6 )
G C S E -0 .0 1 9 0 (0 .0 8 4 0 ) -0 .0 1 7 5 (0 .0 8 4 3 )
P O O R * K e n y a - 0 .1 7 7 (0 .1 3 2 ) -0 .2 0 8 (0 .2 0 4 )
P O O R * B a n g la d e s h 0 .6 6 3 * * * (0 .1 0 5 ) 0 .4 5 0 * * * (0 .1 4 8 )
P O O R * P a k iB ta n 0 .3 9 7 * * * (0 .0 9 9 2 ) 0 .2 2 6 (0 .1 3 9 )
P O O R * G e r m a n y -0 .3 3 0 * * * (0 .1 2 5 ) -0 .4 2 8 * * (0 .1 7 2 )
R IC H -0 .1 6 1 * (0 .0 9 3 2 ) -0 .3 8 8 * * * (0 .1 3 7 )
R IC H *  K e n y a 0 .0 7 4 5 (0 .1 2 9 ) 0 .1 9 2 (0 .1 8 5 )
R IC H * B a n g la d e sh 0 .1 8 4 (0 .2 2 1 ) 0 .1 8 6 (0 .3 0 9 )
R I C H * P a k is ta n 0 .3 8 7 * * * (0 .1 3 2 ) 0 .6 6 1 * * * (0 .1 9 4 )
R IC H *  G e rm  a n y 0 .0 5 3 0 (0 .1 1 9 ) 0 .0 3 3 0 (0 .1 7 3 )
S O N S * P O O R -0 .3 6 9 * * * (0 .1 1 8 )
S O N S * P O O R * K e n y a 0 .1 0 6 (0 .2 6 7 )
S O N S *  P O O R *  B a n g la d e s h 0 .4 1 6 * * (0 .2 0 2 )
S O N S * P O O R * P a k ie ta n 0 .3 2 7 * (0 .1 9 7 )
S O N S *  P O O R *  G e rm  a n y 0 .1 6 7 (0 .2 4 9 )
S O N S * R IC H 0 .0 5 4 0 (0 .1 4 3 )
S O  N S * R IC H *  K e n y a -0 .2 2 8 (0 .2 5 8 )
S O N S * R I C H ‘ B a n g la d e s h 0 .0 0 6 8 5 (0 .4 4 2 )
S O N S * R I C H * P a k is ta n -0 .4 7 3 * (0 .2 6 4 )
S O N S * R I C H * G e rm a n y 0 .0 4 3 2 (0 .2 3 6 )
O b s e r v a t io n s    2 3 9 9    2399
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
(b) Parity 2
l i)___________________(21
A G E -0 .0 7 8 9 (0 .0 9 8 0 ) -0 .0 9 2 1 (0 .0 9 8 2 )
A G E 2 -0 .0 0 0 1 9 0 (0 .0 0 1 7 5 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 0 5 8 0 (0 .0 0 1 7 5 )
D E G R E E 0 .2 6 9 (0 .2 0 0 ) 0 .2 8 5 (0 .2 0 2 )
A L -0 .2 4 7 (0 .2 2 4 ) -0 .2 8 7 (0 .2 2 5 )
F E 0 .0 8 7 6 (0 .2 3 9 ) 0 .0 5 2 3 (0 .2 4 2 )
G C S E -0 .0 3 4 8 (0 .1 5 9 ) -0 .0 1 6 2 (0 .1 5 9 )
P O O R *  K e n y a -0 .0 4 7 9 (0 .2 6 0 ) 0 .4 9 5 (0 .4 5 3 )
P O O R * B a n g ]a d e s h 0 .9 1 3 * * * (0 .1 6 1 ) 0 .9 4 3 * * * (0 .2 6 1 )
P O O R *  P a k i s ta n 1 .0 9 8 * * * (0 .1 5 6 ) 0 .7 5 0 * * * (0 .2 6 7 )
P O O R *  G e rm a n y 0 .2 5 1 (0 .2 2 8 ) 0 .5 4 0 (0 .3 5 4 )
R IC H -0 .2 6 5 (0 .1 6 5 ) -0 .0 8 2 5 (0 .2 8 4 )
R IC H * K e n y a 0 .0 9 7 0 (0 .2 2 7 ) 0 .3 7 6 (0 .3 6 7 )
R IC H ‘ B a n g la d e s h 0 .9 1 3 * * * (0 .2 6 1 ) 0 .5 9 3 (0 .4 5 7 )
R IC H ‘ P a k i s ta n 1 .1 2 3 * * * (0 .1 7 4 ) 0 .9 1 2 * * * (0 .2 9 0 )
R IC H ‘ G e rm a n y 0 .3 2 3 (0 .2 0 6 ) 0 .2 0 2 (0 .3 5 4 )
S O N S * P O O R -0 .2 2 5 (0 .1 6 4 )
S O N S * P O O R *  K e n y a -0 .5 5 2 (0 .4 2 9 )
S O N S * P O O R * B a n g la d e s h -0 .0 3 2 4 (0 .2 2 4 )
S O N S * P O O R *  P a k is ta n 0 .3 4 7 (0 .2 1 9 )
S O N S ‘ P O O R *  G e rm a n y -0 .3 3 4 (0 .3 2 7 )
S O N S * R IC H -0 .4 0 0 * * (0 .1 8 2 )
S O N S ‘ R IC H ‘ K e n y a -0 .2 9 5 (0 .3 4 0 )
S O N S ‘ R IC H ‘ B a n g la d e s h 0 .3 0 8 (0 .4 1 8 )
S O N S ‘ R IC H ‘ P a k i s ta n 0 .1 9 7 (0 .2 5 2 )
S O N S ‘ R IC H ‘ G e rm a n y 0 .1 2 6 (0 .3 0 3 )
O b s e r v a t io n s  1 180  1180
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
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Table 3.8: Birth hazard rate regressions with country fixed effects and country 
son preference effects, split by income at (1 ) first quartile, (2 ) sample median, 
and (3) third quartile. Selected coefficients only; full results in Tables B . 8  and 
B.9 (pp. 164).
(a) Parity 1
(1) (2) 1ST
S O N S * P O O R -0 .3 0 8 * (0 .1 7 2 ) -0 .3 6 9 * * * (0 .1 1 8 ) - 0 .3 0 7 ” ’ (0 .0 9 9 0 )
S O N S * P O O R * K e n y a 0 .5 8 2 (0 .3 9 9 ) 0 .1 0 6 (0 .2 6 7 ) -0 .0 3 6 7 (0 .2 0 8 )
S O N S *  P O O R *  B a n g la d e s h 0 .3 6 7 (0 .2 4 5 ) 0 .4 1 6 * * (0 .2 0 2 ) 0 .3 3 4 * (0 .1 8 5 )
S O N S * P O O R * P a k is ta n 0 .3 0 2 (0 .2 6 5 ) 0 .3 2 7 * (0 .1 9 7 ) 0 .261 (0 .1 6 8 )
S O N S *  P O O R *  G e rm a n y 0 .0 3 9 8 (0 .3 9 4 ) 0 .1 6 7 (0 .2 4 9 ) 0 .1 7 0 (0 .1 9 3 )
S O N S * R IC H -0 .1 6 0 (0 .1 0 7 ) 0 .0 5 4 0 (0 .1 4 3 ) 0 .2 1 1 (0 .2 3 0 )
S O N S * R I C H ‘ K e n y a -0 .1 8 9 (0 .2 0 8 ) -0 .2 2 8 (0 .2 5 8 ) -0 .0 1 7 0 (0 .3 9 8 )
S O N S * R I C H * B a n g la d e s h 0 .1 6 7 (0 .3 3 5 ) 0 .0 0 6 8 5 (0 .4 4 2 ) 0 .5 9 8 (0 .7 4 8 )
S O N S *  R IC H ‘ P a k i s ta n -0 .1 4 7 (0 .1 9 9 ) -0 .4 7 3 * (0 .2 6 4 ) -1 .2 4 7 * * * (0 .4 7 0 )
S O N S ‘ R IC H ‘ G e rm a n y 0 .1 7 4 (0 .1 8 9 ) 0 .0 4 3 2 (0 .2 3 6 ) 0 .0 5 5 3 (0 .3 6 2 )
O b s e rv a t io n s 2399 2399 2399
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.10, * *  p  <  0.05, * * *  p  <  0.01.
(b) Parity 2
( l ) (2 ) (3)
S O N S ’ P O O R -0 .3 7 0 * (0 .2 2 1 ) -0 .2 2 5 (0 .1 6 4 ) - 0 .2 9 2 ” (0 .1 3 5 )
S O N S * P O O R *  K e n y a 0 .5 0 1 (0 .7 2 8 ) -0 .5 5 2 (0 .4 2 9 ) -0 .1 8 0 (0 .3 0 5 )
S O N S * P O O  R ’ B a n g la d e s h 0 .1 0 6 (0 .2 7 1 ) -0 .0 3 2 4 (0 .2 2 4 ) 0 .0 2 2 2 (0 .2 0 2 )
S O N S * P O O R *  P a k is ta n 0 .3 7 3 (0 .2 9 8 ) 0 .3 4 7 (0 .2 1 9 ) 0 .2 9 4 (0 .1 8 3 )
S O N S * P O O  R ’ G e rm a n y -0 .8 6 8 (0 .7 4 4 ) -0 .3 3 4 (0 .3 2 7 ) -0 .2 2 5 (0 .2 8 3 )
S O N S * R IC H -0 .3 1 9 * * (0 .1 4 5 ) ■0.400** (0 .1 8 2 ) -0 .3 8 8 (0 .2 8 5 )
S O N S * R IC H  * K e n y a -0 .5 3 3 * (0 .2 9 1 ) -0 .2 9 5 (0 .3 4 0 ) -0 .9 2 3 * (0 .5 2 7 )
S O N S * R IC H ‘ B a n g la d e s h 0 .2 1 7 (0 .3 4 4 ) 0 .3 0 8 (0 .4 1 8 ) 0 .4 9 2 (0 .5 6 6 )
S O N S * R IC H ‘ P a k i s ta n 0 .3 1 2 (0 .1 9 7 ) 0 .1 9 7 (0 .2 5 2 ) 0 .3 3 0 (0 .3 8 6 )
S O N S * R IC H ‘ G e rm a n y -0 .0 3 6 4 (0 .2 4 2 ) 0 .1 2 6 (0 .3 0 3 ) 0 .1 1 0 (0 .3 8 9 )
O b s e rv a t io n s  1 180  1 1 8 0 ______________________ 1180
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.10, * *  p  <  0.05, * * *  p  <  0.01.
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higher skilled men are both wealthier and have higher skilled partners; while 
their wealth relaxes the household budget constraint allowing for more children, 
the increased opportunity cost of childrearing time more than offsets this. The 
empirical story is unclear in larger families: the RICH coefficient becomes in­
significant at parity 2 . 32 The educational dummies remain insignificant, and the 
pattern is robust to using the first and third quartiles as split points in place of 
median income (see Table 3.8).
Some significant differences between the country groups are seen, notably 
Pakistan, different from India amongst both income groups at parity 1 (10%), 
though not many other groups show significant coefficients. The small sample 
size may explain this. However, the son preference coefficients are jointly sig­
nificant to zero for the poor groups at parity 1 (p =  0.052, x 2 test), and for the 
rich group at parity 2  (p =  0.066).33
Whilst this analysis is not conclusive, the evidence suggests that sex pref­
erence behaviour is significantly different across country groups, regardless of 
income. That is, at a given income, behaviours are comparatively similar within 
groups relative to other groups, and this is robust to the choice of the income 
group split, indicating that cultural values shared by the group may dominate 
price-side (ie, environmental) factors when it comes to parental sex preferences.
3.4.5 Time of arrival
The literature on cultural transmission (reviewed in Chapter 1) suggests that, 
if cultural values are a dominant cause of son-preferring behaviour, then these 
values must have been picked up — learnt — early in life. My identification 
strategy depends on the assumption that women from different countries have 
picked up different values before coming to the UK. Feasibly, a longer exposure 
to the prevailing culture in a woman’s country of origin would lead her to hold
3 2  Only Indian and Pakistani women would be included at parity 3 so I restrict attention to 
parities 1 and 2 .
33Only the Pakistani dummy appears at parity 3; this coefficient is significant at 5% as 
described (p  =  0.043).
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those values more strongly. Here, I test whether arrival in Britain at a young 
age results in weaker son preferences.
The LFS contains data the years of arrival in the UK for immigrants. This 
allows me to perform an analogue of the previous exercise, splitting the sam­
ple by age at arrival (AGECAME). I use this to define an indicator variable 
YOUNG, equal to one for women arriving before a certain age, zero other­
wise, with OLD being the complement. YOUNG*Country and OLD*Country 
interactions are included to capture fecundity effects associated with arriving 
young/arriving later for each country group, along with SONS interactions to 
capture sex preferences. These regressions are found in Table 3.9.34
In each panel, Column (1) reports regressions with the split point at ten 
years. Women arriving before their tenth birthday show insignificant son pref­
erence. Of the largest five country groups,35 no SONS*YOUNG*Country coef­
ficient is significant except for Nigeria at parity 2, implying that son preferring 
behaviour is not particularly different across these groups. The YOUNG inter­
action terms show significance jointly for only parity 2 , at 1 0 %.
Conversely, women arriving after the age of ten do show significant son 
preference at each parity. Moreover, differences between groups are significant. 
Bangladeshi women show less son preference at all three parities, and Pakistani 
and German women less for two of the three. For each country all signs match 
except for Nigeria at parity 2, and the coefficients are jointly significant at at 
least 5% in each regression.
For SONS*OLD*Country coefficients, the signs are usually positive except 
for Kenya (usually negative), suggesting that some countries consistently exhibit 
son preference. Conversely, the signs for SONS*YOUNG*Country coefficients
34The regression equation is
log A* =  t f X i  +  Y  7 ?  OLD* * dic +  7 YOUNG* +  Y  7 YYOUNG* * d*c
C   C
+  <5°SONS* * OLD* +  Y  5?SONSt * OLD* * die
C
+<5YSONS* * YOUNG* +  Y  6c SONS* * YOUNG* * dic
C
3 5 Kenya, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Germany appear in each regression.
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Table 3.9: Birth hazard rate regressions with country fixed effects and country 
son preference effects, split by age on immigration to the UK. Column (1) split 
at age 10, Column (2) at age 15. Selected coefficients only; full results in Tables 
B.10-B.12 (pp . 162).
(a) Parity 1
(1 ) (2 )
S O N S * O L D  
S O N S * O L D * K e n y a  
SO  N S * O L D *  N ig e r ia  
S O N S *  O L D *  B a n g la d e s h  
S O N S * O L D * P a k is ta n  
SO  N S * O L D *  G e rm a n y
-0 .2 8 5 " '' '’
-0 .0 1 6 8
0 .1 7 4
0 .2 3 3 * *
0 .1 3 2
0 .3 7 2 * *
(0 .0 5 8 3 )
(0 .1 2 1 )
(0 .1 4 2 )
(0 .0 9 5 2 )
(0 .0 8 3 8 )
(0 .1 5 9 )
-0 .2 5 0 ’ ”
-0 .0 3 7 9
0 .1 4 1
0 .1 6 7 *
0 .0 7 8 4
0 .3 4 8 * *
(0 .0 6 0 9 )
(0 .1 4 0 )
(0 .1 4 5 )
(0 .1 0 1 )
(0 .0 8 7 4 )
(0 .1 7 4 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G  
S O N S *  Y O U N G  * K e n y a  
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ N ig e r ia  
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  B a n g la d e s h  
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ P a k i s ta n  
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ G e rm a n y
-0 .1 0 1
-0 .0 7 9 4
-0 .0 8 7 0
0 .0 4 9 3
-0 .1 8 0
0 .171
(0 .1 3 3 )
(0 .2 1 8 )
(0 .4 2 4 )
(0 .2 5 4 )
(0 .2 0 5 )
(0 .1 7 3 )
-0 .2 9 4 * * *
0 .0 7 3 5
0 .1 2 3
0 .3 6 0 *
0 .1 3 4
0 .3 6 0 * *
(0 .1 1 0 )
(0 .1 7 1 )
(0 .3 6 1 )
(0 .1 8 9 )
(0 .1 6 8 )
(0 .1 5 3 )
O b s e rv a t io n s 13112 13112
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.10, **  p  <  0.05, * * *  p  <  0.01
(b) Parity 2
_.... f .r  .
(2 )
S O N S * O L D  
S O N S *  O L D *  K e n y a  
S O N S *  O L D *  N ig e r ia  
S O N S *  O L D *  B a n g la d e s h  
S O N  S * O L D *  P a k i s ta n  
S O N S * O L D *  G e rm a n y
- 0 .2 7 3 ” ’
-0 .2 8 2 *
-0 .0 1 8 3
0 .1 7 1 *
0 .1 4 7 *
0 .0 6 1 3
(0 .0 7 0 4 )
(0 .1 5 4 )
(0 .1 5 2 )
(0 .0 9 6 2 )
(0 .0 8 7 2 )
(0 .2 1 8 )
- 0 . 2 5 3 * "
-0 .4 7 6 * *
-0 .0 1 1 0
0 .1 2 9
0 .1 4 6
0 .0 1 5 0
(0 .0 7 3 3 )
(0 .1 8 9 )
(0 .1 5 5 )
(0 .1 0 0 )
(0 .0 9 0 6 )
(0 .2 3 8 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G  
S O N S * Y O U N G * K e n y a  
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ N ig e r ia  
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ B a n g la d e s h  
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ P a k i s ta n  
S O N S * Y O U N G * G e rm a n y
-0 .2 1 7
-0 .3 6 7
1 .1 5 3 * *
0 .1 2 7
-0 .0 3 9 2
0 .1 4 6
(0 .1 4 9 )
(0 .2 8 4 )
(0 .5 8 7 )
(0 .2 3 5 )
(0 .2 1 0 )
(0 .1 9 7 )
-0 .3 0 5 * *
-0 .0 8 7 6
0 .5 9 4
0 .2 9 8
0 .0 0 7 7 5
0 .2 3 7
(0 .1 3 0 )
(0 .2 0 9 )
(0 .4 5 7 )
(0 .1 9 0 )
(0 .1 7 6 )
(0 .1 8 0 )
O b s e r v a t io n s  7630  7630
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.10, * *  p  <  0.05, * * *  p  <  0.01.
(c) Parity 3
ii)_____________ (2)
S O N S * O L D -0 .4 .11*** (0 .1 1 0 ) - 0 . 3 6 8 * " (0 .1 1 5 )
S O N S *  O L D ‘ K e n y a -0 .1 2 0 (0 .2 4 8 ) -0 .2 6 3 (0 .2 9 5 )
S O N S *  O L D ‘ N ig e r ia 0 .1 9 4 (0 .2 0 0 ) 0 .1 4 0 (0 .2 0 3 )
S O N S * O L D * B a n g la d e s h 0 .2 4 3 * (0 .1 3 2 ) 0 .2 0 7 (0 .1 3 9 )
S O N S * O L D * P a k is ta n 0 .2 6 7 * * (0 .1 2 5 ) 0 .2 1 8 * (0 .1 3 1 )
S O N S *  O L D ‘ G e rm a n y 1 .2 1 9 * * * (0 .4 1 5 ) 1 .0 7 1 * * (0 .4 6 4 )
S O N S * Y O U N G -0 .1 3 0 (0 .2 5 5 ) -0 .3 8 3 * (0 .2 0 9 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ K e n y a -0 .1 7 2 (0 .5 0 0 ) 0 .0 7 6 2 (0 .3 5 3 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * N ig e r ia -0 .6 5 6 2 .2 7 7 (1 -8 3 9 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * B a n g la d e s h -0 .0 0 8 8 5 (0 .3 9 5 ) 0 .1 8 9 (0 .2 7 0 )
S O N S * Y O U N G ‘ P a k is ta n -0 .1 6 9 (0 .2 9 7 ) 0 .1 8 1 (0 .2 4 2 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * G e r m a n y -0 .0 0 8 0 3 (0 .3 8 4 ) 0 .3 5 7 (0 .3 3 7 )
O b s e r v a t io n s  2 3 1 7  2 3 1 7
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, * * *  p  <  0.01.
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are mixed. Therefore, though these lower significance levels may result from 
reduced power due to small group sizes, the data is consistent with less variation 
in son preference for younger arrivals.
Column (2) in each panel moves the age split point to fifteen. Son prefer­
ence becomes significant for young arrivals in all three regressions. Since the 
number of these young arrivals is only increased by 35% (parities 1 and 2), the 
extra power of the tests does not solely explain the higher significance. The 
OLD*SONS coefficients remain significant at 1 %, but are reduced in each case. 
Also, the SONS*YOUNG coefficients are larger in magnitude for all parities. 
At parity one, the number of significant SONS*YOUNG*Country coefficients 
rises from three to six (see Table B.10). Some of the OLD interactions become 
insignificant, and the joint p-value of the SONS*OLD*County coefficients at 
parity 3 increases to 0.11. These findings suggest that women arriving when 
younger display less son preference, and that the 10-15 age range may be a 
cut-off point. This range coincides roughly with high school education in the 
UK. Girls arriving before ten could be expected to receive at least six years 
of education in Britain and hence receive considerable exposure to prevailing 
values.
Overall, the results presented here can be taken as marginal evidence that 
immersion in another country diminishes the cultural influence of individuals’ 
countries of origin. It is likely that arriving in a foreign environment at a 
young age in fact exposes individuals more strongly to the prevailing culture, 
particularly though education. The evidence is consistent with this story.
3.5 Conclusion
Previous work has not provided clear explanation for the causes of son preference 
in many countries worldwide. The evidence presented in here is supportive of a 
cultural explanation for cross-country differences in sex preferences. Conversely, 
the theoretical results derived from my model imply that price-side effects are
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an unlikely explanation for the variation in parental behaviour observed in my 
sample. In any case, this paper provides the first estimates of underlying son 
preferences that can be compared across countries. Aggregate sex ratios are not 
suitable for this purpose.
Sample selection biases may be of some concern. Aside from selection into 
the survey itself, the decision to emigrate to the UK may differ between groups 
studies. For example, a Dutch woman may have very different reasons than 
an Iranian. However, selection effects could conceivably reinforce the results: if 
women are more likely to emigrate to Britain if they are ‘culturally similar’, then 
migrants might display less variation than a representative sample of foreign 
women.
Whilst son preference has the attention of policy-makers, there is currently 
no consensus about potential policy interventions. That will remain the case 
until a coherent theory of parental sex preferences is established. The present 
work seeks to advance the debate by highlighting the importance of cultural 
factors.
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Chapter 4
Son preference and sex
ratios: How many ‘missing
women’ are missing?
When parents prefer sons, heterogeneity in the probability of having sons 
can lead to excess girls. I argue that this may lead to under-counting 
the number of ‘missing women’. First, I prove that relaxing assumptions 
on population homogeneity means that son preference can lead to skewed 
sex ratios. Second, I measure significant heterogeneity in the sex ratio at 
birth: ten percent of women have probabilities of having boys that are less 
than 42% or more than 61%. Third, existing work measures significant 
differences in parents’ son preferences between countries. I exploit these 
differences in parental behaviour to simulate sex ratios in the presence of 
heterogeneity. I measure that parents’ son preferences account for 1.5% 
of differences between sex ratios worldwide (significant at 10%). The 
presence of this effect may imply that sex ratios are more biased than 
previously estimated, since previous comparisons use benchmarks that 
already contain too few girls. Therefore there may be more women missing 
due to discrimination than we thought.
4.1 Introduction
Since recognition of the ‘missing women’ problem by Sen [1989], several expla­
nations have been made for the high proportion of boys in a number of countries.
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Recent work has highlighted biological factors as a possible cause of differences 
in sex ratios (the number of boys per girl), notably the Hepatitis-B virus [Os- 
ter, 2005]. Conversely, a majority of authors conclude that social norms are 
the proximate cause, as these lead to lower survival rates for girls. 1 To date, 
however, the effect of son preference in fertility decisions has been neglected, 
despite evidence that parents’ sex preferences are mainly determined by cultural 
background (see Chapter 3).
This paper estimates the effect of parental fertility decisions on sex ratios 
worldwide when women are heterogeneous in the probability of bearing sons. If 
women in a population have boys with differing probabilities, then son-preferring 
fertility behaviour will lead to excess girls. The extra girls borne by women that 
are more likely to have girls outnumber the reduction of girls borne to women 
likely to have boys. Previous theoretical work [Weiler, 1959; Goodman, 1961; 
Yamaguchi, 1989] has recognised this phenomenon in principle; I know of no 
attempt to quantify the effect in practice.
A growing body of biological research suggests that women are indeed het­
erogeneous in the probability with which they have sons.2 ,3  The majority of 
demographic work has considered the first-order implications of such phenom­
ena in affecting the aggregate sex ratio .4 However, many of these mechanisms 
also imply that populations will be heterogeneous; they have a second-order 
effect. This paper focusses on the implications of that heterogeneity on the sex
1 Proponents of cultural explanations include Sen [1992]; Das Gupta et al. [2002]; Aroki- 
asamy [2004]; Das Gupta [2005]; Qian [2006]; Chamarbagwala and Ranger [2006] and Lin 
et al. [2008],
2Graffelman and Hoekstra [2000] outline some of the possible causes:
[M]ore than 30 factors . . .  could affect the sex ratio. Among these are family size, 
age of the parents, age difference of the parents, birth order of the child, race, in­
cest, blood groups, season, frequency of sexual intercourse, socioeconomic status 
of the parents, legality of the child, climatological conditions, profession of the 
parents, pollution, use of the contraceptive pill, nutrition, hormonal treatments, 
type and timing of fertilization, urbanity, several diseases, handedness of the 
parents, stress.
3The existence of many of these phenomena can be explained in an evolutionary context: 
the aim is to maximise the reproductive fitness of one’s offspring. For example, beautiful 
people are relatively more likely to have daughters since good looks confer a greater advantage 
to  girls than to  boys [Miller and Kanazawa, 2007].
4 Eg, Graffelman and Hoekstra [2000]; Oster [2005].
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ratio in the presence of a cultural preference for boys.
Like previous authors [reviewed in James, 2000], I find significant hetero­
geneity in the probability of having a son, suggesting that ten percent of women 
have boys with probabilities outside the interval [0.42, 0.61]. Accounting for 
parental behaviour, this heterogeneity leads to sex ratios in the range 1.043- 
1.051, explaining 1.5% of differences worldwide (significant at the 10% level). 
As the theory suggests, son preference is associated with excess girls. Thus, 
since previous estimates of missing women have used comparisons without ac­
counting for these excess girls at birth, the number of women missing due to 
explicit discrimination may have been under-counted.
Chapter 3 provides theoretical and empirical evidence that parents’ prefer­
ence for sons is mainly driven by cultural factors. I provide uniquely compa­
rable estimates of son preference between countries, based on the behaviour of 
foreign-born women in the UK. Figure 4.1 plots son preference after two chil­
dren versus sex ratios in those women’s countries of origin. The correlation is 
significant and negative (and robust to omission of outliers). This suggests that 
culturally-driven son preference may lead to a reduction in the sex ratio.
Consider an extreme example: women continue to have children until they 
have a son. If boys and girls are equally likely for every women, the sex ratio in 
aggregate will be 1 [Weiler, 1959; Goodman, 1961; Sheps, 1963]. However, if half 
of women only ever have boys and half only girls, the former will obtain their son 
at the first birth. The latter will continue to have girls until some maximum 
family size is reached, and girls will outnumber boys. I prove a more general 
form of this result in Section 4.2. The phenomenon relies on the existence of 
heterogeneity in the probability of a son.
Figure 4.2 suggests that within-population heterogeneity of probability of 
having a son is indeed a possibility. In Section 4.3, I provide estimates of such 
heterogeneity, and find homogeneity is rejected at the 0.01% level. I derive an 
estimator based on modelling childbirth as a limited dependent variable problem 
with random effects. A woman i has an unobserved factor X i, and child j  is a
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Figure 4.1: Son preference of immigrant women versus sex ratios in their coun­
tries of origin. Son preference (after two children) is estimated from a birth- 
hazard regression for foreign-born women in the UK grouped by country of 
origin. Child sex ratio is derived from World Development Indicators (1997), 
under-15 male population divided by under-15 female population. Correlation 
is significant at 5% (robust to inclusion/exclusion of outliers) . 0
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Figure 4.2: Family composition (5 children) under a binomial model (B  ~  
Bernoulli(0.5)), versus actual data (see Table 4.1). The data show more dis­
persion than predicted by the model with homogeneous probabilities of having 
sons.
Boys in family: Binomial model versus data
0.35
Binomial, p = 0.5 
Observed
0 1 2 3 4 5
Boys in family
boy if Xi +  eXj > 0 , with eXj being drawn from an independent standard normal 
distribution. Thus, woman i gives birth to boys with probability $ (X j) . 5 By 
assuming a distributional form for X , parameters may be obtained by maxi­
mum likelihood estimation. I find significant heterogeneity amongst a sample 
of 116,513 British-born women: 10% of women have boys with probabilities 
outside [0.42, 0.61]. My measurements are closely in line with previous work, 
despite the difference in estimation technique.
In Section 4.4, I simulate the effect of son preferences on aggregate sex 
ratios, using the estimates for heterogeneity derived in Section 4.3. To obtain 
preferences for sons, I estimate the son preferences of immigrant women in 
the UK. By grouping the women by country of origin, I measure the fertility 
behaviour in response to their existing family compositions. I can then calculate 
the sex ratio that would emerge in a population of women behaving this way.
5<l> is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF).
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This simulated sex ratio is then compared with the sex ratio in the women’s 
countries of origin.
The contribution of this paper is to establish that fertility behaviour does 
feasibly affect sex ratios in practice. Moreover, the bias is towards the less- 
favoured sex. Therefore, even though the effect I find is likely outweighed by 
discriminatory behaviour (such as selective abortion, infanticide or neglect), it 
is important because missing women cannot be measured correctly unless sex 
ratios at birth are properly accounted for. This reinforces the arguments made 
by Mayer [1999] and Griffiths et al. [2000], that sex ratios alone should be treated 
with caution as a measure of women’s position in society: I maintain sex ratios 
must be treated with care when measuring the number of missing women.
Related Literature
There have been numerous attempts to quantify the number of missing women 
worldwide, notably Dreze and Sen [1989], who arrive at a figure of 100 million, 
and Coale [1991] finding a reduced figure of 60 million. Oster [2005] takes 
account of Hepatitis-B and its effect on the probabilities of having sons, coming 
to a still lower figure of 32 million. All three works take probabilities of sons to 
be homogeneous within countries.6
Meanwhile, there is a growing literature that implies within-population het­
erogeneity in the probability of having boys. Factors thought to affect the 
‘parental’ sex ratio include status and personal traits such as dominance [Kem­
per, 1994; James, 1994; Grant, 1996, cited in Edlund, 1999], parental percep­
tion of the adult sex ratio [James, 1995], times of war [Graffelman and Hoek­
stra, 2000], Hepatitis B [Oster, 2005, 2006], maternal partnership status [Nor- 
berg, 2004] and maternal diet [Matthews et al., 2008]. Further, Lindsey and 
Altham [1998] find that a binomial model, as implied by homogeneity in son- 
probabilities, has a poor fit to family composition data. They find the number of
6 NonetheIess, Oster’s work does in fact imply heterogeneity with at least two types: virus 
carriers and non-carriers.
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sons in families is ‘overdispersed’, suggesting heterogeneity. The demographic 
literature on probability heterogeneity is comprehensively surveyed by James 
[2000]. The theoretical result that population heterogeneity creates a link be­
tween son preference and aggregate sex ratios is not new, going back to Weiler 
[1959] and Goodman [1961], but the finding is not recognised in the economic 
literature.
There is wide acknowledgement that cultural factors such as son preferences 
and the status of women drive mortality-rate differentials and incentivise female 
infanticide and selective abortion [Sen, 1992; Das Gupta et al., 2002, for exam­
ple]. Despite this recognition, no one has yet attempted to measure the effect 
of parents’ fertility decisions on sex ratios. This omission surely results from an 
awareness of the fact that with homogeneous probabilities of having boys, son 
preference will have no effect on the sex ratio in large populations [Sheps, 1963; 
Leung, 1988].
The present paper sits at the juncture of two strands of literature. The 
first strand considers sex ratios and the biological factors affecting an individual 
woman’s probability of having boys. However, instead of accounting for bio­
logical differences amongst women from different countries (as in Oster [2005]), 
I treat biological differences as unobserved but existing within every popula­
tion. In this paper, differences between countries are cultural. Here, I follow 
the new literature on cultural differences between countries, such as [Fernandez 
and Fogli, 2005, 2006], which determine that cultural background is a significant 
predictor of fertility outcomes. Of particular relevance to the present work is 
Chapter 3, which finds strong evidence that son preferences amongst immigrant 
women in the UK is driven by cultural factors, rather than economic mecha­
nisms. This accords with Chamarbagwala and Ranger [2006], who argue that 
several cultural aspects such as religious composition and caste structure ex­
plain in part the high sex ratios found in some parts of India. Their suggested 
mechanism relies on selective abortion, infanticide and neglect of girls leading 
to an increase in the sex ratio (an excess of boys).
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The results of this paper imply that son preferences lead to an excess of girls. 
This finding is of compatible with the results of Coale [1991]; Chamarbagwala 
and Ranger [2006] and others if discrimination outweighs the contribution of 
fertility decisions. In fact, the work here reinforces previous studies. I demon­
strate the existence of a mechanism that opposes the effect of discrimination 
on the sex ratio. Thus, previous estimates may understate the importance of 
discrimination, and the number of missing women may be under-measured.
4.2 Theory
In this section I prove that parents’ fertility decisions can affect population sex 
ratios, with a bias against the favoured sex. A necessary and sufficient condition 
is that the probability of a son is heterogeneous within the population .7 This 
finding dates back to Weiler [1959] and Goodman [1961, both papers cited in 
Yamaguchi, 1989]; my proof is presented here for clarity and to support the 
intuition. In this paper, I focus on lexis variation, whereby women differ in their 
probabilities of having sons, but each woman’s probability does not change over 
time .8
4.2.1 Background
Much existing research has focussed on homogeneous populations. In large 
samples, homogeneity entails that the population sex ratio matches the ‘natural’ 
ratio of boys to girls — the ratio which would prevail if parents only cared about 
the size of their families, not their sexes [Sheps, 1963; Leung, 1988]. With 
homogeneity, the probability that a further child is a boy is independent of the 
current family composition. Why you choose to have a child doesn’t affect the 
probability you’ll have a son. (This argument establishes that heterogeneity is
7Throughout this paper, the ‘probability of having a son’ refers only to the biological 
chance of conceiving and bearing a boy. I assume that selective abortion never occurs. In the 
empirical sections, child mortality is also ignored (following Gangadharan and Maitra [2003]). 
Neither of these factors are likely to affect my results, since these phenomena are uncommon 
in the UK. (However, see Dubuc and Coleman [2007].)
8James [2 0 0 0 ] discusses in detail the implications of different types of variation.
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necessary for son preference to affect sex ratios.)
Heterogeneity implies that the composition of a family is not independent 
of its size. When one sex is preferred, a woman’s childbearing decisions are 
co-related to the probability she has boys.
Without loss of generality, let parents prefer sons. Then, those having boys 
are more likely to cease having children than those having girls. So those likely 
to have sons will, on average, have smaller families than those likely to have 
daughters. The difference in family sizes gives an excess of girls relative to the 
case without sex preferences.
4.2.1.1 Progression Rates
Of women with a certain number of children, the proportion going on to have 
further children is known as the progression rate. Rates can be compared be­
tween women who have different family compositions. Usually, women having 
boys are found to have lower progression rates, indicating a preference for sons9 
and this is rationalised by the microeconomic models of Leung [1991] and Chap­
ter 3. For the model here, I choose the most extreme form of this behaviour: 
women have children until they bear a son (this may be called a 1-boy stopping 
rule). This formulation simplifies the algebra considerably, but is not necessary 
for the intuition . 10
4.2.2 Model
4.2.2.1 H om ogeneity
First, consider the case of homogeneous probabilities. Let there be N  women, 
each with natural probability p of having a boy at any birth. Since each woman 
i continues bearing children until a son is born, the number of boys in each 
family (bi) will be one. Thus, the number of boys in the population will be
9See, for example, Leung [1988]; Gangadharan and Maitra [2003]; Das Gupta [2005].
10Any n-boy stopping rule would yield exactly the same bias in the sex ratio (proof omitted). 
The effect of mixed-family stopping rule (eg, n boys, m  girls) would be smaller but qualitatively 
similar (as long as n >  m). The intuition is unchanged provided that after a son a woman is 
less likely to continue having children than after a daughter.
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N
B  d= J 2 bi = N
The number of girls in each family takes a geometric distribution .11 gi ~
Geom(p). The total number of girls, G d= Y^=i 9ii tends to N 1^ pp) as N  —► oo,
4.2.2.2 H ete rogene ity
Now, consider a mean preserving spread in the probabilities, with a fraction a  
having boys with probability p i , and the remainder with probability P2 =  Pi “pi • 
With no son preference, childbearing ends independently of the composition of 
each family and (hence) independently of the woman’s type. The population 
sex ratio will again be y ^ .
With son preference, each woman still has one son, so B  — N . However the 
distribution of girls is not the same for all women, since gi ~  Geom(pi), and
because the expected number of girls in each family is Therefore the sex 
ratio converges to as when parents have no son preference. Equivalently,
B
B+G
E[Si] =  Thus> as N
Hence the population sex ratio is:
l
P 1P 2
a ( l  -p i)p 2  +  (1  -  o t ) p i ( l - p 2) 
P 1P 2
(1  -  a)pi +  ap2 -  P1P2
£  is necessarily smaller than the sex ratio with no preference, as the follow­
ing theorem shows.
n I tak e  th e  geom etric  defined as th e  n u m b er of failures before a  success, n o t th e  num ber 
of attempts. /Geom(p)(s) =  (1 ~ P )9P-
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T heorem  1. In a large population of women, let a proportion a  have boys with
probability p i, and the remainder have boys with probability P2 ■ Then B /G  <
B /G  if  and only ifp i ^  P 2 • Heterogeneity is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for son preference to bias in the population sex ratio.
Proof. I begin with the following inequality, due to Cauchy (it is also implied by 
Jensen’s inequality). 2pip — 2 < p2 +  p2 holds with equality only when p\ =  P2 , 
ie, the case of homogeneity. Otherwise, the inequality is strict:
2pip2 < pl+pl 
{2a -  2a2)pip2 < a ( l  -  a){p\ + p\)
(1  -  (1  -  a ) 2 -  a 2 )pip2 <  <*(1 -  a){p\ +  p\)
P1P2 < a ( l  -  a)p\ +  (1 -  a )2pip2
+  a2pip2 +  a ( l  -  a)p2
P 1P 2 ~  <*pIp2 -  (1 -  <*)pipI <  « ( 1  -  ot )p\  +  (1 -  a ) 2p i p 2
+ a2piP2 +  0 (1  -  a)p2 
-  c tp lp2  -  (1 -  o l )p ip I  
Pip2(l  -  a p x  -  (1 - a ) p 2) <  (apx +  (1 -  a)p2)((l -  a)pi +  ap2 -  P 1P2 )
P 1P 2 a p i  +  (1 -  a)p2
(1 -  a)p i  +  a p 2 -  P 1P2 1 -  a p i -  (1 -  a )P 2
B  B
' g < g
Therefore the sex ratio is biased in favour of girls. Note that, under homogeneity 
of probabilities, each of the inequalities becomes an equality. The parental 
decisions only affect the sex ratio under heterogeneity. □
We see that a mean preserving spread in the probability of having sons skews 
the sex ratio in favour of girls when parents prefer boys. In the next sections, I 
take this theoretical result and estimate the magnitude of the effect in reality.
One caveat must be noted. Here, I treat women as biologically heterogeneous 
but socially identical: they share the same preferences and behave the same. 
This is unlikely to be the case in practice. No work to date has considered
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heterogeneity in son preference within groups, despite evidence of variations 
between groups (see Chapter 3). However, heterogeneity in behaviour would 
likely result in a averaged outcome; the effects modelled here would apply for 
any subgroups behaving similarly. The overall effect would be an aggregate of 
the subgroup effects.
4.3 Estimating Heterogeneity
In this section, I attempt to estimate within-population heterogeneity in the 
probability of having a son. Previous work by economists has considered child­
bearing as a Bernoulli trial with a probability p of bearing a son, and 1 — p of 
bearing a daughter; authors have allowed p to differ between populations but 
not within them. Here, this restriction is reversed: p varies within populations, 
but the distribution is the same across countries.
I assume that, throughout their life, each woman has the same probability 
of having sons. In other words, I assume only lexis variation. Therefore, since 
I observe multiple outcomes (children) for some women, I am able to estimate 
the underlying distribution of probabilities, given some functional assumptions.
4.3.1 Empirical model
Consider a population of women, with each woman i having some underlying 
factor X i which affects the likelihood that she bears a son when she has a child. 
For simplicity, let X be distributed as a normal random variable with mean p  
and variance a 2:
X i ~ N  (m,<t2)
When woman i bears a child j ,  an independent, identically distributed draw 
is made. I take this also to be Gaussian, and without loss of generality, 
normalise the mean and variance to 0  and 1 respectively:
Uj  ~  N (0 ,1)
117
C u l t u r e , F e r t il i t y , a n d  S o n  P r e f e r e n c e
A boy is born if the sum of X  and e is greater than zero. That is, if B i j  is 
a random variable indicating birth of a boy,
_ d e f  0  if X i  +  €ij < 0  
Bij = <
1 if Xj +  €ij > 0
Let $  and (j) be the cumulative distribution and probability density functions 
of the standard normal distribution . 12 The probability of woman i having a boy 
at any birth is
Pi  =  P [ A i  +  € i j  >  0]
=  P[e<i < ~Xi\
=  1 - H - X i )
=  *(*<)
Thus, B ^  may be treated as a Bernoulli trial with probability of success
Pi =  $ p y . 13
4.3.2 Likelihood functions
If X i  were known, the likelihood of observing a certain family composition 
for woman i can be easily computed. Suppose observed sons are indicated by
12When necessary, the CDF and PDF of X will be denoted <t>x and <f>x-
13This ‘Probit’ derivation is inherently isomorphic to the formulation Bij  ~  Bernoulli(pt) 
w ithp having CDF $ x ( $ - 1  (p))- Whilst somewhat arbitrary, the approach taken here is easily 
comprehensible, treating X  as an unobserved variable in an LDV problem. An alternative 
method would be to estimate a distribution for p  directly: possible distributions include 
the Beta, Kumaraswamy, Raised Cosine, Triangular, Truncated Normal, and Uniform (the 
support must be inside [0,1]). As well as being analytically simple, my chosen functional form 
gives p to be distributed on the whole of [0 ,1 ] with extreme values being unlikely, regardless 
of parametrisation. None of these other distributions display this property.
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bn ■ biki- Then, since individual births are independent,
C{bij\Xt) d=f  P [B^ = b^ for j  = 1 . . .  ki]
ki
=  n P [By =6y]
...................................3= 1 ...........................................................
ki
3=1
k f  and k f  are the numbers of boys and girls borne by women i. (k f  + k f  = ki.) 
Since only the numbers of boys and girls matter, the likelihood may be rewritten 
£ (k f  ,kj*\Xi) =  (ki^Bi )^ (X i)k  ^(1  — $ (X i))k**, with the combination factor 
accounting for the number of different ways that composition can occur.14
The unconditional likelihood is obtained by integrating over X ,  given its 
distribution:
A  =  j f  -  * (x ))k?<tox (x) (4.1)
The sample likelihood is the product of the women’s individual likelihoods, 
£(/*> *) =  II  i C i , because the X i are independent. Estimates of the parameters 
of the distribution of X  may be made by maximising this likelihood: (/i, a) =
argmax £(/i, a). 15
4.3.3 Data and Estimations
Using data from the UK Labour Force Survey 1996-2005, I construct fertility 
histories for 116,513 British-born women aged 16-55. When a household enters 
the survey, a matrix of household relationships is recorded, so I match women 
with their natural children under the age of 16.16 Table 4.1 records the compo-
14Under the assumption of only lexis variation (constant probabilities for each woman), 
including uncompleted families does not affect the estimator.
15Recall that /x and er parameterise the distribution of X .  They appear in Equation 4.1 via 
the integrating density, d $ x ( x )-
16The survey is conducted as a rolling panel with households appearing in the survey for five 
quarters. I use only the households’ first-quarter responses. Birth histories ignore mortality
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Children 0 1
Number of Boys 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
1 24526 25710 - - - - - - - - -
2 11205 24283 12014
3 1812 5100 5394 2182
4 233 744 1188 904 328
5 29 108 193 2 0 0 114 31
6 2 14 30 56 32 14 7 - - - -
7 0 1 9 7 1 0 9 4 1 - - -
8 0 0 4 2 4 3 2 0 0 - -
9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 -
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Table 4.1: Family composition data from the UK Labour Force Survey 1996- 
2005. British-born women aged 16-55.
Table 4.2: Maximum likelihood estimates of distribution of X  N(/z, cr2) from 
family composition data. The underlying probability that a woman has sons is 
p = $ (X ). Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis (200 samples).
Estimate Std. Dev. 90% Cl
A 0.0305 (0.00285) [0.0258, 0.0351]
a 0.145 (0.0165) [0.118, 0.172]
sitions of these families. As can be seen in Equation 4.1, my estimator requires 
only the number of boys and girls in each household.
My estimates of the parameters underlying X  are derived by Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation, as outlined in the previous section, and standard errors 
by the bootstrap method (200 bootstrap samples). Baseline estimates are shown 
in Table 4.2, with Figure 4.3 giving estimated values for the bootstrap samples.
Two implications are immediate: first, the median woman has natural prob­
ability of = 0.512 of giving birth to a boy, yielding a ‘natural’ sex ratio of 
1.050 boys per girl. This figure is lower than the usually cited ratio of 1.06 and 
the difference is statistically different at the 5% level. 17 However, my estimate 
lies within the range 1.03-1.06 given by Edlund [1999] as ‘biologically normal’. 
The coherence of my estimate p  with existing studies acts as a ‘sanity check’ on
and the possibility some children are absent from the household. I expect these omissions to  
have only minor effects on my results. I take the oldest child under the age of 16 to  be the 
woman’s first, following the example of Gangadharan and Maitra [2003]. The same caveats 
apply to the birth histories used in Section 4.4.2.
17The median probability will be different from the mean, E x  4>(Y). However, in this case 
they are identical to three significant figures.
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Figure 4.3: Bootstrap estimates for parameters p  and a  of X  rsj N(/z, a 2) (200 
samples from family composition data, Table 4.1). Probability of a son is p = 
* ( * ) ■
Bootstrap estimates: p Bootstrap estimates: a
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my methodology.
The second implication is more important: the variation in X ,  and hence 
p, is large. The baseline estimate gives a standard deviation for X  of 0.145. 
This implies a 90% confidence interval (Cl) of [0.42 , 0.61] for p. Five percent of 
women are likely to have a boy with a greater than 61 % chance, and five percent 
of women are likely to have a boy with a less than 4%% chance. Even taking a 
minimal value of a  (at the lower end of the 90% Cl interval, a — 0.118) yields 
a 90% confidence interval of [0.44, 0.59] for p.
I test for the significance of this heterogeneity with a likelihood ratio test. 
Homogeneity entails that X  takes a degenerate distribution with value p. Then 
all women would have boys with probability 4>(/z). This case is equivalent to 
<r =  0, though now the likelihood function in Equation 4.1 is not well defined. 
However, the likelihood of a family comprising k f  boys and k f  girls nonetheless
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exists:
C ( k f ,k f  ;m) =  (1  -  * M ) k?
The restricted sample likelihood is analogous to the sample likelihood, being 
C(n) =  Yli £ ( k f  , k ? ; fi). MLE on this restricted model yields an estimate of 
p — 0.0303. Thus, the likelihood ratio statistic can be computed:
max C{p)
A = —  ----------
max £(p, a)
/i,<7
The restricted likelihood reduces the dimension of the problem by one, so the 
we have (asymptotically) —2  log A ~  Xi- I am able to reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no heterogeneity at the 0.01% significance level ( —2  log A =  16.8). 
This result suggests that my model does indeed perform better than one in 
which all women have the same probability of having sons, as can be seen in 
Figure 4.4.
Lindsey and Altham [1998] find significant ‘overdispersion’ in family com­
position relative to a binomial model, as I do. Using their data, I am able to 
make a second estimate of heterogeneity in the probability of having sons. 18 
Their data gives p' =  0.0367 and a' =  0.127. The mean is significantly different 
from my original estimate at the 1 % significance level, but the standard devi­
ation estimate is not significantly different. Predicted son-probabilities are not 
practically dissimilar, with a 90% Cl for p of [0.43, 0.60].
James [2000] surveys a variety of estimates of the standard deviation of p, 
centred on 0.05. My original estimates (p = 0.0305,d =  0.145) give a standard 
deviation of 0.0572, and my estimates with the Lindsey and Altham data give 
0.0502.
I can also compare Lindsey and Altham’s model with my own. Under a 
fixed parametrisation with respect to family size, their Beta-Binomial model 
performs very similarly using Pearson’s x 2 test. However, as they note, they
18Theirs is a sample of almost one million families from Saxony in the period 1876-1885, 
collected by Arthur Geissler.
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Figure 4.4: Family composition (3 children): under (a) binomial model,
B  ~  Bernoulli($(0.0303)); (b) under ‘probit’ form heterogeneity, B  ~  
Bernoulli($(X)), X  ~  N(0.0305,0.1452); and (c) actual data (Table 4.1).
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merely perform a data-fitting exercise and they highlight the lack of biological 
explanation behind their results. My model is perhaps more amenable to a 
biological explanation, since it is based on individual effects for each woman. 
Lindsey and Altham’s model performs better than mine when parameters are 
allowed to vary with family size. They suggest that sex preferences are not the 
cause, since final children are omitted from their sample, though it is impossible 
to test this assertion with their data. In Appendix C.l, I propose a robustness 
check to deal with this concern.
Since Lindsey and Altham find family-size effects, women may not have 
constant probabilities of bearing sons over throughout their lives. This implies 
some Markov variation in the probabilities of birth [James, 2000], with p chang­
ing (monotonically) with birth order. My estimation technique does not account 
for such effects.
In sum, I conclude [after James, 2000] that lexis variation does exist in
Boys in family: Binomial model versus data
l^ lB in o m ia l  model
I___| Observed
■  Probit model
Boys in family
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women’s probability of having sons. In the next section I use my estimates 
to calculate the effect of parents’ son preferences on the aggregate sex ratio in 
practice.
4.4 Sex ratio simulation
If parents have preferences for sons, heterogeneity in the chance that individual 
women have boys will lead to a skew in the sex ratio, as proved in Section 4.2. 
Here I attempt to calibrate the size of this effect using a simulation.
4.4.1 Procedure
I construct predictions of the sex ratio in countries worldwide based on two 
pieces of data: first, the underlying distribution of probabilities of having sons 
(estimated in the previous section), and the observed sex preferences of women 
from a variety countries (following Chapter 3).
Two assumptions underlie this calibration. First, I take as given that my 
heterogeneity estimates apply to women from all countries. My justification is 
that estimates from recent UK data (1996-2005) are similar to estimates based 
on data from Saxony in the late 19th century [Lindsey and Altham, 1998]. Both 
sets of estimates fall in line with previous estimations of lexis variation in the 
probability of having sons James [2 0 0 0 ].
Second, and more problematically, it is necessary to assume that the fertility 
behaviour of immigrants to the UK is the same as that of women in their 
countries of origin. This assertion somewhat stretches the external validity 
of Chapter 3. Problems include: (1) emigrants being unrepresentative, (2) 
cost differences between childrearing in the UK and elsewhere, and (3) cultural 
assimilation within the UK. However, the first and third of these concerns are 
likely to bias measures of son preference down, relative to what they would be 
in the countries of origin. Women moving to the UK may be more likely to 
have preferences similar to British women, and absorption of local norms will
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reduce son preference (British women appear to show little son preference — 
see Appendix C.l).
The second concern — price differentials — may bias the measure up if girls 
cost more to raise than boys (see Section 3.2, page 76). Women already having 
girls may reduce their fertility due to a wealth effect. However, in light of the 
large cultural effects found in that paper, it is likely that son preferences of 
immigrant women in the UK are less extreme than those of their compatriots. 
Therefore the effects predicted in this section may give a lower bound for the 
effect of parents’ preferences on sex ratios worldwide.
Initially I generate a population of women (i =  1 . . .  N )  and assign them 
probabilities of having sons (Pi) using the distribution derived in Section 4.3. 
Then, for each woman, I construct a latent family composition (B ^  for j  =  
1. . .  k] Bij indicates woman Vs j th child would be a son). This gives the sexes 
of the women’s (first) k children. This is the ‘biological’ population, which stays 
the same throughout the simulation.
P i  =  $(A i) with X i ~  N(/2, a)
~  Bernoulli (pi)
I then allow the fertility behaviour to vary by country. Let qbj be the pro­
portion of women from a given country who continue to have children, after 
having b boys amongst j  children. (I measure these qbj in Section 4.4.2, below.) 
For example, I take Indian women who have a boy and two girls and measure 
the proportion who go on to have a fourth child. This measurement is 9 i3 DIA.
Finally, I simulate each woman’s fertility decisions according to the observed 
patterns the data. I simulate the sex ratios for each country separately. I use 
the q probabilities to generate ‘actual’ birth histories for each woman in the 
simulation. If woman already has j  children and b boys, child j  + 1 is born with 
probability qbj. This continues until the woman fails to have a child. I denote
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a birth of a j th child to woman i by C ^.
' i j + 1
B.i j + 1
Bernoulli(<75^ )  if Ciy =  1 for all j '  < j  
0  otherwise
B ij+ 1  if Cij.|-i =  1 
[missing] otherwise
This procedure provides me with a simulated sample of birth histories based 
on the sex preferences of women from each country. The ratio of boys to girls 
in this sample is easy to compute, and I compare this with the child sex ratios 
found in reality. Country data is taken from the World Development Indicators
(1997), with the sex ratio being the under-15 male population divided by the 
under-15 female population.
4.4.2 Fertility Behaviour
4.4.2.1 E stim ation m ethod
Estimates of parental behaviour are derived from the birth histories of foreign- 
born women, grouping women by country of origin. For each possible family 
composition (up to three children), I calculate the asymptote of the Kaplan- 
Meier failure rate (KMFR). The KMFR is a non-parametric measure of the 
proportion of women who go on to have another child. The naive progression 
rate, defined as the number of women observed to have a further child, does 
not account for the time women remain under observation (ie, censoring when 
the survey happens shortly after a birth). Thus, the KMFR is a more robust 
measure of true continuation rates.
Here, I consider childbirth as an absorbing transition from one state to an­
other. Women either ‘survive’ with the number of children they have, or ‘fail’, 
and have another at some time. Alternatively, they may exit the dataset be­
fore failure (censoring). The asymptotic Kaplan-Meier failure rate is defined as 
follows [Jenkins, 2005b, p. 55]. Let t\  < . . .  < tm < . . .  < tM be the observed
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transition times for women from a given country with a given family compo­
sition. For simplicity, assume transitions are never contemporary. Let n m be 
the number of women at risk of making a transition immediately prior to tm. 
This does not include women no longer under observation. The Kaplan-Meier
The proportion of women surviving by t\ is simply one minus proportion 
who have made a transition, which is estimated by the number of exits (one)
surviving from ti  to £2 is 1 — ^ , so the overall proportion surviving to £2 is thus 
the product of these: S ( t i ) =  1 —
I am interested in the proportion of women, q, who have a child at any point 
in the future, ie, the asymptote of 1 — S(t) as t —» 0 0 . Therefore I have:
4.4.2.2 D ata
Data is taken from the UK Labour Force Survey 1996-2005. Household com­
position records are available, so parents can be matched with their natural 
children and birth histories compiled. Table 4.3 gives estimated continuation 
rates for women from 55 countries for which more than 30 records are present 
at the second birth . 19
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, considerable variation in behaviour is seen 
amongst the women from different countries. For example, Australian women 
show some preference for daughters: 50% of those having two sons have a third 
child, compared with 37% of those with two daughters. Those with mixed
19Not all countries of origin in the LFS are identified uniquely. Five groups of countries 
appear in my regressions; I define the sex ratio for these to be total boys over total girls. The 
groups are:
estimate of the proportion surviving to time t is then:
divided by the number at risk, m . So S (t\)  =  1 — Similarly, the proportion
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families are more likely to stop. On the other hand, Singapore shows a different 
pattern: 33% of those with three daughters have a fourth child compared with 
none of those with three sons.
4.4.3 Simulation results
Using the fertility behaviour for women from different countries, I compute 
expected sex ratios for those countries. I use three sets of estimates for the 
underlying likelihoods of having sons: my benchmark derived in Section 4.3 
(/x =  0.0305,cr =  0.145), my estimate using data from Lindsey and Altham 
[1998] (// =  0.0367,cr =  0.127), and a conservative estimate of the heterogeneity 
in my sample, at the bottom of the 90% Cl (/x =  0.0305, a  =  0.118). I simulate 
births for one million women (the same latent birth histories are used for each 
country estimate). Results are presented in Table 4.4, alongside the child sex 
ratio from the World Development Indicators (under-15 male population divided 
by under-15 female population).
Simulated sex ratios range from 1.043 (Colombia) to 1.051 (Australia) in my 
benchmark model. The ranges are similar for all three sets of estimates, though 
they are higher overall for the estimates with Lindsey and Altham’s data. The 
larger estimate for /x shifts the whole distribution in favour of having sons.
Figure 4.5 plots my simulated sex ratios against the data and fitted values 
from the regression R -R p r e d ic te d  — a  +  /^ R R d a ta - -R2  is 0.053, and the 
estimate (3 — 0.015 is significantly different to zero at the 10% level, suggesting 
that parents’ preferences do indeed have an effect on country sex ratios due to
heterogeneity in the probability of having a son. However, the intercept, a  is
Grp02 ‘Other Caribbean Commonwealth’: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Dominica, 
Grenada, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines.
Grp04 ‘Other Africa’: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cen­
tral African Republic, Chad, Congo, Rep., Cote d ’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Togo.
Grp07 ‘Other South America’: Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname
Grp08 ‘Other Middle East’: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen.
Grpl2 Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal.
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Table 4.3: Kaplan-Meier birth continuation rates by family composition.
Foreign-born women in the UK LFS are grouped by country of origin. Statistics 
give the proportion of women having a further child given they already have b
boys of j  children.
Country
1 child 
0 boys 1 boy 0 boys
2 children 
1 boy 2 boys 0 boys
3 children 
1 boy 2 boys 3 boys
AGO 0.93 0.88 0.67 0.33 0.33 - - -
AUS 0.76 0.78 0.37 0.44 0.50 0.40 0.13 0.34 1.00
BGD 0.91 0.93 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.61
BRB 0.62 0.70 0.43 0.22 0.55 - - - -
CAN 0.76 0.75 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.60
CHN 0.58 0.60 0.40 0.34 0.07 - - - -
COL 0.65 0.66 0.37 0.77 0.00 - - - -
CYP 0.76 0.76 0.36 0.40 0.43 0.50 0.27 0.24 0.40
DEU 0.71 0.73 0.44 0.41 0.46 0.12 0.29 0.35 0.30
EGY 0.66 0.71 0.35 0.52 0.46 - - - -
ESP 0.64 0.63 0.37 0.48 0.27 - - - -
FRA 0.71 0.74 0.41 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.11 0.21 0.50
GHA 0.81 0.74 0.61 0.62 0.57 0.43 0.28 0.61 0.50
GRP02 0.68 0.59 0.15 0.38 0.28 - - - -
GRP04 0.81 0.80 0.76 0.64 0.49 0.40 0.28 0.45 0.50
GRP07 0.78 0.82 0.43 0.37 0.27 - - - -
GRP08 0.86 0.85 0.80 0.73 0.58 0.75 0.45 0.55 0.55
G R P 12 0.90 0.93 1.00 0.69 0.63 - - - -
GUY 0.67 0.64 0.25 0.38 0.54 - - - -
HKG 0.76 0.67 0.47 0.32 0.35 0.53 0.20 0.19 0.30
IND 0.81 0.75 0.59 0.39 0.39 0.53 0.31 0.27 0.22
IRN 0.80 0.69 0.14 0.28 0.12 - - - -
IRQ 1.00 0.81 0.73 0.56 0.75 - - - -
ITA 0.56 0.72 0.45 0.33 0.20 - - - -
JAM 0.57 0.65 0.71 0.43 0.30 0.70 0.41 0.28 0.53
JPN 0.67 0.64 0.44 0.22 0.13 - - - -
KEN 0.83 0.75 0.64 0.29 0.31 0.53 0.19 0.20 0.21
LBY 0.85 0.71 0.55 0.69 0.72 - - - -
LKA 0.73 0.70 0.16 0.29 0.41 - - - -
MAR 0.91 0.81 0.34 0.53 0.75 - - - -
MLT 0.76 0.62 0.52 0.38 0.41 - - - -
MUS 0.68 0.65 0.30 0.33 0.61 - - - -
MW I 0.91 0.76 0.64 0.59 0.42 - - - -
MYS 0.86 0.75 0.42 0.32 0.46 0.00 0.42 0.27 0.38
NGA 0.89 0.86 0.79 0.60 0.68 0.73 0.47 0.53 0.55
NLD 0.76 0.77 0.40 0.39 0.74 - - - -
NZL 0.71 0.62 0.52 0.37 0.46 - - - -
PAK 0.92 0.87 0.84 0.78 0.74 0.80 0.68 0.65 0.76
PHL 0.54 0.71 0.21 0.25 0.21 - - - -
POL 0.58 0.49 0.05 0.29 0.47 - - - -
PRT 0.71 0.63 0.55 0.26 0.53 - - - -
SGP 0.76 0.76 0.38 0.39 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.25 0 . 0 0
SLE 0.75 0.56 0.54 0.42 0.40 - - - -
SOM 0.91 0.92 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.92 0.79 0.81 0.90
SWE 0.82 0.82 0.00 0.33 0.24 - - - -
T TO 0.66 0.67 0.55 0.21 0.61 - - - -
T U R 0.82 0.83 0.57 0.46 0.50 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.38
TZA 0.79 0.63 0.54 0.30 0.24 0.40 0.15 0.14 0.33
UGA 0.78 0.74 0.52 0.32 0.41 0.36 0.45 0.37 0.38
USA 0.78 0.71 0.43 0.39 0.49 0.25 0.41 0.44 0.20
VNM 0.79 0.88 0.41 0.40 0.56 - - - -
YUG 0.84 0.77 0.49 0.43 0.58 - - - -
ZAF 0.76 0.73 0.44 0.36 0.34 0.25 0 . 0 0 0.32 0.25
ZMB 0.77 0.77 0.71 0.48 0.53 0.25 0.52 0.18 1.00
ZWE 0.71 0.69 0.42 0.43 0.40 0.33 0.37 0.19 0.25
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Table 4.4: Simulation of sex ratios worldwide, accounting for son preference 
and heterogeneity in the probability of having sons. Three different estimates 
of the underlying distribution of sexes are used: my benchmark, estimates from 
Lindsey and Altham’s 1998 data, and a conservative estimate from my data. 
Parental behaviour is taken from UK LFS data (Table 4.3). Actual country sex 
ratios (under-15 male population divided by the under-15 female population) 
are taken from the World Development Indicators (1997).
Predicted Values
fj, =  0.0305 M =  0.0376 H =  0.0305
Country D ata cr =  0.145 a  =  0.127 a  =  0.118
AGO 1.002 1.047 1.060 1.048
AUS 1.051 1.052 1.063 1.051
BGD 1.046 1.049 1.061 1.049
BRB 1.000 1.051 1.062 1.050
c a n 1.048 1.051 1.063 1.051
c h n 1.066 1.048 1.060 1.049
COL 1.038 1.047 1.060 1.048
CYP 1.062 1.049 1.061 1.049
DEU 1.054 1.049 1.060 1.049
EGY 1.048 1.049 1.061 1.049
ESP 1.060 1.049 1.061 1.050
FRA 1.048 1.049 1.061 1.050
GHA 1.010 1.049 1.061 1.049
GRP02 1.070 1.049 1.061 1.049
GRP04 1.035 1.047 1.059 1.048
GRP07 1.032 1.047 1.059 1.048
GRP08 1.042 1.047 1.060 1.048
GRP12 1.038 1.049 1.061 1.049
GUY 1.020 1.049 1.061 1.049
HKG 1.012 1.046 1.059 1.047
IND 1.066 1.047 1.059 1.048
IRN 1.036 1.048 1.061 1.049
IRQ 1.045 1.048 1.060 1.049
ITA 1.058 1.048 1.060 1.049
JAM 1.029 1.046 1.059 1.048
JPN 1.050 1.047 1.059 1.048
k e n 1.022 1.045 1.058 1.047
LBY 1.045 1.048 1.060 1.048
LKA 1.097 1.049 1.061 1.049
MAR 1.038 1.051 1.063 1.051
MLT 1.062 1.048 1.061 1.049
MUS 1.027 1.051 1.063 1.051
MWI 1.005 1.046 1.059 1.047
MYS 1.055 1.048 1.060 1.049
NGA 1.007 1.048 1.060 1.049
n l d 1.045 1.051 1.062 1.050
n z l 1.057 1.047 1.060 1.048
PAK 1.040 1.047 1.060 1.048
PHL 1.051 1.049 1.061 1.049
POL 1.051 1.049 1.061 1.049
PRT 1.063 1.048 1.061 1.049
SGP 1.072 1.048 1.060 1.048
SLE 0.995 1.046 1.059 1.048
SOM 1.007 1.049 1.061 1.049
SWE 1.050 1.051 1.062 1.050
TTO 1.031 1.050 1.062 1.050
TUR 1.043 1.049 1.061 1.049
TZA 1.009 1.045 1.058 1.046
UGA 1.006 1.048 1.060 1.048
USA 1.048 1.049 1.062 1.050
VNM 1.039 1.051 1.063 1.051
YUG 1.070 1.049 1.062 1.050
ZAF 0.994 1.050 1.062 1.050
ZMB 1.016 1.048 1.060 1.048
ZWE 1.004 1.047 1.060 1.048
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Figure 4.5: Simulated sex ratios and country data. Simulation is based on het­
erogeneity in the probability of a son as derived in Section 4.3 (//. =  0.0305, a  = 
0.145). Parental behaviour is given in Table 4.3.
1.052
1.051
3O
J2 1.05a>n
3
1.049
(Da
| 1048
a>|
11047 
33
.§ 1.046 to
1.045
1.033, and is significantly different from one at 0.1%, implying that my model 
does not capture the whole story. Regressions with the other distributional 
estimates produce similar results.
The estimated slope, 0.015, is shallow. It suggests that parental behaviour 
and underlying heterogeneity accounts for 1.5% of the difference in sex ratios 
between countries. There are several possible reasons for this small figure. First 
is data quality. Aside from the usual noise issues, I have used child sex ratios, 
not birth sex ratios. If son-preferring fertility behaviour is correlated with dis­
criminatory behaviour (as is likely), countries that are expected to have excess 
girls at birth will also have high female mortality, reducing the number of girls 
as I measure them. Under this assumption, my estimate of 1.5% will be biased 
downwards, since mortality due to discrimination lowers the excess of girls I 
am looking for. Data quality would be one area in which this study could be 
improved.
Sex ratio: simulated values versus data
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Child sex ratio (WDI 1997)
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My two identifying assumptions may be incorrect: behaviour of immigrants 
to the UK may not represent countries of origin in terms of preferences, or the 
underlying distribution of ‘natural’ probabilities of sons is not identical across 
countries for biological or social reasons [cf. Oster, 2005; Matthews et al., 2008]. 
However, as discussed in Section 4.4.1, the former of these caveats may work 
against finding a positive result, if immigrants in the UK prefer sons less than 
their compatriots. The second concern is allayed by James [2000] and others 
who find similar levels of heterogeneity.
Finally, in a model simulating at most four children, the theoretical minimum 
and maximum sex ratios are 1.030 and 1.068 respectively (under my benchmark 
son-probability estimates). These ratios occur when parents practice extremely 
selective behaviour: stopping only after one son or daughter. The range seen 
in the data is [0.994, 1.097], so child mortality plainly plays a larger role in 
affecting sex ratios than parental preferences do.
Nonetheless, 1.5% very probably represents a lower bound on the effect of 
parental preferences on aggregate sex ratios. Most importantly, mortality dif­
ferences between girls and boys in the countries of origin will likely bias my 
estimate downwards. Moreover, parental behaviour of immigrants to the UK is 
likely to be less extreme than women in their originating countries.
4.5 Discussion
For almost fifty years, it has been recognised that parental preferences can influ­
ence aggregate sex ratios when women have heterogeneous ‘natural’ probabilities 
of having boys [Yamaguchi, 1989]. However, the literature on ‘missing women’ 
has, to date, failed to account for such effects. In the present paper I attempt 
to calibrate the size of this effect.
My simulation gives that 1.5% of differences in country sex ratios are ex­
plained by parental preferences. However, as I discuss in Section 4.4.3, this 
figure is likely to be a lower bound on the potential effect. The major causes
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are attenuated preferences amongst immigrants to the UK and the limitation of 
using child sex ratios rather than birth sex ratios. My estimates of heterogeneity 
in son-probability are broadly in line with previous work by Lindsey and Altham
[1998] and authors surveyed by James [2000], suggesting that misspecifiction of 
that distribution is not a concern.
Due to limited data and the caveats given above, I do not compute any 
adjusted estimates of the number of missing women worldwide. Nonetheless, 
the implications of my findings are not heartening: there may be more missing 
women than previously thought. My model predicts that a country with strong 
son preferences will have a low sex ratio at birth, because heterogeneity in the 
probability of having a son leads to excess girls, relative to homogeneity. Pre­
vious comparisons have used a baseline that is not biased towards girls. Thus, 
countries such as China or India which are known to favour boys [Das Gupta 
et al., 2 0 0 2 ] are missing more girls than we had believed. At the very least, the 
results presented here should caution the use of aggregate sex ratios as a mea­
sure of attitudes, particularly in light of the negative correlation with parental 
preferences (Figure 4.1).
As Das Gupta [2005] notes, social and cultural preferences for sons play a 
prime role in skewing sex ratios in several developing countries, whether due 
to selective abortion, infanticide, or higher mortality rates for girls. I present 
evidence that fertility decisions guided by the same parental preferences can 
also lead to biased sex ratios in aggregate. Since son preferences bias the ratio 
downward, previous estimates of the number of missing women may be too low. 
Future work should aim to better account for the effect of parents’ preferences.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
A .l Country Groupings
Due to the agglomeration in the Labour Force Survey of several countries under 
some country codes, I do not have perfect resolution for the country of origin 
variable. I hence take population-weighted means for my proxy data, as listed 
in Table 2.2. The members of these groups are given below.
GRP01 Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland
GRP02 ‘Other Caribbean Commonwealth’: Antigua and Barbuda, Ba­
hamas, The, Dominica, Grenada, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
GRP03 ‘Other New Commonwealth’: Fiji, Tonga 
GRP04 ‘Other Africa’: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Rep., Cote 
d ’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozam­
bique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sene­
gal, Togo
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GRP05
GRP06
GRP07
GRP08
GRP09
GRP10
GRP11
GRP12
GRP13
GRP14
‘Other Caribbean’: Aruba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nether­
lands Antilles, Puerto Rico
‘Other Central America’: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama
‘Other South America’: Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Suri­
name
‘Other Middle East’: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, 
West Bank and Gaza, Yemen, Rep.
‘Other Asia’: Brunei, Comoros, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea 
France and Monaco
French Polynesia, Kiribati, New Caledonia, Samoa, Vanuatu, 
American Samoa, Cayman Islands, Faeroe Islands, Guam, Ko­
rea, Dem. Rep., Marshall Islands, Mayotte, Northern Mariana 
Islands, Palau, Virgin Islands (U.S.), Timor-Leste 
Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal 
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan
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Appendix to Chapter 3
B .l Sex Ratio Comparisons
A reasonable amount of research into fertility determinants has used country- 
level or regional fertility rates. This appendix argues that aggregate sex ratio 
statistics are not an appropriate analogue to fertility rates when studying son 
preferences.
The concept underlying sex ratio comparisons is that, if parents have a 
preference for children of a given sex, that sex will be more prevalent, due 
to a combination of fertility decisions and mortality due to discrimination. 1 
However, whilst differential mortality due to discrimination has an unambiguous 
effect on population sex ratios, the major obstacle for this type of analysis is 
the ambiguity of the effect of individuals’ fecundity decisions.
A natural (ie, physiological) sex ratio of 1.06 (106 boys for every 100 girls) 
is given by many authors. However, various other factors are believed to affect 
this ratio, notably times of war [Graffelman and Hoekstra, 2000], Hepatitis B 
[Oster, 2005, 2006], maternal partnership status [Norberg, 2004] and maternal 
diet [Matthews et al., 2008]. Though Oster’s work is not conclusive, a secondary
1This discrimination may be either pre- or post-natal, possibly talcing the form of selective 
abortions [Goodkind, 1999], infanticide, or neglect —  either explicit or implicit. Lin et al. 
[2008] find that the trade-off between abortion rates and female neonatal mortality to be high 
in Taiwan.
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argument gives that the figure of 1.06 may not be common to all ethnic groups, 
notably the Chinese.
B.1.1 Parental decisions
The simplest means of controlling the sex composition of one’s family is what 
might be called a stopping rule. This sets some criterion for ceasing childbearing, 
such as having a boy, or having children of both sexes.
Under a stopping rule or some similar mechanism (including that resulting 
from the model presented in Section 3.2), the sex ratio is likely to converge to 
its natural rate when surveying a large number of homogeneous families. This 
result is demonstrated by Leung [1988], and is proved for a general class of 
stopping rules by Sheps [1963, cited in Leung, 1988]. However, the homogeneity 
condition is necessary: if women have differing probabilities of having boys, a 
stopping rule favouring boys leads to an excess of girls. This is because the 
sex ratio converges in large samples to the harmonic mean of the individuals’ 
natural sex ratios, since the mean number of girls is inversely proportional to 
the probability of having a girl. Finally, the harmonic mean is less than the 
arithmetic mean. Chapter 4 provides an explicit proof and provides an estimate 
of the size of the effect in reality. I find that the preferences of immigrants to 
the UK do significantly predict sex ratios in their countries of origin.
Finally, Leung suggests that the presence of incomplete families will likely 
bias downward the observed number of boys [p. 100]. His logic is that, if par­
ents favour boys, incomplete families will contain fewer boys than complete ones, 
since parents are more likely to cease having children after having boys. How­
ever, this argument is fallacious: if any given birth is a boy with homogeneous 
probability p, then the sex ratio for any given birth parity is Thus the 
overall sex ratio must equal The flaw in Leung’s argument stems from an 
incorrect partition of families in to ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ — these cate­
gories are not independent of the sex composition of the family. Below, I prove 
that the sex ratio in a population containing incomplete families must converge
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to i - v ’
T heorem  2. In a large homogeneous population having boys with probability p 
and practising a one-boy stopping rule, the ratio of girls to boys converges to 
even when incomplete families are counted.
Proof. Consider a population of families who practice a one-boy stopping rule. 
Boys are born with common probability p. At the time of survey, not all families 
have had the opportunity to complete their fertility. Family i has had the 
opportunity to have ki children at most (hi S N).
Let Bk =  Ylk =k hi be the number of boys in families limited to size k, and 
similarly Gk =  ]C/c =fc 9i be the number of girls. If Nk is the number of such 
families, then:
B k -> ^  [ l - a - p ) 1] 
Gk -» N k
k - 1
k ( l - p ) k +  j ( l  ~ p )3p
j =l
The first expression follows from the fact that families continue having children 
until they have a boy; the number of boys is Nk times the expected chance of 
having a boy within k attempts.
To derive the second expression, note that a given family has probability (1—p)ip  
of having j  < k girls, and a probability (1  — p)k of k girls.
Manipulation of the second term yields:
Gk N k k { l - p ) k +
1 - p  (1  - p ) k(kp+  ( 1  - p ) )
Thus we have Gk —► for each k. Therefore in large populations, the sex
ratio H will approach the natural ratio j ^ .  Leung’s assertion [1988, p. 100] is 
incorrect. □
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B.1.2 Implications
Due to the reasons outlined above, macro-level measures of sex bias should come 
under tough scrutiny. Though, as Leung admits, severely skewed sex ratios 
may indicate sex preferences amongst parents, the magnitude — and even the 
direction — of these preferences will remains unclear. W ith parental decisions 
being impossible to control for, even measurement of the ‘biologically normal 
population sex ratio’ [Edlund, 1999, p. 1275] is tenuous.
These arguments present a bar on the feasibility of cross-sectional compar­
ison of aggregate sex ratios, such as Oster [2005].2 However, to date no study 
has sought to perform any micro-level investigation of son preferences between 
country groups. This partly stems from a lack of appropriate data: the focus on 
aggregate sex ratios results from the easily access to these statistics. I intend 
this paper to close this gap in the literature, using a survey of immigrant women 
in the United Kingdom with different countries of origin.
B.2 Empirical Methodology 
B.2.1 Hazard rate estimation
This paper uses hazard rate estimation to measure the dependence of childbear­
ing on existing family composition. These techniques sidestep the problems of 
measuring tastes for sons with aggregate statistics and allow this unique cross­
country comparison of parental sex preferences.
In essence, a birth is considered to be an absorbing transition from one state 
(eg, birth parity k ) to another (parity k + 1). This transition is probabilistic, and 
survival analysis presents a set of tools for assessing how various factors affect 
the likelihood of this transition at any given time. Jenkins [2005b,a] provides 
a complete theoretical exposition, along with full notes on implementation of
2  Possible exceptions to this critique include Dubuc and Coleman [2007] and Lin et al. 
[2008], which use sex ratios at birth in time-series. While the issues discussed here are still 
pertinent when considering sex ratios absolutely, analyses of changes in sex ratios should be 
more robust to these concerns. Moreover, the focus of these papers —  sex-selective abortion 
—  has unambiguous effects on the sex ratio.
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these techniques in the statistical package Stata.
Consider that the time to transition (next birth) for a woman is T, dis­
tributed with cumulative distribution function (CDF) F(-). P (T  < t) =  F(t). 
F(-) is named the failure function; conversely, S(t) =  1 — F (t) is the survivor 
function, denoting the probability of surviving in the current state until time 
t 3
Denoting the probability density function (PDF) by /  =  F ', the hazard rate 
O(-) is given by
ff(t ) = M  = M
[ ) 1 -  F(t) S(t)
Loosely, 9 describes the transition intensity at any time Jenkins [2005b, p. 15]. 
As opposed to unconditional probability of transition at time t, it reflects the 
probability of transition at time t given survival to time t. Recall that S(t) is 
the probability of surviving to time t; the derivation of the hazard rate follows 
from Bayes’ rule.
W ith data on transition times and the time to survey, parametric estimation 
of 9 can be performed by the maximum likelihood method (MLE). Let Cj indi­
cate that transition is observed, otherwise the record is censored at the time of 
survey.
Ci =
1 if the spell is complete
0  if the spell is censored
Ti denotes the time at risk for woman i. This is the total time for which the 
woman is observed, until she exits the sample through transition or is censored at 
the time of survey. If transition is observed, the likelihood is given by Ci =  f{Ti), 
since this is the instantaneous probability of transition. Otherwise, in the case
of censoring, the likelihood function for woman i is given by Ct = S(T i); this is
3I treat transition time as a continuous variable. In the data, time is measured in months 
(records are anonymised by removing day of birth information). W hilst a discrete model 
might be appropriate, with months corresponding to menstrual cycles, fertility spacing is 
sufficient that continuous time models are a valid approximation. I therefore follow the existing 
literature.
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the probability that she survives to the time of survey. Therefore the likelihood 
functions may be written as follows.
Ci =  C,f{Ti) +  (1 -  C,)S(Tj)
=  CMTiWTJ + i l -C iW T i)
log Ci = Ci\oge(Ti) + \ogS(Ti)
log £  =  [Ci log B(Ti) + log S(2j)]
i
B.2.2 Estimation specifications
In order to conduct estimation of hazard functions, some parametric assump­
tions must be made. Under the Proportional Hazards (PH) assumption, the 
hazard function 6 takes the form
Oi{t) =  0o( t ) exp(p 'Xi )
As its name suggests, the hazard rate is proportionally higher for some in-
dcfdividuals at all points in time. A* =  exp(/3'Xi) denotes the proportion for 
individual i. (3 captures the effects of the factors in X  on the hazard rate, 
with a unit change in X (&) representing a proportional change in 6 of exp (P ^). 
The conventional method for estimating (3 is to specify a distribution for Oq 
and estimate its parameters, as in Leung [1988] and Gangadharan and Maitra 
[2003]. They use the Weibull distribution, which is parameterised (following 
Jenkins [2005b, §3, p. 26]) as 9q =  a t a_1, where a > 0 gives the shape of the 
distribution, and is estimated as a free parameter.4
4Gangadharan and Maitra [2003] in fact use a Gamma distribution in some sections of their 
work; this is a generalisation of the Weibull distribution, additionally using a second param­
eter to define the shape of the hazard function. However, identifying this second parameter 
empirically requires a large data set, making this approach infeasible for some subgroups in 
my sample.
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B.2.3 The Cox PH model
However, an alternative method is the Cox Proportional Hazards model due to 
Cox [1972].5 This leaves the underlying hazard function do undetermined and 
uses the ratio of hazard rates of different individuals to estimate parameters 
[Jenkins, 2005b]. This is a more general approach and is thus preferable in 
theory. For the regressions in this paper, analogous estimations with the Weibull 
model give near-identical results for (3 and are therefore not reported.
The Cox model is estimated using a Partial Likelihood (PL) method, rather 
than maximum likelihood estimation. The sample partial likelihood is
K
Cp = £fc
fc=i
Here, k indexes transition events, not individuals. I use index i = 1. . .  N  
to index individuals, ordered by time at risk Tj. Thus, when individual ik 
experiences event k at time Tik, individuals ik +  1 ■ ■ • N  remain at risk (the rest 
have exited either through transition or censoring).
Ck is defined as the probability that ik undergoes transition at time Tik, 
conditional on being in the risk set at that time. That is,
Ck = P[ifc experiences event k\ik remains at risk]
From the derivation of the hazard rate, recall that the probability of a tran­
sition occurring in the time period [£, t + dt) is f( t)d t = d(t)S(t)dt. So define
event k is experienced by i
and not by i = ik .. .i  — 1 , i +  1 . . .  TV
In particular, Pik =  P[event k is experienced by ik and not by * =  ik +  
5This exposition follows that of Jenkins [2005b].
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We have then that, since transitions are independent, 
p-i =
i^i
=  m T u ) S i i (Tik) ] Y l s i (Ti t )
i^i
Now Ck can be computed:
P,
Ck = ik
Pik +  -P ifc+1 +  ' ' ' +  Pn 
Oik {Tik )
Oik {Tik ) + &ik+ 1  (Tik) H 1- On  (Tik)
The first line follows naturally from the definition of Ck as a conditional 
probability, and the second from the evaluation of the P*s; the survivor functions 
cancel. Applying the proportional hazards assumption, $i(t) =  Oo(t)\i, yields
Ck = Oo{Tik) i^k
(ES.i^ oCTiJAi)
A it.
( S '1*
For any estimate /3, this derivation provides a computation of the partial 
likelihood Cp. (Recall that A* =  exp{(3'Xi).) The Cox estimator maximises 
this partial likelihood:
K
Ad ox - arg max < Ck
.k= 1 
K
= arg max I Jj[ ^%k
13 [k=l (j2 iL ik j 
B.2.4 Interpretation of coefficients
Coefficients arising from the Cox PH estimator have exactly the same interpreta­
tion as those derived from fully parametric estimators under the PH assumption,
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save for the exclusion of any constant term, reflecting the fact that the baseline 
hazard is undefined. In a fully parametric model the shape of the baseline haz­
ard must be estimated. However, since the shape parameters define the baseline 
hazard at a normalised level, an intercept term is needed.
The lack of a need for an intercept term with the Cox model becomes clear 
on consideration that only the order of the transitions k =  1. . .  K  matters; 
all exposure times could be scaled up linearly without affecting the estimated 
coefficients.
The PH specification is also known as the ‘multiplicative hazards’ or ‘log rel­
ative hazard’ model. Recall, the PH imposition is 6{t,X i) =  0o(i) exp(P'Xi) =  
Oo(t)Xi. This implies that absolute differences in X  give proportionate differ­
ences in the hazard rate at all times:
S(i’ =  exp(/3%  -  P 'X ,)  =  exp(/?'(X< -  Xj))
e( t ,Xj )
Alternately:
Supposing that X i and Xj  differ only on dimension q (ie, X iP =  X j P for all 
p 7  ^q), then it can be seen that
1 _  Q i f v  y  \
9(t, X j)
Hence
a io g g (t,x )
Pq a x ,
In vector terms, j3 =  V x log#(f, X ).
B.2.5 Son preference
It is estimates of these (3 terms that are reported in Section 3.4. Positive terms 
correspond to higher hazard rates and, in this application, higher onward fertil­
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ity.
I shall use the term ‘observed son preference’ to label the phenomenon where 
women reduce their onward fertility in response to having sons.6 This is mea­
sured as a negative coefficient on the variable SONS, denoting the number of 
male children a woman has had at the parity in question. The proportional ef­
fect on the hazard rate is exp/?soNS> so coefficients of -0.5, -0.1 and -0.05 reflect 
reductions in the hazard rate by factors of 0.61, 0.9 and 0.95 respectively per 
son.
B.3 Full Regression Tables
Table B.l: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 1 for immigrant women in 
the UK. Country fixed effects and country son preference effects.
( i ) (2 )
A G E 0 .1 6 4 * ” (0 .0 1 9 7 ) 0 .1 6 5 * ” (0 .0 1 9 7 )
A G E 2 -0 .0 0 3 8 5 * * * (0 .0 0 0 3 6 6 ) -0 .0 0 3 8 8 * * * (0 .0 0 0 3 6 7 )
D E G R E E 0 .1 8 1 * * * (0 .0 3 9 6 ) 0 .1 7 4 * * * (0 .0 3 9 7 )
A L -0 .0 5 1 4 (0 .0 4 4 9 ) -0 .0 5 2 6 (0 .0 4 5 0 )
F E 0 .0 4 2 7 (0 .0 4 7 0 ) 0 .0 3 7 2 (0 .0 4 7 1 )
G C S E 0 .0 4 8 9 (0 .0 3 6 9 ) 0 .0 4 5 6 (0 .0 3 7 0 )
A u s t r a l i a 0 .1 5 5 * (0 .0 8 3 8 ) -0 .0 6 8 8 (0 .1 1 8 )
C a n a d a 0 .0 6 7 7 (0 .0 9 3 4 ) -0 .1 1 2 (0 .1 3 9 )
N ew  Z e a la n d 0 .0 3 0 2 (0 .1 2 6 ) -0 .1 1 2 (0 .1 9 0 )
K e n y a 0 .0 3 0 9 (0 .0 5 2 6 ) 0 .0 4 4 5 (0 .0 7 6 4 )
U g a n d a -0 .0 4 5 5 (0 .0 7 8 5 ) -0 .1 5 0 (0 .1 1 2 )
T a n z a n ia -0 .1 0 7 (0 .1 0 3 ) 0 .0 1 0 1 (0 .1 4 0 )
Z a m b ia 0 .0 6 8 4 (0 .1 1 6 ) -0 .1 5 2 (0 .1 7 9 )
Z im b a b w e -0 .1 8 6 * (0 .0 9 5 2 ) -0 .3 5 9 * * (0 .1 4 5 )
G h a n a -0 .0 5 1 0 (0 .0 8 0 6 ) -0 .1 0 0 (0 .1 1 0 )
N ig e r ia 0 .2 4 7 * * * (0 .0 6 7 4 ) 0 .1 4 9 (0 .0 9 4 8 )
J a m a ic a -0 .5 5 9 * * * (0 .0 6 8 8 ) -0 .7 8 7 * * * (0 .1 0 1 )
G rp 0 2 -0 .4 9 8 * * * (0 .1 2 5 ) -0 .5 6 0 * * * (0 .1 7 6 )
B a n g la d e s h 0 .3 8 6 * * * (0 .0 4 4 6 ) 0 .2 6 8 * * * (0 .0 6 6 2 )
S ri L a n k a -0 .0 6 6 7 (0 .0 8 6 2 ) -0 .0 9 1 6 (0 .1 2 7 )
H K  & C h in a -0 .1 6 8 * * (0 .0 7 7 1 ) -0 .2 5 4 * * (0 .1 1 7 )
M a la y s ia 0 .2 0 2 * * (0 .0 8 9 4 ) 0 .2 1 0 * (0 .1 2 3 )
S in g a p o re 0 .0 1 2 3 (0 .0 8 6 4 ) -0 .1 4 8 (0 .1 2 6 )
C y p ru s -0 .1 3 0 * (0 .0 7 5 8 ) -0 .2 5 2 * * (0 .1 1 5 )
M a l ta -0 .2 1 0 * (0 .1 1 9 ) -0 .1 9 0 (0 .1 7 1 )
M a u r i t iu s -0 .3 4 5 * * * (0 .1 2 4 ) -0 .4 4 0 * * * (0 .1 6 9 )
SA 0 .0 1 5 6 (0 .0 7 2 7 ) -0 .0 9 5 4 (0 .1 0 3 )
G rp 0 4 -0 .0 1 6 8 (0 .0 9 4 0 ) -0 .2 0 3 (0 .1 3 4 )
US 0 .1 7 6 * * * (0 .0 6 7 2 ) 0 .0 8 1 2 (0 .0 9 1 5 )
P a k i s ta n 0 .4 3 8 * * * (0 .0 3 8 6 ) 0 .3 8 6 * * * (0 .0 5 6 2 )
C h in a -0 .4 9 1 * * * (0 .1 2 5 ) -0 .6 7 6 * * * (0 .1 8 4 )
J a p a n -0 .0 1 6 2 (0 .1 3 1 ) -0 .1 8 9 (0 .1 8 7 )
P h i l ip p in e s -0 .2 8 1 * * * (0 .0 8 9 8 ) -0 .6 4 1 * * * (0 .1 4 1 )
I r a n -0 .1 6 0 (0 .1 0 7 ) -0 .0 8 3 1 (0 .1 6 1 )
GrpO S 0 .3 9 5 * * * (0 .0 9 4 5 ) 0 .2 7 0 * * (0 .1 3 6 )
F ra n c e 0 .0 0 9 9 8 (0 .0 8 8 5 ) -0 .1 2 3 (0 .1 2 7 )
I t a ly -0 .2 7 5 * * * (0 .0 9 6 7 ) -0 .5 8 1 * * * (0 .1 4 4 )
N e th e r la n d s 0 .2 7 0 * * (0 .1 1 8 ) 0 .0 1 8 8 (0 .1 6 5 )
G e rm a n y -0 .1 1 7 * * (0 .0 5 2 0 ) -0 .3 0 8 * * * (0 .0 7 5 3 )
P o la n d -0 .7 0 1 * * * (0 .1 2 5 ) -0 .6 8 8 * * * (0 .1 7 6 )
P o r tu g a l -0 .4 3 4 * * * (0 .1 0 8 ) -0 .5 8 2 * * * (0 .1 5 1 )
S p a in -0 .2 6 1 * * (0 .1 2 9 ) -0 .4 0 4 * * (0 .1 8 1 )
S e r b ia  &  M o n te n e g r o 0 .0 4 8 7 (0 .1 1 6 ) -0 .0 9 3 1 (0 .1 6 7 )
T u rk e y -0 .1 5 8 * (0 .0 8 4 8 ) -0 .3 1 1 * * (0 .1 3 0 )
S o m a lia 0 .6 2 8 * * * (0 .0 7 8 3 ) 0 .3 3 3 * * * (0 .1 1 3 )
c td . c td .
6The theory set out in Section 3.2 suggests that, providing boys are no more expensive 
than girls, observed son preference does indeed imply an underlying preference for sons in a 
neoclassical consumption-fertility model.
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S O N S
(1 ) c td . (2 ) c td .  
-0 .2 6 1 * * * (0 .0 5 3 0 )
S O N S  * A u s t r a l i a 0 .4 2 8 * * (0 .1 6 7 )
S O N S * C a n a d a 0 .3 2 5 * (0 .1 8 7 )
S O N S * N e w  Z e a la n d 0 .2 5 6 (0 .2 5 7 )
S O N S * K e n y a -0 .0 2 1 4 (0 .1 0 5 )
S O N S *  U g a n d a 0 .1 8 1 (0 .1 5 6 )
S O N S * T a n z a n ia -0 .2 4 7 (0 .2 0 7 )
S O N S *  Z a m b ia 0 .3 9 4 * (0 .2 3 4 )
S O N S *  Z im b a b w e 0 .3 0 8 (0 .1 9 2 )
S O N S *  G h a n a 0 .0 5 8 9 (0 .1 6 1 )
S O N S *  N ig e r ia 0 .1 6 9 (0 .1 3 4 )
S O N S *  J a m a ic a 0 .4 1 5 * * * (0 .1 3 7 )
S O N S * G rp 0 2 0 .0 9 5 5 (0 .2 5 0 )
S O N S *  B a n g la d e s h 0 .2 0 9 * * (0 .0 8 8 4 )
S O N S * S r i  L a n k a 0 .0 4 8 7 (0 .1 7 2 )
S O N S * H K  & C h in a 0 .1 5 7 (0 .1 5 6 )
S O N S * M a la y s ia -0 .0 3 7 3 (0 .1 7 7 )
S O N S * S in g a p o re 0 .2 9 0 * (0 .1 7 6 )
S O N S *  C y p ru s 0 .2 1 5 (0 .1 5 3 )
S O N S * M a lta -0 .0 3 8 2 (0 .2 3 7 )
S O N S *  M a u r it iu s 0 .1 5 1 (0 .2 4 9 )
S O N S * S A 0 .1 9 2 (0 .1 4 5 )
S O N S * G rp 0 4 0 .3 3 9 * (0 .1 8 8 )
S O N S * U S 0 .1 5 5 (0 .1 3 4 )
S O N S * P a k is ta n 0 .0 8 7 5 (0 .0 7 7 0 )
S O N S * C h in a 0 .3 3 3 (0 .2 5 1 )
S O N S * J a p a n 0 .3 1 6 (0 .2 6 2 )
S O N S * P h il ip p in e s 0 .6 4 9 * * * (0 .1 8 2 )
S O N S * Ira n -0 .1 0 7 (0 .2 1 6 )
S O N S * G rp 0 8 0 .2 2 3 (0 .1 8 9 )
S O N S * F ra n c e 0 .2 3 9 (0 .1 7 6 )
S O N S * Ita ly 0 .5 7 3 * * * (0 .1 9 4 )
S O N S *  N e th e r la n d s 0 .4 9 3 * * (0 .2 3 4 )
S O N S * G e r ra a n y 0 .3 4 8 * * * (0 .1 0 3 )
S O N S *  P o l a n d -0 .0 4 3 0 (0 .2 5 0 )
S O N S * P o r tu g a l 0 .2 5 9 (0 .2 1 6 )
S O N S * S p a in 0 .2 5 4 (0 .2 5 8 )
S O N S * S e rb ia  &  M o n te n e g r o 0 .2 5 0 (0 .2 3 3 )
S O N S * T u rk e y 0 .2 6 9 (0 .1 7 1 )
S O N S * S o m a lia 0 .5 6 8 * * * (0 .1 5 6 )
O b s e rv a t io n s ________________________ 13223_________________________ 13223
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p <  0.01.
157
C u l t u r e , F e r t il i t y , a n d  S o n  P r e f e r e n c e
Table B.2: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 2 for immigrant women in 
the UK. Country fixed effects and country son preference effects.
m_________  w
A G E -0 .0 1 4 0 (0 .0 3 7 1 ) -0 .0 0 9 9 7 (0 .0 3 7 2 )
A G E 2 -0 .0 0 1 4 1 * * (0 .0 0 0 6 6 4 ) -0 .0 0 1 4 9 * * (0 .0 0 0 6 6 5 )
D E G R E E 0 .0 7 3 9 (0 .0 7 6 5 ) 0 .0 5 8 3 (0 .0 7 6 6 )
A L -0 .1 9 8 * * (0 .0 8 3 4 ) -0 .2 1 4 * * (0 .0 8 3 6 )
F E -0 .1 4 6 * (0 .0 8 8 3 ) -0 .1 7 4 * * (0 .0 8 8 6 )
G C S E -0 .1 8 8 * * * (0 .0 6 6 0 ) -0 .1 9 3 * * * (0 .0 6 6 2 )
A u s t r a l i a 0 .2 4 3 (0 .1 5 1 ) -0 .5 0 1 * (0 .2 8 4 )
C a n a d a -0 .0 5 9 4 (0 .1 7 8 ) -0 .1 9 8 (0 .2 8 6 )
K e n y a -0 .0 5 2 7 (0 .0 9 3 1 ) 0 .2 4 2 (0 .1 4 9 )
U g a n d a 0 .0 0 9 4 1 (0 .1 4 0 ) -0 .2 2 8 (0 .2 4 4 )
Z im b a b w e 0 .0 0 2 0 4 (0 .1 7 3 ) -0 .3 2 2 (0 .3 2 9 )
G h a n a 0 .6 9 9 * * * (0 .1 1 9 ) 0 .5 5 6 * * * (0 .2 0 5 )
N ig e r ia 0 .7 9 2 * * * (0 .0 9 7 4 ) 0 .7 2 1 * * * (0 .1 7 3 )
J a m a ic a 0 .0 6 0 7 (0 .1 1 8 ) 0 .2 6 1 (0 .2 0 0 )
B a n g la d e s h 0 .8 5 7 * * * (0 .0 6 2 9 ) 0 .6 7 7 * * * (0 .1 0 9 )
S ri L a n k a -0 .1 1 2 (0 .1 8 6 ) -0 .9 2 5 * * (0 .3 6 9 )
H K  & C h in a -0 .1 1 7 (0 .1 4 1 ) -0 .1 4 3 (0 .2 4 8 )
M a la y s ia 0 .1 1 3 (0 .1 6 6 ) -0 .3 7 5 (0 .2 9 6 )
S in g a p o re -0 .2 6 4 (0 .1 7 3 ) -0 .6 1 7 * (0 .3 1 6 )
C y p ru s -0 .0 0 3 0 6 (0 .1 3 1 ) -0 .2 6 1 (0 .2 5 1 )
SA 0 .0 0 4 1 8 (0 .1 3 7 ) -0 .1 2 0 (0 .2 3 3 )
G rp 0 4 0 .5 4 3 * * * (0 .1 3 7 ) 0 .4 7 3 * * (0 .2 3 4 )
US 0 .2 5 6 * * (0 .1 1 7 ) -0 .0 4 1 8 (0 .1 9 7 )
P a k i s ta n 0 .9 2 2 * * * (0 .0 5 6 0 ) 0 .7 8 3 * * * (0 .0 9 6 0 )
P h il ip p in e s -0 .3 1 4 (0 .2 1 9 ) -0 .6 9 4 * (0 .4 1 7 )
G rp 0 8 0 .7 8 1 * * * (0 .1 3 0 ) 0 .7 3 1 * * * (0 .2 2 3 )
F ra n c e 0 .1 5 3 (0 .1 7 3 ) -0 .0 0 4 8 2 (0 .2 8 4 )
I t a ly -0 .1 8 8 (0 .1 9 1 ) -0 .1 8 3 (0 .2 9 5 )
G e rm a n y 0 .0 1 8 5 (0 .0 9 0 6 ) -0 .1 4 8 (0 .1 5 5 )
T u rk e y -0 .2 0 3 (0 .1 5 3 ) -0 .4 7 1 (0 .2 9 5 )
S o m a lia 1 .1 6 2 * * * (0 .0 9 9 6 ) 1 .0 6 9 * * * (0 .1 7 6 )
S O N S -0 .2 8 0 * * * (0 .0 6 3 4 )
S O N S *  A u s t r a l i a 0 .7 5 3 * * * (0 .2 2 4 )
S O N S * C a n a d a 0 .1 3 9 (0 .2 3 4 )
S O N S * K e n y a -0 .3 0 3 * * (0 .1 3 3 )
S O N S *  U g a n d a 0 .2 3 4 (0 .2 0 3 )
S O N S *  Z im b a b w e 0 .3 2 2 (0 .2 7 3 )
S O N S * G h a n a 0 .1 4 3 (0 .1 7 2 )
S O N S * N ig e r ia 0 .0 7 9 8 (0 .1 4 4 )
S O N S *  J a m a ic a -0 .1 9 7 (0 .1 7 7 )
S O N S * B a n g )a d e s h 0 .1 8 3 * * (0 .0 8 8 2 )
S O N S * S ri L a n k a 0 .7 3 6 * * * (0 .2 5 1 )
S O N S * H K  & C h in a 0 .0 4 6 4 (0 .1 9 6 )
S O N S *  M a la y s ia 0 .4 8 1 * * (0 .2 2 6 )
S O N S * S in g a p o r e 0 .3 4 5 (0 .2 4 0 )
S O N S *  C y p ru s 0 .2 5 7 (0 .1 8 9 )
S O N S * S A 0 .1 2 2 (0 .1 9 6 )
S O N S * G rp 0 4 0 .0 4 0 3 (0 .2 2 2 )
S O N S * U S 0 .2 9 7 * (0 .1 6 3 )
S O N S *  P a k i s ta n 0 .1 4 1 * (0 .0 7 9 6 )
S O N S *  P h il ip p in e s 0 .3 6 3 (0 .3 0 3 )
S O N S * G rp 0 8 0 .0 5 7 2 (0 .1 8 4 )
S O N S * F ra n c e 0 .1 5 1 (0 .2 4 5 )
S O N S * Ita Iy -0 .0 2 6 6 (0 .2 5 9 )
S O N S * G e rm a n y 0 .1 6 8 (0 .1 2 5 )
S O N S * T u rk e y 0 .2 6 2 (0 .2 3 4 )
S O N S * S o m a lia 0 .0 9 8 2 (0 .1 4 5 )
O b s e r v a t io n s  7 7 0 4  7 7 0 4
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.10, ** p  <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
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Table B.3: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 3 for immigrant women in 
the UK. Country fixed effects and country son preference effects.
a ) (2 )
A G E - 0 .1 1 0 ’' (0 .0 6 5 2 ) -0 .1 0 5 (0 .0 6 5 4 )
A G E 2 0 .0 0 0 5 6 9 (0 .0 0 1 1 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 4 7 3 (0 .0 0 1 1 0 )
D E G R E E -0 .6 8 1 * * (0 .2 6 5 ) -0 .6 9 5 * * * (0 .2 6 6 )
A L -0 .4 3 6 * (0 .2 3 0 ) -0 .4 8 6 * * (0 .2 3 0 )
F E -0 .3 0 4 (0 .2 2 9 ) -0 .3 1 7 (0 .2 3 0 )
G C S E -0 .4 9 7 * * * (0 .1 7 8 ) -0 .4 9 4 * * * (0 .1 7 8 )
K e n y a 0 .0 7 5 5 (0 .1 9 2 ) 0 .0 8 4 8 (0 .3 0 2 )
N ig e r ia 0 .7 5 9 * * * (0 .1 7 2 ) 0 .5 2 7 * (0 .3 1 2 )
B a n g la d e s h 0 .9 0 7 * * * (0 .1 0 5 ) 0 .6 2 8 * * * (0 .2 0 4 )
P a k i s ta n 1 .0 2 1 * * * (0 .0 9 7 2 ) 0 .7 4 2 * * * (0 .1 8 6 )
G e rm a n y -0 .0 5 0 2 (0 .2 0 1 ) -0 .8 1 7 * (0 .4 4 2 )
S o m a lia 1 .4 5 3 * * * (0 .1 4 2 ) 1 .0 4 5 * * * (0 .2 8 8 )
S O N S -0 .3 6 9 * * * (0 .1 0 0 )
S O N S * K e n y a -0 .0 9 3 1 (0 .2 1 5 )
S O N S * N ig e r ia 0 .1 4 8 (0 .1 9 7 )
S O N S  * B a n g la d e s h 0 .2 0 5 * (0 .1 2 2 )
S O N S *  P a k i s ta n 0 .1 9 8 * (0 .1 1 4 )
S O N S * G e rm a n y 0 .5 0 4 * * (0 .2 3 8 )
S O N S *  S o m a li  a 0 .2 8 2 * (0 .1 6 9 )
O b s e rv a t io n s 2343 2 3 4 3
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.10, ** p  <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
Table B.4: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 2 for immigrant women in 
the UK. Country fixed effects and family composition interactions. Note that 
non-interacted family composition dummies are not included, to allow easy 
comparison of coefficients for each country. Each interaction coefficient measures 
the hazard relative to a compatriot with no sons.
(i)
A G E -0 .0 1 3 6 (0 .0 3 7 3 )
A G E 2 -0 .0 0 1 4 4 * * (0 .0 0 0 6 6 8 )
D E G R E E 0 .0 5 8 3 (0 .0 7 7 0 )
A L - 0 .2 1 9 * * * (0 .0 8 3 8 )
F E -0 .1 7 3 * (0 .0 8 8 9 )
G C S E -0 .1 9 0 * * * (0 .0 6 6 3 )
A u s t r a l i a -0 .5 4 1 * (0 .3 2 6 )
B a n g la d e s h 0 .5 9 6 * * * (0 .1 2 0 )
C a n a d a -0 .2 8 3 (0 .3 1 2 )
C y p ru s -0 .2 7 8 (0 .2 8 9 )
F ra n c e -0 .0 1 9 1 (0 .3 0 0 )
G e rm a n y -0 .1 5 0 (0 .1 6 6 )
G h a n a 0 .331 (0 .2 4 3 )
G rp 0 4 0 .4 8 4 * * (0 .2 4 3 )
G rpO S 0 .5 7 7 * * (0 .2 5 6 )
H K  & C h in a -0 .0 8 7 7 (0 .2 6 3 )
I t a ly -0 .4 5 1 (0 .3 4 3 )
J a m a ic a 0 .2 5 2 (0 .2 1 2 )
K e n y a 0 .2 7 5 * (0 .1 5 3 )
M a la y s ia -0 .2 9 6 (0 .3 1 2 )
N ig e r ia 0 .7 5 1 * * * (0 .1 8 6 )
P a k i s ta n 0 .6 8 6 * * * (0 .1 0 5 )
P h i l ip p in e s -1 .1 3 1 * (0 .5 8 3 )
SA -0 .1 8 1 (0 .2 5 5 )
S in g a p o re -0 .9 8 9 * * (0 .4 1 6 )
S o m a lia 1 .1 0 6 * * * (0 .1 9 0 )
S ri L a n k a -1 .1 2 6 * * (0 .4 5 5 )
T u rk e y -0 .3 9 1 (0 .3 2 6 )
U g a n d a -0 .1 1 0 (0 .2 4 9 )
U S -0 .1 5 0 (0 .2 2 0 )
Z im b a b w e -0 .4 0 2 (0 .3 8 7 )
O  N E B  O Y * A u s t r a l i a 0 .2 9 4 (0 .3 7 7 )
T W O B O Y S *  A u s t r a l i a 0 .9 1 8 * * (0 .4 1 5 )
O N E B O Y *  B a n g la d e s h -0 .2 1 8 * * (0 .1 1 0 )
T W O B O Y S  * B a n g la d e s h -0 .2 0 8 * (0 .1 2 0 )
O N  E B O Y *  C a n a d a -0 .2 8 5 (0 .4 1 0 )
T W O B O Y S * C a n a d a -0 .2 7 7 (0 .4 3 7 )
O N E  B O Y *  C y p ru s -0 .2 4 7 (0 .3 3 2 )
T W O B O Y S + C y p ru s -0 .1 0 5 (0 .3 4 7 )
O N E B O Y * F ra n c e -0 .4 2 6 (0 .3 8 8 )
T W O B O Y S *  F ra n c e -0 .2 1 1 (0 .4 4 1 )
c td .
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O N E B O Y *  G e rm a n y  
T W O B O Y S *  G e rm  a n y
(1 )  c td .  
-0 .4 2 8 * *  
-0 .2 3 1
(0 .1 9 0 )
(0 .2 0 2 )
O N E B O Y * G h a n a  
T W O B O Y S *  G h a n a
0 .0 2 1 8
-0 .2 8 6
(0 .2 7 2 )
(0 .3 3 4 )
O N E B O Y * G rp 0 4
T W O B O Y S * G rp 0 4
-0 .5 6 0 *
-0 .3 1 6
(0 .2 9 3 )
(0 .3 9 1 )
O N E B O Y * G rp 0 8
T W O B O Y S * G rp 8
-0 .1 9 7
-0 .4 4 6
(0 .2 9 8 )
(0 .3 4 9 )
O N E B O Y * H K  U C h in a  
T W O B O Y S * H K  U C h in a
-0 .6 7 1 * *
-0 .5 0 3
(0 .3 3 2 )
(0 .3 3 9 )
O N E B O Y * In d ia  
T W O B O Y S *  I n d ia
-0 .5 8 8 * * *
-0 .5 3 5 * * *
(0 .1 0 3 )
(0 .1 1 7 )
O N E B O Y * Ita ly  
T W O B O Y S ‘ I t a ly
-0 .0 0 1 3 1
-0 .7 0 4
(0 .4 2 2 )
(0 .5 5 8 )
O N E B O Y *  J a m a ic a  
T W O B O Y S *  J a m a ic a
-0 .7 6 1 * * *
-0 .8 8 8 * * *
(0 .2 5 1 )
(0 .3 0 7 )
O N E B O Y * K e n y a
T W O B O Y S * K e n y a
-1 .0 4 3 * * *
-1 .0 4 0 * * *
(0 .1 8 6 )
(0 .2 1 2 )
O N  E B O Y *  M a la y s ia  
T W O B O Y S * M a la y s ia
-0 .2 8 9
0 .3 3 8
(0 .4 0 3 )
(0 .3 9 7 )
O N  E B O Y *  N ig e r ia  
T W O B O Y S *  N ig e r ia
-0 .5 2 9 * *
-0 .3 9 6 *
(0 .2 0 8 )
(0 .2 3 8 )
O N  E B O Y *  P a k i s ta n  
T W O B O Y S *  P a k is ta n
-0 .2 3 3 * * *
-0 .2 8 2 * * *
(0 .0 8 3 9 )
(0 .0 9 4 3 )
O N  E B O Y *  P h il ip p in e s  
T W O B O Y S *  P h il ip p in e s
0 .5 7 3
0 .3 2 6
(0 .6 4 6 )
(0 .6 9 0 )
O N E B O Y ’ SA
T W O B O Y S * S A
-0 .3 2 9
-0 .3 0 5
(0 .3 0 8 )
(0 .3 5 5 )
O N E  B O Y * S in g a p o re  
T W O B O Y S * S in g a p o r e
0 .4 6 3
0 .2 1 5
(0 .4 6 6 )
(0 .5 1 7 )
O N E B O Y *  S o m a lia  
T W O B O Y S *  S o m a lia
-0 .5 3 8 * *
-0 .3 7 6
(0 .2 1 7 )
(0 .2 3 9 )
O N E B O Y * S r i L a n k a  
T W O B O Y S * S ri  L a n k a
0 .5 7 3
0 .9 5 0 *
(0 .5 3 2 )
(0 .5 2 1 )
O N E B O Y * T u rk e y
T W O B O Y S * T u rk e y
-0 .4 0 4
-0 .1 0 6
(0 .3 7 9 )
(0 .4 1 4 )
O N E  B O Y * U g a n d a  
T W O B O Y S * U g a n d a
-0 .6 2 2 *
-0 .0 7 5 1
(0 .3 1 8 )
(0 .3 3 8 )
O N E B O Y *  U S 
T W O B O Y S *  U S
-0 .0 5 1 7
0 .0 3 5 7
(0 .2 5 9 )
(0 .2 9 5 )
O N  E B O Y *  Z im b a b w e  
T W O B O Y S ‘ Z im b a b w e
-0 .0 5 8 7
0 .0 7 7 4
(0 .4 3 7 )
(0 .5 1 8 )
O b s e r v a t io n s  7 7 0 4
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p  <  0.10, ** p  <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
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Table B.5: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 3 for immigrant women in 
the UK. Country fixed effects and family composition interactions. Note that 
non-interacted family composition dummies are not included, to allow easy 
comparison of coefficients for each country. Each interaction coefficient measures 
the hazard relative to a compatriot with no sons.
__________________ ( I )  ________
A G E  -0 .1 0 9 *  (0 .0 6 5 9 )
A G E 2  0 .0 0 0 5 1 5  (0 .0 0 1 1 1 )
D E G R E E
A L
F E
G C S E
-0 .7 0 7 * * *
-0 .4 5 9 * *
-0 .3 2 0
-0 .5 0 6 * * *
(0 .2 6 6 )
(0 .2 3 1 )
(0 .2 3 0 )
(0 .1 7 8 )
B a n g la d e s h
G e rm a n y
K e n y a
N ig e r ia
P a k i s ta n
S o m a lia
0 .4 8 9 *
-0 .8 8 6
0 .0 5 5 4
0 .4 7 0
0 .7 1 0 * * *
1 .1 4 1 * * *
(0 .2 7 6 )
(0 .7 3 5 )
(0 .3 3 2 )
(0 .3 7 4 )
(0 .2 3 2 )
(0 .3 6 2 )
O N  E B O Y *  B a n g la d e s h  
T W O B O Y S *  B a n g la d e s h  
T H R E E B O Y S * B a n g la d e s h
-0 .3 0 8
-0 .3 0 8
-0 .6 6 2 * * *
(0 .2 1 6 )
(0 .2 1 5 )
(0 .2 5 2 )
O N  E B O Y *  G e rm a n y
T W O B O Y S * G e rm a n y
T H R E E B O Y S * G e rm a n y
-0 .0 4 0 2
0 .121
0 .2 8 9
(0 .7 7 0 )
(0 .7 6 5 )
(0 .8 1 8 )
O N E B O Y * In d ia
T W O B O Y S * I n d ia
T H R E E B O Y S * In d ia
-0 .7 2 4 * * *
-0 .9 1 1 * * *
-1 .2 0 4 * * *
(0 .2 4 0 )
(0 .2 4 8 )
(0 .3 2 5 )
O N E B O Y * K e n y a  
T W O B O Y S *  K e n y a  
T H R E E B O Y S * K e n y a
-0 .8 7 1 * *
-1 .2 9 4 * * *
-0 .9 7 0 *
(0 .4 0 4 )
(0 .4 8 9 )
(0 .5 6 7 )
O N  E B O Y *  N ig e r ia  
T W O  B O Y S *  N ig e r ia  
T H R E E B O Y S * N ig e r ia
-0 .4 3 9
-0 .6 8 6 *
-0 .4 7 6
(0 .3 9 2 )
(0 .4 0 9 )
(0 .5 4 9 )
O N E B O Y * P a k is ta n  
T W O B O Y S ‘ P a k i s ta n  
T H R E E B O Y S * P a k is ta n
-0 .3 6 2 * *
-0 .6 7 0 * * *
-0 .3 6 2 * *
(0 .1 4 4 )
(0 .1 4 4 )
(0 .1 7 1 )
O N E B O Y * S o m a lia  
T W O  B O Y S ‘ S o m a lia  
T H R E E B O Y S * S o m a lia
-0 .5 9 7
-0 .4 1 8
-0 .5 2 6
(0 .3 6 5 )
(0 .3 4 4 )
(0 .4 5 1 )
O b s e r v a t io n s 2 343
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p  <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
161
C u l t u r e , F e r t il i t y , a n d  S o n  P r e f e r e n c e
Table B.6: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 1. Country fixed effects and
country son preference effects, split by income at sample median.
0) ___________________w
r d * **  rn  n M fi*A G E 0 .2 8 0 (0 .0 4 8 3 ) 0 .2 8 6 * ’ * (0 .0 4 8 5 )
A G E 2 -0 .0 0 5 7 4 * * * (0 .0 0 0 8 8 7 ) -0 .0 0 5 8 3 * * * (0 .0 0 0 8 9 0 )
D E G R E E 0 .0 8 8 5 (0 .0 8 4 8 ) 0 .0 8 8 0 (0 .0 8 5 4 )
A L -0 .0 3 4 1 (0 .1 0 4 ) -0 .0 3 0 5 (0 .1 0 5 )
F E 0 .1 3 5 (0 .1 1 5 ) 0 .1 4 7 (0 .1 1 6 )
G C S E -0 .0 1 9 0 (0 .0 8 4 0 ) -0 .0 1 7 5 (0 .0 8 4 3 )
P O O R * A u s t r a l ia 0 .0 5 3 2 (0 .2 1 3 ) -0 .2 5 1 (0 .2 8 1 )
P O O R * K e n y a -0 .1 7 7 (0 .1 3 2 ) -0 .2 0 8 (0 .2 0 4 )
P O O R *  B a n g la d e s h 0 .6 6 3 * * * (0 .1 0 5 ) 0 .4 5 0 * * * (0 .1 4 8 )
P O O R * S r i  L a n k a -0 .0 5 2 5 (0 .1 7 3 ) -0 .5 7 7 * (0 .3 1 4 )
P O O R * S A 0 .0 2 7 7 (0 .2 0 2 ) -0 .5 8 7 * (0 .3 4 4 )
P O O R * U S -0 .1 4 9 (0 .2 4 4 ) 0 .2 2 0 (0 .3 6 4 )
P O O R *  P a k i s ta n 0 .3 9 7 * * * (0 .0 9 9 2 ) 0 .2 2 6 (0 .1 3 9 )
P O O R *  P h i l ip p in e s -0 .5 3 9 * * * (0 .1 8 7 ) -0 .8 5 6 * * * (0 .3 0 1 )
P O O R * F r a n c e -0 .2 2 0 (0 .2 8 5 ) -0 .6 0 9 (0 .4 5 7 )
P O O R * G e r ra a n y -0 .3 3 0 * * * (0 .1 2 5 ) -0 .4 2 8 * * (0 .1 7 2 )
R IC H -0 .1 6 1 * (0 .0 9 3 2 ) -0 .3 8 8 * * * (0 .1 3 7 )
R IC H *  A u s t r a l i a 0 .2 2 8 (0 .1 6 3 ) 0 .1 6 3 (0 .2 2 4 )
R IC H * K e n y a 0 .0 7 4 5 (0 .1 2 9 ) 0 .1 9 2 (0 .1 8 5 )
R IC H *  B a n g la d e s h 0 .1 8 4 (0 .2 2 1 ) 0 .1 8 6 (0 .3 0 9 )
R IC H * S ri  L a n k a -0 .2 3 7 (0 .2 0 8 ) 0 .0 1 3 0 (0 .2 9 8 )
R IC H * S A 0 .2 9 9 * * (0 .1 3 6 ) 0 .4 6 0 * * (0 .1 9 3 )
R IC H * U S 0 .3 0 8 * * (0 .1 2 9 ) 0 .3 4 2 * (0 .1 8 7 )
R I C H * P a k is ta n 0 .3 8 7 * * * (0 .1 3 2 ) 0 .6 6 1 * * * (0 .1 9 4 )
R I C H * P h il ip p in e s -0 .2 5 5 (0 .2 0 3 ) -0 .4 4 6 (0 .3 2 1 )
R IC H ‘ F ra n c e -0 .0 3 1 8 (0 .1 5 9 ) 0 .1 1 3 (0 .2 3 5 )
R IC H ‘ G e rm a n y 0 .0 5 3 0 (0 .1 1 9 ) 0 .0 3 3 0 (0 .1 7 3 )
S O N S * P O O R -0 .3 6 9 * * * (0 .1 1 8 )
S O N S ‘ P O O R *  A u s t r a l i a 0 .6 5 2 (0 .4 3 2 )
S O N S ‘ P O O R *  K e n y a 0 .1 0 6 (0 .2 6 7 )
S O N S * P O O R * B a n g la d e s h 0 .4 1 6 * * (0 .2 0 2 )
S O N S * P O O R * S ri  L a n k a 0 .8 6 1 * * (0 .3 7 5 )
S O N S * P O O R * S A 1 .0 9 2 * * (0 .4 2 5 )
S O N S ‘ P O O R *  U S -0 .4 9 5 (0 .4 9 0 )
S O N S  * P O  O R *  P a k i s ta n 0 .3 2 7 * (0 .1 9 7 )
S O N S ‘ P O O R *  P h il ip p in e s 0 .5 6 6 (0 .3 8 4 )
S O N S * P O O R * F ra n c e 0 .7 0 0 (0 .5 8 3 )
S O N S ‘ P O O R *  G e rm a n y 0 .1 6 7 (0 .2 4 9 )
S O N S * R IC H 0 .0 5 4 0 (0 .1 4 3 )
S O N S ‘ R IC H *  A u s t r a l i a 0 .1 7 3 (0 .3 2 7 )
S O  N S * R IC H *  K e n y a -0 .2 2 8 (0 .2 5 8 )
S O N S * R I C H * B a n g la d e s h 0 .0 0 6 8 5 (0 .4 4 2 )
S O N S * R IC H * S ri L a n k a -0 .4 4 6 (0 .4 1 3 )
S O N S * R IC H * S A -0 .3 0 9 (0 .2 7 2 )
S O N S * R IC H * U S -0 .0 6 1 3 (0 .2 5 8 )
S O N S ‘ R IC H ‘ P a k i s ta n -0 .4 7 3 * (0 .2 6 4 )
S O N S * R I C H * P h il ip p in e s 0 .3 3 9 (0 .4 1 3 )
S O N S * R I C H * F ra n c e -0 .2 5 8 (0 .3 1 8 )
S O N S *  R IC H *  G e rm a n y 0 .0 4 3 2 (0 .2 3 6 )
O b s e r v a t io n s  2 3 9 9  2399
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p  <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
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Table B.7: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 2. Country fixed effects and 
country son preference effects, split by income at sample median.
(1 ) (2 )
A G E
A G E 2
D E G R E E
A L
F E
G C S E
-0 .0 7 8 9
-0 .0 0 0 1 9 0
0 .2 6 9
-0 .2 4 7
0 .0 8 7 6
-0 .0 3 4 8
(0 .0 9 8 0 )
(0 .0 0 1 7 5 )
(0 .2 0 0 )
(0 .2 2 4 )
(0 .2 3 9 )
(0 .1 5 9 )
-0 .0 9 2 1
0 .0 0 0 0 0 5 8 0
0 .2 8 5
-0 .2 8 7
0 .0 5 2 3
-0 .0 1 6 2
(0 .0 9 8 2 )
(0 .0 0 1 7 5 )
(0 .2 0 2 )
(0 .2 2 5 )
(0 .2 4 2 )
(0 .1 5 9 )
P O O R *  K e n y a  
P O O R *  B a n g la d e s h  
P O O R *  P a k i s ta n  
P O O R *  G e rm a n y
-0 .0 4 7 9
0 .9 1 3 * * *
1 .0 9 8 * * *
0 .2 5 1
(0 .2 6 0 )
(0 .1 6 1 )
(0 .1 5 6 )
(0 .2 2 8 )
0 .4 9 5
0 .9 4 3 * * *
0 .7 5 0 * * *
0 .5 4 0
(0 .4 5 3 )
(0 .2 6 1 )
(0 .2 6 7 )
(0 .3 5 4 )
R IC H
R IC H *  K e n y a  
R IC H *  B a n g la d e s h  
R IC H *  P a k is ta n  
R IC H *  G e rm a n y
-0 .2 6 5
0 .0 9 7 0
0 .9 1 3 * * *
1 .1 2 3 * * *
0 .3 2 3
(0 .1 6 5 )
(0 .2 2 7 )
(0 .2 6 1 )
(0 .1 7 4 )
(0 .2 0 6 )
-0 .0 8 2 5
0 .3 7 6
0 .5 9 3
0 .9 1 2 * * *
0 .2 0 2
(0 .2 8 4 )
(0 .3 6 7 )
(0 .4 5 7 )
(0 .2 9 0 )
(0 .3 5 4 )
S O N S 'P O O R  
S O N S *  P O O R *  K e n y a  
S O N S *  P O O R *  B a n g la d e s h  
S O N S *  P O O R *  P a k i s ta n  
S O N S * P O O R * G e rm a n y
-0 .2 2 5
-0 .5 5 2
-0 .0 3 2 4
0 .3 4 7
-0 .3 3 4
(0 .1 6 4 )
(0 .4 2 9 )
(0 .2 2 4 )
(0 .2 1 9 )
(0 .3 2 7 )
S O N S * R IC H  
S O N S *  R IC H  * K e n y a  
S O N S *  R IC H  * B a n g la d e s h  
S O N S *  R IC H *  P a k i s ta n  
S O N S * R IC H * G e rm a n y
-0 .4 0 0 * *
-0 .2 9 5
0 .3 0 8
0 .1 9 7
0 .1 2 6
(0 .1 8 2 )
(0 .3 4 0 )
(0 .4 1 8 )
(0 .2 5 2 )
(0 .3 0 3 )
O b s e rv a t io n s 1180 1 180
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p  <  0.10, ** p  <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
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Table B.8: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 1 with country fixed effects
and country son preference effects, split by income at (1) first quartile, (2)
sample median, and (3) third quartile.
( 1) ( 2 )
A G E 0 .2 8 6 * * ’ (0 .0 4 8 4 ) 0 .2 8 6 * ’ * (0 .0 4 8 5 ) 0 .2 7 3 * * * (0 .0 4 8 1 )
A G E 2 -0 .0 0 5 8 3 * * * (0 .0 0 0 8 8 9 ) -0 .0 0 5 8 3 * * * (0 .0 0 0 8 9 0 ) -0 .0 0 5 6 3 * * * (0 .0 0 0 8 8 2 )
D E G R E E 0 .0 5 3 7 (0 .0 8 4 3 ) 0 .0 8 8 0 (0 .0 8 5 4 ) 0 .0 6 0 5 (0 .0 8 4 8 )
A L -0 .0 6 3 0 (0 .1 0 5 ) -0 .0 3 0 5 (0 .1 0 5 ) -0 .0 2 8 8 (0 .1 0 5 )
F E 0 .1 2 4 (0 .1 1 6 ) 0 .1 4 7 (0 .1 1 6 ) 0 .1 5 2 (0 .1 1 7 )
G C S E -0 .0 5 3 3 (0 .0 8 4 2 ) -0 .0 1 7 5 (0 .0B 43) 0 .0 0 2 5 9 (0 .0 8 4 7 )
P O O R *  A u s t r a l i a -1 .5 8 0 (1 .0 0 8 ) -0 .2 5 1 (0 .2 8 1 ) -0 .3 4 0 (0 .2 2 1 )
P O O R *  K e n y a -0 .5 5 2 * (0 .3 1 6 ) -0 .2 0 8 (0 .2 0 4 ) -0 .1 2 8 (0 .1 5 2 )
P O O R *  B a n g la d e s h 0 .4 5 1 * * (0 .1 8 2 ) 0 .4 5 0 * * * (0 .1 4 8 ) 0 .3 7 9 * * * (0 .1 3 6 )
P O O R * S r i  L a n k a -0 .7 9 6 * (0 .4 6 5 ) -0 .5 7 7 * (0 .3 1 4 ) -0 .4 3 7 * (0 .2 5 4 )
P O O R * S A -0 .2 5 5 (0 .7 1 9 ) -0 .5 8 7 * (0 .3 4 4 ) -0 .2 2 2 (0 .2 1 6 )
P O O R * U S 0 .3 1 3 (1 0 0 8 ) 0 .2 2 0 (0 .3 6 4 ) -0 .3 1 3 (0 .2 3 0 )
P O O R *  P a k is ta n 0 .1 2 7 (0 .1 8 8 ) 0 .2 2 6 (0 .1 3 9 ) 0 .2 5 3 * * (0 .1 2 0 )
P O O R * P h i l ip p in e s -0 .5 4 6 (0 .4 6 5 ) -0 .8 5 6 * * * (0 .3 0 1 ) -0 .6 4 0 * * * (0 .2 3 5 )
P O O R * F r a n c e -0 .7 4 9 (0 .5 9 3 ) -0 .6 0 9 (0 .4 5 7 ) -0 .2 7 1 (0 .2 8 0 )
P O O R * G e r m a n y -0 .4 9 3 * (0 .2 7 4 ) -0 .4 2 8 * * (0 .1 7 2 ) -0 .3 3 4 * * (0 .1 3 6 )
R IC H -0 .2 6 4 * (0 .1 4 8 ) -0 .3 8 8 * * * (0 .1 3 7 ) -0 .5 7 7 * * * (0 .1 7 7 )
R IC H *  A u s t r a l i a 0 .0 6 7 1 (0 .1 7 8 ) 0 .1 6 3 (0 .2 2 4 ) 0 .6 2 8 * * (0 .2 9 2 )
R IC H * K e n y a 0 .1 0 7 (0 .1 4 9 ) 0 .1 9 2 (0 .1 8 5 ) 0 .3 2 3 (0 .2 9 1 )
R I C H * B a n g la d e sh 0 .1 8 1 (0 .2 3 2 ) 0 .1 8 6 (0 .3 0 9 ) 0 .5 6 2 (0 .5 3 0 )
R IC H * S ri  L a n k a -0 .1 5 4 (0 .2 4 3 ) 0 .0 1 3 0 (0 .2 9 8 ) 0 .175 (0 .4 1 1 )
R IC H * S A 0 .1 4 3 (0 .1 6 6 ) 0 .4 6 0 * * (0 .1 9 3 ) 0 .7 3 8 * * * (0 .2 6 0 )
R IC H * U S 0 .2 1 5 (0 .1 6 2 ) 0 .3 4 2 * (0 .1 8 7 ) 0 .9 7 1 * * * (0 .2 4 4 )
R I C H * P a k is ta n 0 .5 2 9 * * * (0 .1 4 5 ) 0 .6 6 1 * * * (0 .1 9 4 ) 1 .1 3 4 * * * (0 .3 5 6 )
R IC H * P h il ip p in e 8 -0 .7 0 4 * * * (0 .2 4 9 ) -0 .4 4 6 (0 .3 2 1 ) -0 .9 2 4 (0 .6 0 0 )
R IC H ‘ F ra n c e -0 .0 5 1 3 (0 .2 1 5 ) 0 .1 1 3 (0 .2 3 5 ) 0 .2 6 6 (0 .3 1 2 )
R IC H ‘ G e rm a n y -0 .1 3 9 (0 .1 3 5 ) 0 .0 3 3 0 (0 .1 7 3 ) 0 .1 6 7 (0 .2 6 4 )
S O N S * P O O R -0 .3 0 8 * (0 .1 7 2 ) -0 .3 6 9 * * * (0 .1 1 8 ) - 0 .3 0 7 * * * (0 .0 9 9 0 )
S O N S * P O O R *  A u s t r a l i a 1 .546 (1 -2 3 9 ) 0 .6 5 2 (0 .4 3 2 ) 0 .6 2 2 * (0 .3 3 5 )
S O N S * P O O  R * K e n y a 0 .5 8 2 (0 .3 9 9 ) 0 .1 0 6 (0 .2 6 7 ) -0 .0 3 6 7 (0 .2 0 8 )
S O N S * P O O R *  B a n g la d e s h 0 .3 6 7 (0 .2 4 5 ) 0 .4 1 6 * * (0 .2 0 2 ) 0 .3 3 4 * (0 .1 8 5 )
S O N S * P O O R * S ri  L a n k a 1 .2 9 0 * * (0 .5 7 5 ) 0 .8 6 1 * * (0 .3 7 5 ) 0 .5 8 8 * (0 .3 1 1 )
S O N S * P O O R * S A 1.4 9 6 * (0 .8 0 2 ) 1 .0 9 2 * * (0 .4 2 5 ) 0 .5 3 1 * (0 .2 9 0 )
S O N S * P O O R *  US -0 .5 0 4 ( 1 1 6 8 ) -0 .4 9 5 (0 .4 9 0 ) 0 .1 5 6 (0 .3 1 5 )
S O N S * P O O R *  P a k is ta n 0 .3 0 2 (0 .2 6 5 ) 0 .3 2 7 * (0 .1 9 7 ) 0 .261 (0 .1 6 8 )
S O N S * P O O R *  P h il ip p in e s 0 .1 7 6 (0 .5 9 7 ) 0 .5 6 6 (0 .3 8 4 ) 0 .2 9 6 (0 .3 0 7 )
S O N S * P O O  R 'F r a n c e -0 .1 8 0 ( 1 1 6 9 ) 0 .7 0 0 (0 .5 8 3 ) 0 .231 (0 .3 5 2 )
S O N S * P O O R * G e rm a n y 0 .0 3 9 8 (0 .3 9 4 ) 0 .1 6 7 (0 .2 4 9 ) 0 .1 7 0 (0 .1 9 3 )
S O N S * R IC H -0 .1 6 0 (0 .1 0 7 ) 0 .0 5 4 0 (0 .1 4 3 ) 0 .211 (0 .2 3 0 )
S O N S *  R IC H ‘ A u s t r a l i a 0 .361 (0 .2 6 8 ) 0 .1 7 3 (0 .3 2 7 ) -0 .0 9 8 3 (0 .4 2 8 )
S O N S ‘ R IC H ‘ K e n y a -0 .1 8 9 (0 .2 0 8 ) -0 .2 2 8 (0 .2 5 8 ) -0 .0 1 7 0 (0 .3 9 8 )
S O N S * R IC H * B a n g la d e s h 0 .1 6 7 (0 .3 3 5 ) 0 .0 0 6 8 5 (0 .4 4 2 ) 0 .5 9 8 (0 .7 4 8 )
S O N S * R IC H * S ri L a n k a 0 .0 5 3 1 (0 .3 1 0 ) - 0 .4 4 6 (0 .4 1 3 ) -0 .7 7 2 (0 .6 0 3 )
S O N S *  R IC H  *S A 0 .0 3 2 3 (0 .2 3 6 ) - 0 .3 0 9 (0 .2 7 2 ) -0 .4 8 0 (0 .3 7 2 )
S O N S *  R IC H *  US -0 .0 0 1 8 3 (0 .2 2 6 ) -0 .0 6 1 3 (0 .2 5 8 ) -0 .4 1 4 (0 .3 4 5 )
S O N S * R I C H * P a k is ta n -0 .1 4 7 (0 .1 9 9 ) -0 .4 7 3 * (0 .2 6 4 ) -1 .2 4 7 * * * (0 .4 7 0 )
S O N S ‘ R IC H ‘ P h il ip p in e s 0 .5 4 2 * (0 .3 1 9 ) 0 .3 3 9 (0 .4 1 3 ) 1 .4 9 6 * * (0 .7 1 6 )
S O N S * R IC H * F ra n c e 0 .0 3 9 3 (0 .2 8 5 ) -0 .2 5 8 (0 .3 1 8 ) -0 .3 7 9 (0 .4 6 4 )
S O N S * R IC H * G e rm a n y 0 .1 7 4 (0 .1 8 9 ) 0 .0 4 3 2 (0 .2 3 6 ) 0 .0 5 5 3 (0 .3 6 2 )
O b s e rv a t io n s  2 3 9 9  2399  2399
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p  <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
164
C u l t u r e , F e r t i l i t y , a n d  S o n  P r e f e r e n c e
Table B.9: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 2 with country fixed effects
and country son preference effects, split by income at (1) first quartile, (2)
sample median, and (3) third quartile.
(1 ) (2 )  (3 ) '
A G E -0 .1 0 0 (0 .0 9 8 8 ) -0 .0 9 2 1 (0 .0 9 8 2 ) -0 .1 0 9 (0 .0 9 8 4 )
A G E 2 0 .0 0 0 1 0 3 (0 .0 0 1 7 6 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 0 5 8 0 (0 .0 0 1 7 5 ) 0 .0 0 0 2 0 8 (0 .0 0 1 7 6 )
D E G R E E 0 .291 (0 .2 0 1 ) 0 .2 8 5 (0 .2 0 2 ) 0 .2 8 7 (0 .2 0 6 )
A L -0 .2 7 2 (0 .2 2 6 ) -0 .2 8 7 (0 .2 2 5 ) -0 .2 8 9 (0 .2 2 6 )
F E 0 .0 4 2 3 (0 .2 4 3 ) 0 .0 5 2 3 (0 .2 4 2 ) 0 .0 4 1 5 (0 .2 4 0 )
G C S E -0 .0 0 7 9 1 (0 .1 6 0 ) -0 .0 1 6 2 (0 .1 5 9 ) 0 .0 0 7 7 4 (0 .1 5 9 )
P O O R 'K e n y a -0 .1 5 7 (0 .9 0 0 ) 0 .4 9 5 (0 .4 5 3 ) 0 .1 9 0 (0 .3 4 5 )
P O O R *  B a n g la d e s h 0 .5 7 1 * (0 .3 3 3 ) 0 .9 4 3 * * * (0 .2 6 1 ) 0 .8 9 5 * * * (0 .2 3 5 )
P O O R * P a k i s t a n 0 .5 9 7 (0 .3 6 5 ) 0 .7 5 0 * * * (0 .2 6 7 ) 0 .8 0 8 * * * (0 .2 1 7 )
P O O R *  G e rm a n y 1 .038 (0 .8 5 5 ) 0 .5 4 0 (0 .3 5 4 ) 0 .2 9 3 (0 .3 0 9 )
R IC H -0 .4 9 9 (0 .3 2 3 ) -0 .0 8 2 5 (0 .2 8 4 ) -0 .1 5 2 (0 .3 5 7 )
R IC H * K e n y a 0 .5 0 8 * (0 .3 0 2 ) 0 .3 7 6 (0 .3 6 7 ) 0 .9 5 5 * (0 .5 0 4 )
R IC H * B a n g la d e sh 0 .7 2 8 * (0 .3 9 0 ) 0 .5 9 3 (0 .4 5 7 ) 0 .7 3 8 (0 .5 6 5 )
R I C H * P a k is ta n 0 .8 2 6 * * * (0 .2 3 4 ) 0 .9 1 2 * * * (0 .2 9 0 ) 0 .8 1 9 * (0 .4 6 4 )
R IC H * G e rm a n y 0 .381 (0 .2 7 3 ) 0 .2 0 2 (0 .3 5 4 ) 0 .6 1 3 (0 .4 5 7 )
S O N S * P O O R -0 .3 7 0 * (0 .2 2 1 ) -0 .2 2 5 (0 .1 6 4 ) -0 .2 9 2 * * (0 .1 3 5 )
S O N S * P O O R * K e n y a 0.501 (0 .7 2 8 ) -0 .5 5 2 (0 .4 2 9 ) -0 .1 8 0 (0 .3 0 5 )
S O N S * P O O R * B a n g la d e s h 0 .1 0 6 (0 .2 7 1 ) -0 .0 3 2 4 (0 .2 2 4 ) 0 .0 2 2 2 (0 .2 0 2 )
S O N S * P O O R * P a k is ta n 0 .3 7 3 (0 .2 9 8 ) 0 .3 4 7 (0 .2 1 9 ) 0 .2 9 4 (0 .1 8 3 )
S O N S *  P O O R *  G e rm a n y -0 .8 6 8 (0 .7 4 4 ) -0 .3 3 4 (0 .3 2 7 ) -0 .2 2 5 (0 .2 8 3 )
S O N S * R IC H -0 .3 1 9 * * (0 .1 4 5 ) -0 .4 0 0 * * (0 .1 8 2 ) -0 .3 8 8 (0 .2 8 5 )
S O N S * R IC H * K e n y a -0 .5 3 3 * (0 .2 9 1 ) -0 .2 9 5 (0 .3 4 0 ) -0 .9 2 3 * (0 .5 2 7 )
S O N S * R I C H * B a n g la d e s h 0 .2 1 7 (0 .3 4 4 ) 0 .3 0 8 (0 .4 1 8 ) 0 .4 9 2 (0 .5 6 6 )
S O N S *  R IC H ‘ P a k i s ta n 0 .3 1 2 (0 .1 9 7 ) 0 .1 9 7 (0 .2 5 2 ) 0 .3 3 0 (0 .3 8 6 )
S O N S * R I C H * G e rm a n y -0 .0 3 6 4 (0 .2 4 2 ) 0 .1 2 6 (0 .3 0 3 ) 0 .1 1 0 (0 .3 8 9 )
O b s e r v a t io n s  1180 1180_______________________ 1180
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p <  0.01.
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Table B.10: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 1. Country fixed effects and 
country son preference effects, split by age on immigration to the UK. Column 
(1) split at age 10, Column (2) at age 15.
(1 ) (2 )
A G E 0 .1 6 2 * ’ * (0 .0 1 9 9 ) 0 .1 6 2 ’ ” (0 .0 1 9 9 )
A G E 2 -0 .0 0 3 8 2 * * * (0 .0 0 0 3 6 9 ) -0 .0 0 3 8 2 * * * (0 .0 0 0 3 7 0 )
D E G R E E 0 .1 5 1 * * * (0 .0 4 0 4 ) 0 .1 4 9 * * * (0 .0 4 0 3 )
A L -0 .0 8 2 1 * (0 .0 4 6 0 ) -0 .0 8 7 0 * (0 .0 4 6 0 )
F E 0 .0 0 5 4 1 (0 .0 4 8 2 ) 0 .0 0 4 0 8 (0 .0 4 8 2 )
G C S E 0 .0 0 9 0 1 (0 .0 3 8 5 ) 0 .0 0 3 6 3 (0 .0 3 8 8 )
O L D *  A u s t r a l i a -0 .0 7 2 9 (0 .1 4 8 ) -0 .0 3 8 1 (0 .1 5 6 )
O L D *  C a n a d a -0 .0 9 9 5 (0 .1 9 1 ) 0 .0 5 3 8 (0 .2 1 3 )
O L D * N e w  Z e a la n d -0 .1 4 1 (0 .2 3 4 ) -0 .1 6 1 (0 .2 4 0 )
O L D * K e n y a 0 .0 1 1 0 (0 .0 8 8 9 ) -0 .0 6 2 4 (0 .1 0 4 )
O L D *  U g a n d a -0 .2 4 4 * (0 .1 2 9 ) -0 .3 1 7 * * (0 .1 5 4 )
O L D *  T a n z a n ia -0 .0 2 2 2 (0 .1 5 7 ) -0 .2 1 1 (0 .1 8 2 )
O L D *  Z a m b ia -0 .1 8 1 (0 .2 1 3 ) -0 .2 2 7 (0 .2 2 8 )
O L D *  Z im b a b w e -0 .4 1 4 * * (0 .1 6 4 ) -0 .3 9 1 * * (0 .1 6 8 )
O L D * G h a n a -0 .0 9 5 7 (0 .1 1 5 ) -0 .0 5 9 7 (0 .1 1 7 )
O L D ’ N ig e r ia 0 .2 1 1 * * (0 .1 0 1 ) 0 .2 2 7 * * (0 .1 0 3 )
O L D *  J a m a ic a -0 .8 3 1 * * * (0 .1 1 9 ) -0 .7 6 4 * * * (0 .1 4 9 )
O L D * G rp 0 2 -0 .3 9 4 * (0 .2 1 8 ) -0 .0 2 7 0 (0 .2 4 0 )
O L D *  B a n g la d e s h 0 .2 9 8 * * * (0 .0 7 1 2 ) 0 .3 1 9 * * * (0 .0 7 5 7 )
O L D * S ri L a n k a -0 .0 7 2 6 (0 .1 3 5 ) -0 .0 5 6 7 (0 .1 3 6 )
O L D * H K  & C h in a -0 .2 2 9 * (0 .1 3 0 ) -0 .1 9 6 (0 .1 3 6 )
O L D *  M a la y s ia 0 .3 0 1 * * (0 .1 4 0 ) 0 .3 3 9 * * (0 .1 4 5 )
O L D * S in g a p o r e -0 .6 1 6 * (0 .3 1 9 ) -0 .3 9 3 (0 .3 3 7 )
O L D * C y p r u s -0 .3 5 0 * * (0 .1 6 4 ) -0 .3 3 3 * (0 .1 7 3 )
O L D * M a lta -0 .4 2 3 (0 .3 3 6 ) -0 .7 6 6 * (0 .4 1 1 )
O L D *  M a u r i t iu s -0 .4 4 9 * * (0 .1 8 2 ) -0 .4 3 8 * * (0 .1 8 5 )
O L D * S A -0 .0 3 6 9 (0 .1 1 7 ) -0 .0 1 4 0 (0 .1 2 2 )
O L D * G rp 0 4 -0 .1 9 3 (0 .1 4 0 ) -0 .2 0 4 (0 .1 4 4 )
O L D * U S 0 .1 3 6 (0 .0 9 9 2 ) 0 .1 9 5 * (0 .1 0 3 )
O L D *  P a k i s ta n 0 .3 8 6 * * * (0 .0 6 1 4 ) 0 .4 1 1 * * * (0 .0 6 4 5 )
O L D * C h in a -0 .5 9 5 * * * (0 .1 8 8 ) -0 .6 0 9 * * * (0 .1 9 4 )
O L D *  J a p a n -0 .2 0 3 (0 .1 9 1 ) -0 .2 0 6 (0 .1 9 4 )
O L D *  P h il ip p in e s -0 .6 2 2 * * * (0 .1 4 2 ) -0 .6 1 2 * * * (0 .1 4 3 )
O L D * Ira n -0 .1 2 7 (0 .1 7 0 ) -0 .1 2 1 (0 .1 7 3 )
O L D * G rp 8 0 .4 0 6 * * (0 .1 6 2 ) 0 .4 1 5 * * (0 .1 6 8 )
O L D * F ra n c e -0 .0 6 3 9 (0 .1 3 8 ) -0 .0 6 2 2 (0 .1 4 0 )
O L D * I ta ly -0 .7 5 6 * * * (0 .1 8 2 ) -0 .6 9 0 * * * (0 .1 8 5 )
O L D *  N e th e r la n d s 0 .0 8 1 6 (0 .1 7 7 ) 0 .0 8 0 4 (0 .1 8 0 )
O L D *  G e rm a n y -0 .2 9 8 * * * (0 .1 1 5 ) -0 .2 8 9 * * (0 .1 2 6 )
O L D * P o la n d -0 .6 9 7 * * * (0 .1 7 9 ) -0 .7 0 7 * * * (0 .1 8 5 )
O L D *  P o r tu g a l -0 .5 7 3 * * * (0 .1 5 7 ) -0 .5 7 3 * * * (0 .1 6 1 )
O L D * S p a in -0 .4 2 5 * * (0 .1 9 4 ) -0 .4 3 7 * * (0 .1 9 8 )
O L D * S e rb ia  &  M o n te n e g r o -0 .0 7 8 2 (0 .1 6 8 ) -0 .0 6 3 1 (0 .1 6 8 )
O L D * T u rk e y -0 .3 1 3 * * (0 .1 3 4 ) -0 .3 0 3 * * (0 .1 3 6 )
O L D *  S o m a lia 0 .3 4 4 * * * (0 .1 1 4 ) 0 .3 5 9 * * * (0 .1 1 5 )
Y O U N G 0 .1 1 0 (0 .1 0 4 ) 0 .1 4 1 (0 .0 8 9 6 )
Y O U N G *  A u s t r a l i a -0 .1 0 7 (0 .2 0 3 ) -0 .1 5 7 (0 .1 8 4 )
Y O U N G * C a n a d a -0 .1 8 1 (0 .2 1 5 ) -0 .2 8 9 (0 .1 9 1 )
Y O U N G * N e w  Z e a la n d -0 .1 6 1 (0 .3 4 7 ) -0 .1 1 3 (0 .3 2 6 )
Y O U N G * K e n y a 0 .0 9 8 4 (0 .1 5 7 ) 0 .0 9 7 8 (0 .1 2 1 )
Y O U N G * U g a n d a 0 .231 (0 .2 2 9 ) 0 .0 3 2 4 (0 .1 7 0 )
Y O U N G * T a n z a n ia 0 .1 8 2 (0 .3 1 7 ) 0 .4 4 0 * * (0 .2 2 3 )
Y O U N G * Z a m b ia -0 .0 8 8 0 (0 .3 3 0 ) -0 .0 2 9 4 (0 .2 8 8 )
Y O U N G *  Z im b a b w e -0 .0 8 8 6 (0 .3 1 6 ) -0 .2 1 3 (0 .2 8 8 )
Y O U N G * G h a n a 0 .4 0 0 (0 .4 5 8 ) -0 .1 4 6 (0 .3 6 2 )
Y O U N G * N ig e r ia -0 .0 0 7 2 4 (0 .2 8 4 ) 0 .0 0 6 3 6 (0 .2 4 9 )
Y O U N G *  J a m a ic a -0 .6 1 0 * * * (0 .2 0 3 ) -0 .8 5 0 * * * (0 .1 4 8 )
Y O U N G * G rp 0 2 -0 .8 1 2 * * * (0 .3 0 4 ) -0 .9 9 0 * * * (0 .2 6 2 )
Y O U N G *  B a n g la d e s h 0 .0 9 1 1 (0 .1 8 6 ) 0 .1 0 8 (0 .1 3 7 )
Y O U N G * S ri L a n k a -0 .1 4 0 (0 .3 6 6 ) -0 .1 5 6 (0 .3 6 2 )
Y O U N G * H K  U C h in a -0 .3 6 4 (0 .2 6 7 ) -0 .4 2 3 * (0 .2 3 2 )
Y O U N G *  M a la y s ia -0 .0 5 6 0 (0 .2 6 0 ) -0 .0 7 0 6 (0 .2 3 2 )
Y O U N G * S in g a p o re -0 .1 1 4 (0 .1 6 1 ) -0 .1 9 1 (0 .1 5 1 )
Y O U N G * C y p ru s -0 .1 8 7 (0 .1 7 9 ) -0 .2 2 8 (0 .1 6 5 )
Y O U N G * M a lta -0 .1 7 0 (0 .2 1 4 ) -0 .0 9 9 7 (0 .1 9 8 )
Y O U N G * M a u r it iu s -0 .3 0 2 (0 .4 5 7 ) -0 .3 3 2 (0 .4 1 6 )
Y O U N G * S A -0 .2 8 5 (0 .2 1 8 ) -0 .2 9 0 (0 .1 9 3 )
Y O U N G * G rp 0 4 -0 .3 3 5 (0 .5 0 9 ) -0 .0 7 4 6 (0 .4 1 6 )
Y O U N G * U S -0 .1 5 3 (0 .2 4 3 ) -0 .2 6 6 (0 .2 0 8 )
Y O U N G * P a k is ta n 0 .4 1 8 * * * (0 .1 4 3 ) 0 .3 1 3 * * * (0 .1 1 7 )
Y O U N G *  C h in a -1 .7 7 6 * ( 1 0 0 5 ) -1 .0 3 2 * (0 .5 8 3 )
Y O U N G *  J a p a n 2 .1 8 5 * * (1  005) 0 .9 5 4 (0 .7 1 2 )
Y O U N G * P h il ip p in e s 1 .015 (1 .0 0 5 ) -0 .4 2 5 (1 0 0 4 )
Y O U N G * Ir a n 0 .8 7 6 * (0 .5 0 9 ) 0 .6 9 6 (0 .4 5 4 )
Y O U N G * G rp 8 -0 .0 3 1 6 (0 .2 5 4 ) 0 .0 0 4 2 5 (0 .2 3 2 )
Y O U N G *  F ra n c e -0 .2 3 9 (0 .3 1 7 ) -0 .1 8 4 (0 .3 0 0 )
Y O U N G * I ta ly -0 .2 4 6 (0 .2 4 3 ) -0 .4 2 3 * (0 .2 3 2 )
Y O U N G * N e th e r la n d s -0 .4 5 9 (0 .5 0 9 ) -0 .3 1 9 (0 .4 5 4 )
Y O U N G * G e rm a n y -0 .3 7 2 * * * (0 .1 2 4 ) -0 .3 8 5 * * * (0 .1 0 9 )
Y O U N G * P o la n d 1 .237 (1 .0 0 5 ) -0 .0 1 9 2 (0 .5 8 3 )
Y O U N G * P o r tu g a l -0 .3 6 6 (0 .5 8 5 ) -0 .3 6 8 (0 .4 5 4 )
Y O U N G *  S p a in -0 .1 1 3 (0 .5 0 9 ) 0 .0 0 6 6 5 (0 .4 5 4 )
Y O U N G * S e rb ia  & M o n te n e g r o 1 .067 (1 .0 0 5 ) 0 .7 2 7 (0 .7 1 2 )
Y O U N G * T u rk e y -0 .1 3 3 (0 .7 1 3 ) -0 .1 3 4 (0 .5 8 3 )
Y O U N G * S o m a lia 3 .3 0 0 * * * (1 0 0 5 )
c td . c td .
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(1 )  C td . (2 )  c td .
S O N S * O L D -0 .2 8 5 * * * (0 .0 5 8 3 ) -0 .2 5 0 * * * (0 .0 6 0 9 )
S O N S * O L D *  A u s t r a l i a 0 .6 1 5 * * * (0 .2 1 2 ) 0 .6 3 9 * * * (0 .2 2 1 )
S O N S * O L D ‘ C a n a d a 0 .3 6 1 (0 .2 5 1 ) 0 .4 1 4 (0 .2 7 5 )
S O N S * O L D * N e w  Z e a la n d 0 .1 3 0 (0 .3 0 7 ) 0 .2 4 2 (0 .3 1 5 )
S O N S * O L D * K e n y a -0 .0 1 6 8 (0 .1 2 1 ) -0 .0 3 7 9 (0 .1 4 0 )
S O N S * O L D *  U g a n d a 0 .2 5 4 (0 .1 7 9 ) 0 .3 2 2 (0 .2 0 6 )
S O  N S * O L D ‘ T a n z a n ia -0 .2 4 9 (0 .2 3 2 ) -0 .1 5 1 (0 .2 6 8 )
S O N  S * O L D *  Z a m b ia 0 .6 0 6 * * (0 .2 7 8 ) 0 .5 4 5 * (0 .3 1 2 )
S O  N S * O L D *  Z im b a b w e 0 .241 (0 .2 1 9 ) 0 .1 8 5 (0 .2 2 8 )
S O  N S * O L D *  G h a n a 0 .0 4 9 0 (0 .1 7 0 ) -0 .0 2 4 4 (0 .1 7 4 )
S O  N S * O L D *  N ig e r ia 0 .1 7 4 (0 .1 4 2 ) 0 .1 4 1 (0 .1 4 5 )
S O N S *  O L D *  J a m a ic a 0 .5 2 8 * * * (0 .1 6 1 ) 0 .5 2 3 * * * (0 .2 0 0 )
S O N S * O L D * G rp 0 2 0 .0 5 2 3 (0 .2 9 8 ) -0 .4 6 1 (0 .3 6 9 )
S O N S * O L D * B a n g la d e s h 0 .2 3 3 * * (0 .0 9 5 2 ) 0 .1 6 7 * (0 .1 0 1 )
S O N S * O L D * S ri L a n k a 0 .0 9 2 9 (0 .1 8 5 ) 0 .0 6 2 2 (0 .1 8 6 )
S O N S * O L D * H K  it C h in a 0 .1 1 6 (0 .1 7 7 ) -0 .0 4 1 1 (0 .1 8 8 )
S O N S * O L D * M a la y s ia -0 .3 1 4 (0 .2 1 6 ) -0 .3 6 1 (0 .2 2 3 )
S O N S * O L D * S in g a p o re 1 .0 2 9 * * (0 .4 1 8 ) 0 .9 1 6 * * (0 .4 4 5 )
S O N S *  O L D *  C y p ru s 0 .3 1 7 (0 .2 2 0 ) 0 .2 1 0 (0 .2 3 9 )
S O N S * O L D * M a lta -0 .0 9 6 4 (0 .4 8 9 ) 0 .2 2 4 (0 .5 6 0 )
S O N S * O L D * M a u r i tiu s 0 .0 7 1 8 (0 .2 7 3 ) 0 .0 3 4 8 (0 .2 8 5 )
S O N S * O L D * S A 0 .1 4 3 (0 .1 6 9 ) 0 .1 3 2 (0 .1 7 6 )
S O N S * O L D * G rp 0 4 0 .2 7 6 (0 .2 0 1 ) 0 .2 6 2 (0 .2 0 5 )
S O N S * O L D * U S 0 .2 0 9 (0 .1 4 6 ) 0 .1 6 1 (0 .1 5 0 )
S O  N S * O L D *  P a k i s ta n 0 .1 3 2 (0 .0 6 3 6 ) 0 .0 7 8 4 (0 .0 8 7 4 )
S O  N S * O L D *  C h in a 0 .2 7 2 (0 .2 5 7 ) 0 .2 2 0 (0 .2 6 6 )
S O N S * O L D *  J a p a n 0 .4 1 9 (0 .2 6 5 ) 0 .4 0 2 (0 .2 6 8 )
S O  N S * O L D *  P h il ip p in e s 0 .6 6 4 * * * (0 .1 8 4 ) 0 .6 2 4 * * * (0 .1 8 6 )
S O N S * O L D * Ira n -0 .0 0 8 2 7 (0 .2 2 5 ) -0 .0 3 9 6 (0 .2 2 9 )
S O N S * O L D * G rp 8 0 .2 7 2 (0 .2 2 3 ) 0 .2 3 2 (0 .2 3 5 )
S O  N S * O L D *  F ra n c e 0 .2 2 7 (0 .1 8 9 ) 0 .1 7 6 (0 .1 9 2 )
S O N S * O L D ‘ I t a ly 0 .9 2 0 * * * (0 .2 4 1 ) 0 .8 3 6 * * * (0 .2 4 7 )
S O  N S * O L D *  N e th e r la n d s 0 .5 1 1 * * (0 .2 5 1 ) 0 .4 9 0 * (0 .2 5 6 )
S O N  S * O L D *  G e rm a n y 0 .3 7 2 * * (0 .1 5 9 ) 0 .3 4 8 * * (0 .1 7 4 )
S O  N S * O L D *  P o la n d -0 .0 5 3 6 (0 .2 5 9 ) -0 .0 4 2 3 (0 .2 6 3 )
S O N  S * O L D *  P o r tu g a l 0 .2 4 8 (0 .2 2 5 ) 0 .2 0 4 (0 .2 2 9 )
S O N S * O L D * S p a in 0 .2 9 4 (0 .2 7 9 ) 0 .2 8 5 (0 .2 8 4 )
S O N S * O L D * S e rb ia  it M o n te n e g ro 0 .2 5 9 (0 .2 3 5 ) 0 .2 1 6 (0 .2 3 7 )
S O N S * O L D * T u rk e y 0 .2 8 4 (0 .1 7 9 ) 0 .2 5 0 (0 .1 8 1 )
S O N S * O L D * S o m a lia 0 .5 9 5 * * * (0 .1 5 8 ) 0 .5 5 1 * * * (0 .1 5 9 )
S O N S 'Y O U N G -0 .1 0 1 (0 .1 3 3 ) -0 .2 9 4 * * * (0 .1 1 0 )
S O N S * Y O U N G *  A u s t r a l i a 0 .0 7 4 6 (0 .2 8 7 ) 0 .2 5 3 (0 .2 6 4 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ C a n a d a 0 .1 6 3 (0 .2 9 7 ) 0 .2 6 2 (0 .2 6 7 )
S O N S ‘ Y O U N G ‘ N ew  Z e a la n d 1 .1 4 8 * * (0 .4 9 1 ) 0 .4 7 4 (0 .4 6 1 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  K e n y a -0 .0 7 9 4 (0 .2 1 8 ) 0 .0 7 3 5 (0 .1 7 1 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  U g a n d a -0 .1 4 7 (0 .3 2 6 ) 0 .0 4 4 6 (0 .2 5 1 )
S O N S ‘ Y O U N G ‘ T a n z a n ia -0 .2 6 0 (0 .4 5 7 ) -0 .4 5 7 (0 .3 3 0 )
S O N S ‘ Y O U N G ‘ Z a m b ia -0 .0 5 5 8 (0 .4 4 1 ) 0 .2 5 7 (0 .3 6 4 )
S O N S ‘ Y O U N G ‘ Z im b a b w e 0 .5 4 0 (0 .4 0 5 ) 0 .6 0 9 * (0 .3 6 4 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * G h a n a 0 .0 1 5 1 (0 .5 8 6 ) 0 .5 9 2 (0 .4 7 0 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  N ig e r ia -0 .0 8 7 0 (0 .4 2 4 ) 0 .1 2 3 (0 .3 6 1 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ J a m a ic a -0 .0 7 2 6 (0 .2 7 9 ) 0 .3 2 4 (0 .2 0 6 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * G rp 0 2 -0 .0 3 0 8 (0 .4 7 5 ) 0 .5 3 0 (0 .3 5 3 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * B a n g Ia d e sh 0 .0 4 9 3 (0 .2 5 4 ) 0 .3 6 0 * (0 .1 8 9 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * S ri L a n k a -0 .2 2 6 (0 .4 8 3 ) -0 .0 4 6 6 (0 .4 7 0 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * H K  it C h in a 0 .181 (0 .3 3 7 ) 0 .5 5 7 * (0 .2 6 8 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  M a la y s ia 0 .4 8 4 (0 .3 3 7 ) 0 .5 8 0 * (0 .3 0 7 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  S in g a p o re -0 .0 0 2 6 4 (0 .2 2 7 ) 0 .2 4 1 (0 .2 1 3 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ C y p ru s -0 .0 7 9 0 (0 .2 3 8 ) 0 .1 7 3 (0 .2 1 7 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ M a l ta -0 .1 8 7 (0 .2 9 7 ) -0 .0 9 5 8 (0 .2 7 9 )
S O N S ‘ Y O U N G ‘ M a u r it iu s 0 .7 1 2 (0 .6 2 0 ) 0 .4 4 9 (0 .5 3 9 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * S A 0 .2 2 2 (0 .2 9 4 ) 0 .3 2 5 (0 .2 6 3 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * G rp 0 4 0 .9 6 7 (0 .6 1 6 ) 0 .6 0 9 (0 .5 2 8 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  U S -0 .1 5 9 (0 .3 4 7 ) 0 .1 0 5 (0 .3 0 5 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ P a k is ta n -0 .1 8 0 (0 .2 0 5 ) 0 .1 3 4 (0 .1 6 8 )
S O N S ‘ Y O U N G ‘ P h il ip p in e s 1 .748 (1 .2 3 0 )
S O N S ‘ Y O U N G ‘ C h in a 2 .2 0 1 * (1 .2 3 2 ) 1 .7 7 6 * * (0 .7 7 2 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  J a p a n -3 7 .4 7 (3 5 5 1 1 5 4 1 .9 ) -4 5 .2 4
S O N S * Y O U N G * Ira n -1 .5 3 5 * (0 .8 7 7 ) -0 .9 9 9 (0 .6 8 0 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * G rp 8 -0 .0 1 8 7 (0 .3 6 3 ) 0 .2 3 5 (0 .3 2 1 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * F ra n c e 0 .1 2 8 (0 .5 0 2 ) 0 .4 8 8 (0 .4 5 5 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * Ita ly -0 .2 2 3 (0 .3 4 0 ) 0 .1 6 6 (0 .3 1 9 )
S O N S ‘ Y O U N G ‘ N e th e r la n d s 0 .5 5 6 (0 .6 8 4 ) 0 .6 3 6 (0 .6 1 6 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ G e rm a n y 0 .1 7 1 (0 .1 7 3 ) 0 .3 6 0 * * (0 .1 5 3 )
S O N S ‘ Y O U N G *  P o l a n d -0 .6 6 9 (1 .2 3 2 ) -0 .1 8 7 (0 .9 2 0 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ P o r tu g a l 0 .7 0 5 (0 .8 2 7 ) 1 .1 0 4 (0 .6 8 0 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * S p a in -0 .1 4 1 (0 .6 8 4 ) -0 .1 0 4 (0 .6 1 6 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * T u rk e y 0 .0 8 5 1 (0 .7 9 3 ) 0 .2 4 1 (0 .6 6 1 )
O b s e rv a t io n s  13112  13112
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p  <  0.10, **  p  <  0.05, * * *  p  <  0.01.
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Table B .ll: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 2. Country fixed effects and 
country son preference effects, split by age on immigration to the UK. Column 
(1) split at age 10, Column (2) at age 15.
(1 ) (2)
A G E -0 .0 0 8 5 2 (0 .0 3 7 3 ) -0 .0 0 9 5 1 (0 .0 3 7 3 )
A G E 2 -0 .0 0 1 5 3 * * (0 .0 0 0 6 6 8 ) -0 .0 0 1 5 1 * * (0 .0 0 0 6 6 8 )
D E G R E E 0 .0 6 5 7 (0 .0 7 8 2 ) 0 .0 6 3 6 (0 .0 7 8 0 )
A L -0 .1 9 5 * * (0 .0 8 5 2 ) -0 .2 0 3 * * (0 .0 8 5 3 )
F E -0 .1 8 3 * * (0 .0 9 1 6 ) -0 .1 8 9 * * (0 .0 9 1 4 )
G C S E -0 .1 8 6 * * * (0 .0 6 9 1 ) -0 .1 8 5 * * * (0 .0 6 9 1 )
O L D 1* A u s t r a l i a -0 .7 1 2 * (0 .4 0 8 ) -0 .6 0 5 (0 .4 1 8 )
O L D ‘ C a n a d a -0 .2 9 9 (0 .4 2 1 ) 0 .1 2 8 (0 .4 2 9 )
O L D * K e n y a 0 .2 2 5 (0 .1 7 4 ) 0 .2 7 9 (0 .2 0 8 )
O L D ‘ U g a n d a -0 .2 4 8 (0 .2 7 2 ) -0 .2 9 1 (0 .3 2 7 )
O L D ‘ Z im b a b w e -0 .4 5 3 (0 .3 7 4 ) -0 .5 4 2 (0 .3 9 4 )
O L D * G h a n a 0 .6 3 2 * * * (0 .2 1 6 ) 0 .6 4 4 * * * (0 .2 1 9 )
O L D ‘ N ig e r ia 0 .8 9 3 * * * (0 .1 8 0 ) 0 .8 6 6 * * * (0 .1 8 5 )
O L D *  J a m a ic a 0 .4 2 6 * (0 .2 3 3 ) 0 .4 2 6 (0 .2 6 7 )
O L D * B a n g la d e s h 0 .7 4 5 * * * (0 .1 1 8 ) 0 .7 8 7 * * * (0 .1 2 4 )
O L D * S ri L a n k a -0 .9 0 3 * * (0 .4 0 5 ) -0 .9 0 3 * * (0 .4 0 7 )
O L D * H K  k  C h in a -0 .1 2 0 (0 .2 8 3 ) -0 .1 0 2 (0 .2 9 0 )
O L D *  M a la y s ia -0 .3 7 1 (0 .3 8 6 ) -0 .1 9 9 (0 .3 8 3 )
O L D * S in g a p o r e 1 .1 4 5 * * (0 .5 0 6 ) 1 .1 3 7 * * (0 .5 1 5 )
O L D * C y p r u s -0 .3 8 7 (0 .3 9 1 ) -0 .3 6 8 (0 .4 1 7 )
O L D * S A -0 .1 5 0 (0 .2 6 4 ) -0 .1 8 8 (0 .2 7 7 )
O L D * G rp 0 4 0 .5 1 2 * * (0 .2 4 1 ) 0 .4 6 0 * (0 .2 5 1 )
O L D * U S -0 .0 3 9 2 (0 .2 1 1 ) -0 .0 5 5 9 (0 .2 1 9 )
O L D *  P a k i s ta n 0 .8 2 2 * * * (0 .1 0 6 ) 0 .8 0 0 * * * (0 .1 1 1 )
O L D * P h il ip p in e s -0 .7 1 5 * (0 .4 3 1 ) -0 .7 1 8 * (0 .4 3 3 )
O L D * G rp 8 0 .8 8 4 * * * (0 .2 6 7 ) 0 .9 1 4 * * * (0 .2 7 1 )
O L D * F ra n c e 0 .0 1 2 2 (0 .3 0 5 ) 0 .0 7 6 1 (0 .3 0 5 )
O L D * I ta ly -0 .2 1 9 (0 .3 5 1 ) -0 .2 2 6 (0 .3 5 3 )
O L D *  G e rm  a n y -0 .2 1 2 (0 .2 5 9 ) -0 .1 0 8 (0 .2 8 6 )
O L D * T u rk e y -0 .3 0 9 (0 .2 9 9 ) -0 .3 7 8 (0 .3 0 9 )
O L D * S o m a lia 1 .1 0 8 * * * (0 .1 8 0 ) 1 .1 1 1 * * * (0 .1 8 2 )
Y O U N G 0 .1 6 8 (0 .1 9 2 ) 0 .1 3 2 (0 .1 6 9 )
Y O U N G *  A u s t r a l i a -0 .4 1 4 (0 .4 2 2 ) -0 .4 8 7 (0 .3 9 9 )
Y O U N G * C a n a d a -0 .2 0 4 (0 .4 1 3 ) -0 .4 8 6 (0 .3 9 9 )
Y O U N G ‘ K e n y a 0 .1 2 9 (0 .3 1 5 ) 0 .0 8 0 4 (0 .2 3 5 )
Y O U N G * U g a n d a -0 .0 0 0 2 7 5 (0 .5 4 7 ) -0 .1 7 0 (0 .3 6 9 )
Y O U N G * Z im b a b w e 0 .3 4 7 (0 .7 1 7 ) 0 .585 (0 .6 3 8 )
Y O U N G * G h a n a -0 .3 7 1 (0 .9 9 6 ) -0 .0 8 4 3 (0 .7 9 2 )
Y O U N G * N ig e r ia -1 .1 3 0 (0 .8 1 1 ) -0 .2 0 4 (0 .5 7 4 )
Y O U N G *  J a m a ic a -0 .1 0 3 (0 .3 9 5 ) 0 .0 7 3 3 (0 .3 0 7 )
Y O U N G ‘ B a n g la d e s h 0 .3 6 9 (0 .2 9 4 ) 0 .3 6 4 (0 .2 3 4 )
Y O U N G * S ri L a n k a -1 .1 9 8 (0 .9 3 2 ) -1 .0 1 4 (0 .9 0 1 )
Y O U N G 'H K  k  C h in a -0 .2 6 6 (0 .5 2 7 ) -0 .3 0 7 (0 .4 9 7 )
Y O U N G ‘ M a la y s ia -0 .4 4 1 (0 .4 7 6 ) -0 .6 3 6 (0 .4 7 4 )
Y O U N G * S in g a p o re -1 .2 4 1 * * * (0 .4 2 4 ) -1 .1 7 5 * * * (0 .4 0 7 )
Y O U N G * C y p ru s -0 .2 1 2 (0 .3 4 9 ) -0 .2 0 1 (0 .3 2 7 )
Y O U N G * S A 0 .0 4 3 7 (0 .5 1 6 ) 0 .1 0 6 (0 .4 4 8 )
Y O U N G * G rp 0 4 1 .2 0 2 (0 .9 9 8 ) 1 .2 4 2 * (0 .6 8 9 )
Y O U N G 'U S 0 .0 0 8 4 6 (0 .5 8 6 ) 0 .1 8 8 (0 .4 6 4 )
Y O U N G ‘ P a k i s ta n 0 .6 2 7 * * * (0 .2 4 1 ) 0 .7 8 8 * * * (0 .1 9 8 )
Y O U N G ‘ P h i l ip p in e s 2 .4 7 8 * * (1 .0 0 8 ) 2 .293 (1 -5 4 6 )
Y O U N G * G rp 8 0 .3 2 0 (0 .4 3 0 ) 0 .3 9 2 (0 .4 0 0 )
Y O U N G *  F ra n c e -0 .0 6 3 6 (0 .8 2 7 ) -0 .4 1 6 (0 .8 1 0 )
Y O U N G ‘ I t a ly •0 .1 4 0 (0 .5 5 3 ) -0 .0 9 3 0 (0 .5 4 4 )
Y O U N G ‘ G e rm a n y -0 .2 3 4 (0 .2 3 6 ) -0 .2 4 2 (0 .2 1 2 )
Y O U N G ‘ T u rk e y -2 .4 4 6 (2 .0 9 0 ) -0 .3 0 5 (1 .2 1 2 )
S O N S * O L D -0 .2 7 3 * * * (0 .0 7 0 4 ) -0 .2 5 3 * * * (0 .0 7 3 3 )
S O N S ‘ O L D *  A u s t r a l i a 0 .7 5 3 * * (0 .3 1 8 ) 0 .7 7 9 * * (0 .3 2 8 )
S O N S * O L D * C a n a d a 0 .0 9 4 3 (0 .3 3 6 ) -0 .3 7 3 (0 .3 7 9 )
S O N S * O L D * K e n y a -0 .2 8 2 * (0 .1 5 4 ) -0 .4 7 6 * * (0 .1 8 9 )
S O N S ‘ O L D *  U g a n d a 0 .1 9 0 (0 .2 3 5 ) 0.221 (0 .2 7 2 )
S O N S * O L D * Z im b a b w e 0 .4 4 4 (0 .3 0 9 ) 0 .452 (0 .3 2 3 )
S O N S * O L D * G h a n a 0 .0 9 9 1 (0 .1 8 3 ) 0 .0 5 5 0 (0 .1 8 7 )
S O N S ‘ O L D *  N ig e r ia -0 .0 1 8 3 (0 .1 5 2 ) -0 .0 1 1 0 (0 .1 5 5 )
S O N S ‘ O L D *  J a m a ic a -0 .3 4 2 (0 .2 0 9 ) -0 .4 5 0 * (0 .2 5 4 )
S O N S ‘ O L D ‘ B a n g la d e s h 0 .1 7 1 * (0 .0 9 6 2 ) 0 .1 2 9 (0 .1 0 0 )
S O N S ‘ O L D * S ri L a n k a 0 .6 5 1 * * (0 .2 7 6 ) 0 .6 4 2 * * (0 .2 7 7 )
S O N S * O L D * H K  k  C h in a 0 .0 5 9 5 (0 .2 3 0 ) 0 .0 7 1 2 (0 .2 4 2 )
S O  N S * O L D *  M a la y s ia 0 .4 7 3 (0 .3 0 8 ) 0 .3 8 5 (0 .3 0 4 )
S O N S ‘ O L D ‘ S in g a p o re -1 .2 1 6 * * (0 .5 7 2 ) -1 .2 6 3 * * (0 .6 0 5 )
S O  N S * O L D ‘ C y p r u s 0 .2 7 1 (0 .2 9 3 ) 0 .2 2 6 (0 .3 2 2 )
S O N S ‘ O L D * S A 0 .1 4 3 (0 .2 2 2 ) 0 .1 1 5 (0 .2 3 4 )
S O N S * O L D * G rp 0 4 0 .0 6 1 6 (0 .2 2 4 ) 0 .1 2 7 (0 .2 3 1 )
S O N S * O L D * U S 0 .4 2 2 * * (0 .1 7 4 ) 0 .3 8 8 * * (0 .1 7 9 )
S O N S * O L D ‘ P a k i s ta n 0 .1 4 7 * (0 .0 8 7 2 ) 0 .1 4 6 (0 .0 9 0 6 )
S O N S * O L D *  P h i l ip p in e s 0 .3 7 1 (0 .3 1 2 ) 0 .3 7 0 (0 .3 1 4 )
S O N S * O L D * G rp 8 0 .1 0 0 (0 .2 1 7 ) 0 .0 8 0 4 (0 .2 2 0 )
S O N S * O L D * F ra n c e 0 .1 0 9 (0 .2 6 4 ) 0 .0 0 9 8 7 (0 .2 7 1 )
S O N S * O L D * Ita ly 0 .0 9 8 4 (0 .3 1 1 ) 0 .1 4 6 (0 .3 1 3 )
S O N S * O L D * G e rm a n y 0 .0 6 1 3 (0 .2 1 8 ) 0 .0 1 5 0 (0 .2 3 8 )
S O N S * O L D * T u rk e y 0 .1 2 8 (0 .2 4 8 ) 0 .171 (0 .2 5 2 )
S O N S ‘ O L D * S o m a lia 0 .0 9 0 6 (0 .1 4 8 ) 0 .0 7 0 2 (0 .1 5 0 )
S O N S * Y O U N G -0 .2 1 7 (0 .1 4 9 ) -0 .3 0 5 * * (0 .1 3 0 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  A u s t r a l i a 0 .7 6 2 * * (0 .3 4 3 ) 0 .7 8 2 * * (0 .3 2 1 )
c td . c td .
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(1 )  c td . (2 )  c td .
S O N S * Y O U N G * C a n a d a 0 .1 4 2 (0 .3 4 4 ) 0 .5 2 4 * (0 .3 1 6 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * K e n y a -0 .3 6 7 (0 .2 8 4 ) -0 .0 8 7 6 (0 .2 0 9 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ U g a n d a 0 .1 5 9 (0 .4 1 7 ) 0 .2 5 0 (0 .3 1 2 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  Z im b a b w e -0 .3 3 9 (0 .6 1 7 ) -0 .3 0 1 (0 .5 5 8 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * G h a n a 0 .6 4 9 (0 .6 4 1 ) 0 .6 8 7 (0 .5 2 1 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * N ig e r ia 1 .1 5 3 * * (0 .5 8 7 ) 0 .5 9 4 (0 .4 5 7 )
S O N S ’ Y O U N G *  J a m a ic a -0 .0 2 0 2 (0 .3 6 3 ) -0 .0 2 6 0 (0 .2 7 1 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ B a n g la d e s h 0 .1 2 7 (0 .2 3 5 ) 0 .2 9 8 (0 .1 9 0 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * S ri L a n k a 1 .4 2 9 * * (0 .6 3 3 ) 1 .2 9 9 * * (0 .6 0 7 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * H K  & C h in a 0 .0 1 0 1 (0 .3 8 8 ) 0 .0 7 9 2 (0 .3 5 6 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  M a la y s ia 0 .4 0 7 (0 .3 4 9 ) 0 .5 9 4 * (0 .3 4 9 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * S in g a p o re 0 .6 4 7 * * (0 .3 0 9 ) 0 .7 2 5 * * (0 .2 9 8 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  C y p ru s 0 .1 6 8 (0 .2 7 0 ) 0 .2 5 9 (0 .2 5 0 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * S A -0 .1 1 2 (0 .4 3 5 ) 0 .0 0 7 6 7 (0 .3 8 0 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * G rp 0 4 -1 .8 0 7 (1 .1 9 9 ) -1 .4 8 9 * (0 .8 4 7 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * U S -0 .5 0 0 (0 .5 1 6 ) -0 .1 8 8 (0 .4 0 3 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * P a k is ta n -0 .0 3 9 2 (0 .2 1 0 ) 0 .0 0 7 7 5 (0 .1 7 6 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  P h i l ip p in e s -1 .0 0 9 (1 .1 7 6 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * G rp 8 -0 .2 6 2 (0 .3 9 4 ) -0 .0 7 0 9 (0 .3 5 1 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * F ra n c e 0 .3 5 2 (0 .7 1 3 ) 0 .8 1 7 (0 .6 2 7 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G ‘ I t a ly -0 .3 4 6 (0 .4 8 0 ) -0 .3 3 5 (0 .4 7 4 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  G e rm a n y 0 .1 4 6 (0 .1 9 7 ) 0 .2 3 7 (0 .1 8 0 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * T u rk e y 1.525 (1 .1 6 5 ) 0 .3 1 4 (0 .8 0 8 )
O b s e rv a t io n s  _____   7 630___________  7630
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
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Table B.12: Birth hazard rate regressions at parity 3. Country fixed effects and 
country son preference effects, split by age on immigration to the UK. Column 
(1) split at age 10, Column (2) at age 15.
(1) (2T
A G E -0 .0 9 9 5 (0 .0 6 5 8 ) -0 .1 0 3 (0 .0 6 5 6 )
A G E 2 0 .0 0 0 3 7 3 (0 .0 0 1 1 1 ) 0 .0 0 0 4 3 5 (0 .0 0 1 1 1 )
D E G R E E -0 .7 4 8 * * * (0 .2 7 5 ) -0 .7 8 0 * * * (0 .2 7 7 )
A L -0 .5 1 6 * * (0 .2 3 3 ) -0 .5 4 3 * * (0 .2 3 2 )
F E -0 .3 0 1 (0 .2 3 3 ) -0 .3 1 0 (0 .2 3 2 )
G C S E -0 .5 2 1 * * * (0 .1 8 3 ) -0 .5 3 5 * * * (0 .1 8 2 )
O L D * K e n y a 0 .1 0 9 (0 .3 4 7 ) 0 .3 4 7 (0 .4 1 0 )
O L D * N ig e r ia 0 .5 8 4 * (0 .3 1 7 ) 0 .7 0 3 * * (0 .3 2 3 )
O L D * B a n g la d e s h 0 .6 6 2 * * * (0 .2 1 7 ) 0 .7 5 6 * * * (0 .2 3 1 )
O L D * P a k is ta n 0 .7 0 2 * * * (0 .2 0 2 ) 0 .7 9 0 * * * (0 .2 1 4 )
O L D * G e rm a n y -1 .5 6 0 * (0 .8 8 6 ) -1 .3 7 0 (0 .9 9 5 )
O L D *  S o m a li a 1 .0 4 1 * * * (0 .2 9 6 ) 1 .1 3 2 * * * (0 .3 0 2 )
Y O U N G 0 .0 0 5 4 3 (0 .4 5 8 ) 0 .4 3 8 (0 .3 7 7 )
Y O U N G * K e n y a 0 .1 8 9 (0 .7 1 9 ) -0 .3 2 9 (0 .5 0 6 )
Y O U N G * N ig e r ia -4 4 .0 8 -4 .6 9 5 (3 .7 9 8 )
Y O U N G * B a n g la d e s h 0 .2 8 9 (0 .6 8 0 ) 0 .1 6 5 (0 .4 4 6 )
Y O U N G * P a k is ta n 0 .8 5 2 * (0 .4 8 3 ) 0 .4 8 2 (0 .3 8 0 )
Y O U N G  ^ G e rm a n y -0 .5 7 3 (0 .6 6 2 ) -1 .0 3 8 * (0 .5 8 1 )
S O N S * O L D -0 .4 1 1 * * * (0 .1 1 0 ) -0 .3 6 8 * * * (0 .1 1 5 )
S O N S * O L D *  K e n y a -0 .1 2 0 (0 .2 4 8 ) -0 .2 6 3 (0 .2 9 5 )
S O  N S * O L D *  N ig e r ia 0 .1 9 4 (0 .2 0 0 ) 0 .1 4 0 (0 .2 0 3 )
S O N S * O L D * B a n g la d e s h 0 .2 4 3 * (0 .1 3 2 ) 0 .2 0 7 (0 .1 3 9 )
S O N S *  O L D *  P a k i s ta n 0 .2 6 7 * * (0 .1 2 5 ) 0 .2 1 8 * (0 .1 3 1 )
S O N S *  O L D ‘ G e rm a n y 1 .2 1 9 * * * (0 .4 1 5 ) 1 .0 7 1 * * (0 .4 6 4 )
S O N S * O L D * S o m a lia 0 .3 2 5 * (0 .1 7 5 ) 0 .2 8 3 (0 .1 7 9 )
S O N S * Y O U N G -0 .1 3 0 (0 .2 5 5 ) -0 .3 8 3 * (0 .2 0 9 )
S O N S *  Y O U N G *  K e n y a -0 .1 7 2 (0 .5 0 0 ) 0 .0 7 6 2 (0 .3 5 3 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * N ig e r ia -0 .6 5 6 2 .2 7 7 (1 -8 3 9 )
S O N S * Y O U N G * B a n g la d e s h -0 .0 0 8 8 5 (0 .3 9 5 ) 0 .1 8 9 (0 .2 7 0 )
S O N S ‘ Y O U N G ‘ P a k i s ta n -0 .1 6 9 (0 .2 9 7 ) 0 .1 8 1 (0 .2 4 2 )
S O N S ‘ Y O U N G ‘ G e rm a n y -0 .0 0 8 0 3 (0 .3 8 4 ) 0 .3 5 7 (0 .3 3 7 )
O b s e rv a t io n s  2 3 1 7    2317
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p  <  0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
C .l Robustness of heterogeneity estimates
If parents base their fertility decisions on their current family composition, there 
may be concerns that my estimates of heterogeneity in son-probability are bi­
ased. In particular, the measured heterogeneity might be a result of differences 
in behaviour due to preferences over family composition. Here, I test for the ef­
fect of observed parental behaviour in a simulation. The exercise is very similar 
to that of Section 4.4, however the outcome of interest if not the final sex ratio, 
but the estimates of underlying heterogeneity.
Figure C .l suggests there may be cause for concern when estimating het­
erogeneity. The homogeneous model without son preference performs relatively 
badly, and is rejected at the 10% level using Pearson’s x 2 test. Including son 
preference improves the fit slightly, and the difference from the data becomes 
insignificant. However, once heterogeneity is introduced, the fit improves fur­
ther and the p-value increases to 0.97. This suggests that, although parents’ 
preferences can affect the overall ratios of families with given compositions, 
variation in the probability of having sons is present nonetheless. The remain­
der of this section formally tests the robustness of my heterogeneity estimates 
to the preferences of women in my sample.
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Figure C.l: Family composition, data versus simulations accounting for son 
preferences. Where applied, son preferences are as reported in Table C.l. Het­
erogeneity model uses my benchmark estimates from Section 4.3.3 (/I =  0.303, 
a =  0.145). Homogeneity uses the restricted model, with a fixed probability of 
0.512 of having boys (equivalent to jj, = 0.0303).
Boys in family: data versus simulations under homogeneity and heterogeneity
■ D a ta  
I ISim.: SP & heterog.
I ISim.: SP & homog.
H S i m . :  homog.
Boys in family
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Table C.l: Kaplan-Meier birth continuation rates by family composition for 
UK-born women. Sample selection is that in Section 4.3.3. Statistics give the 
proportion of women having a further child given they already have b boys of j  
children.
Children 0  boys 1 boy 2  boys 3 boys 4 boys 5 boys
1 0.70 0.69 - - - -
2 0.40 0.33 0.42 - - -
3 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.34 - -
4 0.38 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.31
5 0.58 0.46 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.34
Following the model of Section 4.2, suppose that the true distribution of the 
underlying factor X  were N(/i, a2). I generate a population of such women and 
also a latent family composition for each woman. Next, I simulate each woman’s 
fertility decisions according to the observed patterns amongst the women in my 
sample. If some woman has two boys and a girl, I set the probability of her 
having a fourth child to be that observed amongst actual women with those 
children, giving simulated birth histories for each of the women. See Section 
4.4.1 for details.
The key step is to compute estimates p  and a based on these simulated birth 
histories by the MLE method of Section 4.3. By comparing p  and a  to p  and 
a, the robustness of the estimator to parental fertility decisions can be assessed. 
In the case where p zz  p  and <r «  <7 for measured values, these estimates can be 
considered robust to son and daughter preferences.
Table C .l records birth progression rates for the UK-born women in my 
sample, grouped by existing family composition. These estimates are computed 
exactly as in Section 4.4.2. This data gives the proportion qbj of women who go 
on to have another child if they already have b boys amongst j  children. 1
Figure C .2  gives estimated p and a based on various values of p  and a  in a 
simulation with one million women. Tested values are encompass the parameter
1 These British-born women appear to have preferences for mixed families: after two or 
three children, progression rates are lowest with children of each sex. Conversely, after four 
and five children some son preference is seen. It is feasible that these women having more 
children are not representative, and both the larger family and son preference is driven by 
some unobserved factor, such as being a second generation migrant.
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Figure C.2: Robustness check on heterogeneity estimates under observed
parental decisions. Estimated /t and a based on different possible ‘true’ val­
ues jl and a. 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  women simulated, following the fertility behaviour given 
in Table C.l.
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confidence intervals derived by the bootstrap procedure of Section 4.3.3. For 
each parameter, estimates are very close to the posited values. Correlation in 
either case is 1 .0 0  (three significant figures), and the slopes are also very close 
to one. I conclude that the preferences held by British-born women are very 
unlikely to bias my estimates of heterogeneity in the probability of having sons.
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